Can voters in multi‐party systems predict which coalition will form the government with any degree of accuracy? To date, studies which explore voter expectations of coalition formation have emphasized individual level attributes, such as education, but the complexity of the environment at the time the coalitions are forming should also be consequential in enabling (or handicapping) voters in forming expectations. We examine the relative effects of individual level attributes (e.g., education, cognitive mobilization) versus contextual factors (e.g., information availability) in 19 German state elections and 3 German general elections between 2009 and 2017. We find that the ease of identifiability of alternative future governments varies significantly across multi‐party systems. We find that respondents are more likely to predict governments that they would like to see in office, that have a higher probability of receiving a majority of seats, and that consist of ideologically proximate parties. Combining survey data with a novel indicator of coalition signals, measured through a quantitative text analysis of newspaper coverage, we also find that voters consider positive pre‐election coalition signals when predicting the government. Finally, we find that the information environment is much more relevant for correct coalition predictions than individual‐level characteristics of respondents. Although individual attributes do influence predictive ability, these factors are strongly dominated by the context in which the prediction is taking place. The information environment has by far the largest effect on predicting coalition outcomes. Our results have implications for the literature on strategic voting in multi‐party settings, as well as the literature on accountability.

Polls and coalition signals can help strategic voters in multiparty systems with proportional representation and coalition governments to optimise their vote decision. Using a laboratory experiment embedded in two real election campaigns, this study focuses on voters' attention to and perception of polls and coalition signals. The manipulation of polls and coalition signals allows a causal test of their influence on strategic voting in a realistic environment. The findings suggest that active information acquisition to form fairly accurate perceptions of election outcomes can compensate for the advantage of high political sophistication. The theory of strategic voting is supported by the evidence, but only for a small number of voters. Most insincere vote decisions are explained by other factors. Thus, the common practice to consider all insincere voters as strategic is misleading.

How quickly, to what extent and under what conditions do voters and elites adapt to new electoral institutions in order to not waste their votes and effort on hopeless competitors? A latent‐curve model of strategic adaptation is developed and fitted to district‐level election data from Spain. The extent of strategic adaptation is generally found to vary with the strength of the electoral system. However, grave ethnic tensions are demonstrated to seriously retard adaptation even under favourable institutional conditions.

The extent of strategic voting in the Spanish general elections of 2000, 2004 and 2008 is estimated using a new measure of strategic incentives suitable for proportional representation systems that avoids some of the problems associated with lagged variables. Strategic behaviour increased from 12 to 33 per cent of the electoral base of the United Left Party, the major victim of strategic defection. This estimate is a conservative one as elite mobilisation is controlled for in the constituencies, which is unusual in the literature on strategic voting that uses regression‐based methods.

Expectations about election outcomes shape voter behavior, yet little research has examined how expectations regarding the post-election formateur influence voting decisions. This study examines the conditions under which voters engage in formateur optimization – strategically supporting parties with a realistic chance of forming the government rather than their most preferred party. We argue that while formateur uncertainty plays a key role, its effect depends on voters’ preferences regarding their most preferred party and their preferred formateur. Using modules 1–5 of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) and German pre-election surveys (1998–2021), we find that formateur optimization is more likely in tightly contested elections. However, our results also show that voters’ preferences moderate the effect of formateur uncertainty: formateur optimization remains low even under high uncertainty when voters strongly favor a non-formateur party over the formateur’s party. Furthermore, we find that voters who expect their preferred formateur candidate to lose behave similarly to those uncertain about the outcome – and still engage in formateur optimization. These findings highlight the interplay between expectations and preferences in shaping voting decisions in coalition systems, offering new insights into voter calculations in multiparty democracies.

If instant runoff voting (IRV) mitigates strategic voting, is that because the rules of the system mechanically reduce strategic opportunities, or because of other more indirect effects? In single-vote plurality elections, a voter can be pivotal if adding one vote to a candidate would cause that candidate to win. In IRV, it is more complicated to identify when one voter can be pivotal. This letter derives all the ways that a single ballot can change the result of an IRV election, for any number of candidates and voters. I obtain an expression for the probability of casting a pivotal vote in IRV by phrasing the probability that any pivotal event occurs as a function of all the rankings cast by other voters. This expression facilitates modeling vote choice in IRV, and enables the estimation of voters’ strategic opportunities in IRV contests between any number of candidates. I present some illustrative simulations estimating pivotal probabilities in both IRV and Single-Member District Plurality for stylized electorates with identical preference structures. These simulations produce similar estimated pivotal probabilities in the two systems, suggesting that these systems may provide similar opportunities to strategically cast a decisive vote.

We use a revealed preference approach to disentangle conformity, an intrinsic taste to follow others, from information-driven herding. We provide observations from a series of sequential decision-making experiments in which subjects choose the type of information they observe before making their decision. Namely, subjects choose between observing a private (statistically informative) signal or the history of play of predecessors who have not chosen a private signal (i.e., a statistically uninformative word-of-mouth signal). In our setup, subjects choose the statistically uninformative social signal $34\%$ of the time and, of those, $88\%$ follow their observed predecessors’ actions. When allowing for payoff externalities by paying subjects according to the collective action chosen by majority rule, the results are amplifed and the social signal is chosen in $51\%$ of all cases, and $59\%$ of those who pick the social signal follow the majority choice. The results from the majority treatment demonstrate that conformist behavior is not driven by inequality aversion, nor by strategic voting behavior in which voters balance others who are uninformed. Raising the stakes five-fold does not eliminate conformist behavior; in both treatments, the social signal is chosen nearly $50\%$ of the time. Individual level analysis yields the identification of rules of thumb subjects use in making their decisions.

The existing literature on vote switching – a major cause of electoral change – rarely discusses strategic incentives as motivating voters to switch parties between elections. We study how coalition-directed voting, a common type of strategic voting in parliamentary democracies, affects vote switching. Utilizing an original three-wave online panel survey conducted in Israel in 2019–2020, we show that voters engage in formateur optimization and policy balancing: they switch their vote in order to affect the identity of the next formateur and desert a party they previously voted for if they believe it will not enter the next coalition. We also show that the perceived level of competition between potential formateurs moderates the effect of coalition expectations on vote switching. The paper highlights the importance of coalition and formateur considerations in electoral change and contributes to a better understanding of both coalition-directed voting and individual-level vote switching.

Do voters use information about and preferences over who will form government in their vote choices? Voters might have preferences over both which party wins the most seats and what type of government that party can form, which they can use to inform their vote choice. To answer this question, we examine the influence of preferences over government types and compare them to trends in party support in the 2019 Canadian federal election. Using rolling, daily cross-sectional survey evidence from the Canadian Election Study, we find that preferences over government type are strongly related to vote choice and that this relationship depends on the perceived viability of the preferred party. We also find that this relationship differs outside and within Quebec: outside Quebec, only the Liberal Party suffers among voters preferring minority governments, while within Quebec, the Liberal Party, New Democratic Party and Conservative Party all struggle to hold on to voters who prefer minority governments.

Although the existence of strategic voting in the United Kingdom and Canada has been well documented, quantifying when a voter will cast a strategic ballot has yet to be done. This article draws on electoral data from five UK and Canadian elections in order to address this gap by identifying a precise “tipping point” for when a non-viable party supporter's probability of voting strategically crosses a 50 per cent threshold. I find the best tipping point measure occurs when a voter rates their favourite viable party greater than 59 out of 100 in the UK and greater than 73 out of 100 in Canada. Both countries also have clear tipping points for the likeability of an individual's highest preferred party and perceptions of that party's distance from contention. Overall, by calculating these tipping points, researchers can better gauge voter behaviour and how, or when, certain factors contribute to strategic voting.

Aggregating individuals’ consistent attitudes might produce inconsistent collective attitudes. Some groups therefore need the capacity to form attitudes that are irreducible to those of their members. Such groups, group-agent realists argue, are agents in control of their own attitude formation. In this paper, however, I show how group-agent realism overlooks the important fact that groups consist of strategically interacting agents. Only by eliminating group agency from our social explanations can we see how individuals vote strategically to gain control of their groups and produce collective attitudes we cannot make sense of if we treat groups as agents.

Access to information about candidates' performance has long stood as a key factor shaping voter behaviour, but establishing how it impacts behaviour in real-world settings has remained challenging. In the 2018 Brazilian presidential elections, unpredictable technical glitches caused by the implementation of biometrics as a form of identification led some voters to cast ballots after official tallies started being announced. In addition to providing a source of exogenous variation of information exposure, run-off elections also enable us to distinguish between different mechanisms underlying the impact of information exposure. We find strong support for a vote-switching bandwagon effect: information exposure motivates voters to abandon losing candidates and switch support for the frontrunner – a finding that stands in the second round, when only two candidates compete against each other. These findings provide theoretical nuance and stronger empirical support for the mechanisms underpinning the impact of information exposure on voter behaviour.

In this study, we examine whether strategic voting – in which a voter seeks to maximize the expected payoff from casting a ballot – occurred among late voters in the 2018 Taipei City mayoral election. This multi-candidate mayoral contest was noteworthy because ballot-counting started before all the votes had been cast, with preliminary results being leaked to the media. Theoretically, having access to real-time updates of voting figures could have influenced the decision of voters who were still in line waiting to cast their ballots. Analysis and reconstruction of aggregate polling data, however, demonstrate that there was very little (if any) strategic voting among these late voters on election day, even if they had information that might have induced them to vote strategically.

This article investigates how Canadian voters react to a perceived lack of quality provided by their most preferred parties and how the anticipated election outcome conditions the reactions. The central argument is that a lack of quality motivates voters to signal their discontent by voting insincerely—that is, they cast a protest vote. The effect is expected to be moderated by the anticipated constituency result. The arguments are tested with two-wave panel survey data from the 2015 Canadian federal election, collected by the Making Electoral Democracy Work (MEDW) project. The results support the central argument but remain inconclusive about the expected moderating effects.

In this article, we study how polarization affects the propensity of supporters of non-viable parties to cast a strategic vote. To do so, we rely on Canadian election panel surveys from the Making Electoral Democracy Work project that were specifically designed to identify strategic voting. We find that the polarization between viable parties increases the probability of a supporter of a non-viable party casting a strategic vote, because it increases how much she likes her favourite viable party, and decreases how much she dislikes her least favourite viable party. Polarization thus increases strategic voting because it alters partisan preferences.

Since the Civil War, the president's party has lost seats in the U.S. House of Representatives in all but three midterm election cycles. Many attribute this pattern to “balancing” by moderate voters who prefer a Democratic Congress when Republicans control the White House, and vice versa. Although a number of scholars have tested the balancing hypothesis, the debate remains unsettled. We argue that the U.S. states provide an excellent way to analyze the issue further. Similar to the national government, states feature an executive and (in most cases) a bicameral legislature whose members come up for election in both gubernatorial and state midterm years. If voters balance, one should observe such behavior in state elections when an executive's partisanship is known and a legislative choice is necessary. We examine state legislative elections from 1978 to 2009 and find evidence consistent with the balancing hypothesis.