Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Background
- 3 Lee Teng-hui and the “Two-States” Theory
- 4 Taiwan Under President Chen Shui-bian
- 7 China Responds
- 6 Conclusion
- 7 Postscript
- Appendix 1 The April 2001 U.S. Arms Sales to Taiwan
- Appendix 2 The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue
- Appendix 3 Chen Shui-bian's Victory Speech after the 10th Republic of China Presidential and Vice-Presidential Election
- Appendix 4 Taiwan Stands Up: Advancing to an Uplifting Era
- Glossary
- Index
- About the Author
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Background
- 3 Lee Teng-hui and the “Two-States” Theory
- 4 Taiwan Under President Chen Shui-bian
- 7 China Responds
- 6 Conclusion
- 7 Postscript
- Appendix 1 The April 2001 U.S. Arms Sales to Taiwan
- Appendix 2 The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue
- Appendix 3 Chen Shui-bian's Victory Speech after the 10th Republic of China Presidential and Vice-Presidential Election
- Appendix 4 Taiwan Stands Up: Advancing to an Uplifting Era
- Glossary
- Index
- About the Author
Summary
Taiwan missed the best opportunity to cement a favourable and peaceful cross- strait arrangement in the late 1980s and the early 1990s when Beijing was most eager to make huge concessions. As discussed earlier, Lee Teng-hui misperceived and mismanaged this opportunity. Most likely, he never had the intention to negotiate for anything that would lead to reunification.
Now, Beijing is no longer in a hurry to make concessions. One reason is that their bitter experience with Lee Teng-hui tells loudly that “sweeteners” at this moment will not work out with Taipei. As Chinese President Jiang Zemin summed up in August 2000, “an important lesson to be learnt from the failure in our work towards Taiwan, which saw a deterioration from one China to two Chinas, is that only until we are fully prepared to reclaim it by force would there be a chance for peaceful reunification”.
Chen Shui-bian's election as President on 18 March 2000 has brought about severe political, economic and social dislocations in Taiwan. Beijing has adjusted its Taiwan policy accordingly. It resorts to both well-calculated pressure (on the DPP) and concessions (to the opposition), in the hope that the current political, economic and social disruptions in Taiwan would emasculate the DPP's will and capability for independence. By using political and economic “pincers”, as discussed above, China has the confidence to solve the Taiwan problem gradually but eventually. Force mainly serves as a deterrence against potential radical moves towards Taiwan independence. The earlier discussion on the PLA's modernization demonstrates that it is now emphasizing on its strike capability rather than on its power projection capability. For example, it stresses the development of missiles rather than air and sea lift capability that is essential for a full invasion of Taiwan. This tells that China wants to deter Taiwan from any radical push for independence, but is not planning a full invasion. Such a full invasion would be China's “Vietnam”. To Beijing, reunification is a means to make China stronger, but not to exhaust itself through a war.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- China and TaiwanCross-Strait Relations Under Chen Shui-bian, pp. 117 - 119Publisher: ISEAS–Yusof Ishak InstitutePrint publication year: 2002