7 - The arms race

Summary

Analyses of the arms race that preceded World War I typically focus on quantity, and with good reason. The numbers of weapons and personnel which each alliance could mobilize were enormous indeed, and numbers always matter. As Clausewitz noted, numerical superiority is the “most common element” in tactical and strategic victory, while pointing out it is not always decisive. Although it is common practice to represent the arms race in terms of quantitative comparisons, doing so overshadows the race’s qualitative dimensions, which are just as important to an accurate understanding of the nature of military competition during this period. The quarter-century before the war saw more qualitative advances, defined as technological innovations, than any previous era. The industrial revolution, for all its emphasis on mass production and efficient distribution, also created numerous opportunities for innovation, many of which were actively sought by military establishments. In fact, the pursuit of technological and tactical innovations had become integral to the dynamics of military competition by the turn of the century. Qualitative advances are, in other words, as much hallmarks of the prewar arms race as are its unprecedented numbers of weapons and personnel. As a result, this chapter gives equal attention to the quantitative and qualitative aspects of the prewar arms race.

An arms race is defined here as a competition between two or more parties for military supremacy, which is sought by amassing a greater quantity or quality of weapons, or both. There is an ongoing debate as to whether such competitions tend to become ends in themselves, and the extent to which they then lead to war. An examination of the events of the arms race that preceded World War I suggests the race neither became an end in itself, nor led directly to war. Admittedly, the major competitors at times seemed to embrace the basic impulse to outpace their rivals militarily, thereby giving apparent credence to the idea that arms races tend to become ends in themselves. However, this basic impulse still generally served each of the major powers’ larger political goals, which were as vague as they were inherently competitive.