Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgments
- Acronyms and Abbreviations
- Part I Introduction and Theory
- Part II High Linkage and Democratization: Eastern Europe and the Americas
- Part III The Dynamics of Competitive Authoritarianism in Low-Linkage Regions: The Former Soviet Union, Africa, and Asia
- 8 Conclusion
- Appendix I Measuring Competitive Authoritarianism and Authoritarian Stability
- Appendix II Measuring Leverage
- Appendix III Measuring Linkage
- Appendix IV Measuring Organizational Power
- References
- Index
Appendix IV - Measuring Organizational Power
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 June 2012
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgments
- Acronyms and Abbreviations
- Part I Introduction and Theory
- Part II High Linkage and Democratization: Eastern Europe and the Americas
- Part III The Dynamics of Competitive Authoritarianism in Low-Linkage Regions: The Former Soviet Union, Africa, and Asia
- 8 Conclusion
- Appendix I Measuring Competitive Authoritarianism and Authoritarian Stability
- Appendix II Measuring Leverage
- Appendix III Measuring Linkage
- Appendix IV Measuring Organizational Power
- References
- Index
Summary
STATE COERCIVE CAPACITY
Scope
High: Large, well-trained, and well-equipped internal security apparatus with an effective presence across the national territory. Existence of specialized intelligence or internal security agencies with demonstrated capacity to penetrate civil society and monitor and repress opposition activities at the village and/or neighborhood level across the country.
Medium: Criteria for high scope are not met, but security forces maintain a minimally effective presence across virtually the entire national territory. No evidence of severe deficits of funding, equipment, and training.
Low: Unusually small/underdeveloped security apparatus. Evidence of a lack of minimally effective state presence in significant parts of the national territory or severe deficits of funding, equipment, and training.
Cohesion
High: Evidence of non-material sources of cohesion. This may include:
Recent history of military conflict (leading security officials must be drawn from the generation that participated in the conflict), including:
Large-scale external war (without defeat); or
Intense and enduring military competition or threat; or
Successful revolutionary or anticolonial struggle
or
Pervasive ethnic ties between incumbent party and security forces, in a society that is deeply divided along those ethnic lines
or
Shared ideology in a context in which this ideological cleavage is dominant
or
Evidence of consistent ability to use high-intensity coercion in recent past (pre-1990).
Medium: No evidence of non-material sources of cohesion
and
No evidence of previous insubordination (pre-1990), recent defeat in military conflict, or significant wage arrears to security officials
Low: No evidence of non-material sources of cohesion
and
Evidence from the decade prior to the period under analysis of significant insubordination by state security officials, including attempted coups, open rebellion, large-scale desertion, and refusal to carry out major executive orders
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Competitive AuthoritarianismHybrid Regimes after the Cold War, pp. 376 - 380Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2010