Anti-extremist legislation in Russia has been designed to prosecute both common security threats, such as incitement to hatred, and the promotion of views deemed unacceptable by the authorities. The dual nature of this legislation is clearly evident in the religious sphere. In this sphere, we are also observing how legislation and law enforcement mix common security threats with imaginary threats based on anti-cultist prejudices. Consequently, what is emerging is the binary opposition extremism/traditionalism instead of extremism/social order. The author analyzes the anti-extremist legislation, its development in the last ten years, and its application in relation to the religious sphere. As applied the protection of public safety is increasingly taking a back seat to the suppression of non-mainstream beliefs or actions. At the same time, the repressive policy cannot be said to develop in a linear manner: the flywheel of repression in the religious sphere may speed up or slow down unexpectedly, as happened, for example, in connection with the beginning of the large-scale war against Ukraine in 2022. What can be said definitively is that repressive policy covers an increasingly wide range of targets understood as hostile to traditionalism.