Book contents
- The Cognitive Science of Belief
- The Cognitive Science of Belief
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures and Tables
- Contributors
- Chapter 1 Introduction
- Part I Understanding Belief
- Part II Domains of Beliefs
- Part III Variation in Beliefs
- Pathological Beliefs
- Individual Differences in Beliefs
- Environmental Effects on Beliefs
- Toward Better Beliefs
- Index
- References
Toward Better Beliefs
from Part III - Variation in Beliefs
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 03 November 2022
Book contents
- The Cognitive Science of Belief
- The Cognitive Science of Belief
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures and Tables
- Contributors
- Chapter 1 Introduction
- Part I Understanding Belief
- Part II Domains of Beliefs
- Part III Variation in Beliefs
- Pathological Beliefs
- Individual Differences in Beliefs
- Environmental Effects on Beliefs
- Toward Better Beliefs
- Index
- References
Summary
A summary is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- The Cognitive Science of BeliefA Multidisciplinary Approach, pp. 555 - 556Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2022
References
References
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