8 - The Private Language Arguments

Summary

We have surveyed Wittgenstein's reflections on the nature of language and linguistic representation, and we have looked at the destructive consequences of his conception for metaphysics. Now it is time to move on to what has rightly been said to be the most important philosophical argument of the twentieth century. It is known as ‘the private language argument’, and it occurs in Investigations §§243–315. It might better have been dubbed ‘the private language arguments’ – in the plural – since there is not one argument but a whole battery of bewilderingly interwoven ones. It links Wittgenstein's philosophy of language with his philosophy of psychology.

Wittgenstein had an uncanny ability to dig down deeper into the presuppositions of our thought than any other philosopher. It is a common philosophical failing, he said, not to put the question marks deep enough down. In the case of the Private Language Arguments, Wittgenstein himself put the question mark so deep down that at first glance it is exceedingly difficult to see why the question he raises matters in the slightest. Here is how he begins:

A human being can encourage himself, give himself orders, obey, blame and punish himself; he can ask himself a question and answer it. So one could imagine human beings who spoke only in monologue; who accompanied their activities by talking to themselves. – An explorer who watched them and listened to their talk might succeed in translating their language into ours. (This would enable him to predict these people's actions correctly, for he also hears them making resolutions and decisions.)

But is it also conceivable that there be a language in which a person could write down or give voice to his inner experiences – his feelings, moods, and so on – for his own use? — Well, can't we do so in our ordinary language? – But that is not what I mean. The words of this language are to refer to what only the speaker can know – to his immediate private sensations. So another person cannot understand the language. (PI §243)

So, the question Wittgenstein addresses is whether there could be a radically private language. A private language, as he uses the phrase, is not a language which, as it happens, others cannot understand (such as Esperanto, before its inventor Zamenhof, went public).