Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Background
- 3 Lee Teng-hui and the “Two-States” Theory
- 4 Taiwan Under President Chen Shui-bian
- 7 China Responds
- 6 Conclusion
- 7 Postscript
- Appendix 1 The April 2001 U.S. Arms Sales to Taiwan
- Appendix 2 The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue
- Appendix 3 Chen Shui-bian's Victory Speech after the 10th Republic of China Presidential and Vice-Presidential Election
- Appendix 4 Taiwan Stands Up: Advancing to an Uplifting Era
- Glossary
- Index
- About the Author
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Background
- 3 Lee Teng-hui and the “Two-States” Theory
- 4 Taiwan Under President Chen Shui-bian
- 7 China Responds
- 6 Conclusion
- 7 Postscript
- Appendix 1 The April 2001 U.S. Arms Sales to Taiwan
- Appendix 2 The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue
- Appendix 3 Chen Shui-bian's Victory Speech after the 10th Republic of China Presidential and Vice-Presidential Election
- Appendix 4 Taiwan Stands Up: Advancing to an Uplifting Era
- Glossary
- Index
- About the Author
Summary
As a long-term strategy, Beijing will continue to insist on the “one China” principle, and push for political negotiation on reunification, earlier “three links”, as well as cross-strait cultural and educational exchanges. It will continue to encourage Taiwanese business people to invest in the mainland. Internationally, China will continue to improve its relations with its Asian neighbours and avoid a head-on collision with the United States so that any radical push by the DPP towards independence could only have very limited impact. So long as it can maintain internal stability and sustain its economic growth and military modernization, China believes that time is on its side. Before the time comes, Beijing will try hard to keep its head cool against any impetuous and premature actions.
Political Pressure
Chen's surprising election did not shock Beijing into taking military actions. Even before the election, it had already made the assessment that Chen, if elected, would avoid an immediate showdown on the issue of independence. As early as the National Conference on the Taiwan issue in late March 2000, Beijing had already told the participants (directors of the Taiwan Affairs Offices in various provinces of China) of its assessment that Chen would continue Lee's separatist policy and foster the growth of indigenous Taiwanese nationalism. He would try to perpetuate the current state in which there was neither reunification nor declared independence. This would allow time for the independence movement to gradually erase the cultural and sentimental ties between mainland China and Taiwan, and to reduce resistance against separatism at home. Beijing was prepared for a “long-term struggle with Taiwan's independence forces”.
At the Beidaihe meetings of the Central Committee of the CCP in July–August, a consensus was reached that as long as Chen did not declare independence, and it was unlikely in the near future, there would be no need to take military action on Taiwan. The meetings set the general guidelines of China's Taiwan policy. Though the details still remain unknown, it is clear that there is no dramatic change in its Taiwan policy.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- China and TaiwanCross-Strait Relations Under Chen Shui-bian, pp. 70 - 116Publisher: ISEAS–Yusof Ishak InstitutePrint publication year: 2002