Book contents
- Constraining Dictatorship
- Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions
- Constraining Dictatorship
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Acknowledgments
- Abbreviations
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Why Do Leaders Institutionalize?
- 3 Two Illustrative Cases
- 4 How Should Institutionalization Be Measured?
- 5 What Are the Causes of Regime Institutionalization?
- 6 What Are the Consequences of Institutionalization on Autocratic Stability?
- 7 What Are the Consequences of Institutionalization on Leadership Succession?
- 8 Conclusion
- References
- Index
2 - Why Do Leaders Institutionalize?
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 18 September 2020
- Constraining Dictatorship
- Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions
- Constraining Dictatorship
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Acknowledgments
- Abbreviations
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Why Do Leaders Institutionalize?
- 3 Two Illustrative Cases
- 4 How Should Institutionalization Be Measured?
- 5 What Are the Causes of Regime Institutionalization?
- 6 What Are the Consequences of Institutionalization on Autocratic Stability?
- 7 What Are the Consequences of Institutionalization on Leadership Succession?
- 8 Conclusion
- References
- Index
Summary
This chapter provides my main theoretical argument. I argue that leaders institutionalize their regimes when they enter power weak. Initially weak leaders institutionalize in order to credibly commit to sharing future benefits with other regime elites. This promise is made credible by giving elites access to the state via cabinet appointments and constitutional rules. I demonstrate the logic of this argument through a formal model.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Constraining DictatorshipFrom Personalized Rule to Institutionalized Regimes, pp. 34 - 63Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2020