Book contents
- Contemporary State Building
- Contemporary State Building
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Latin America’s Elite Security Taxes
- 3 A Theory of Elite Taxation and the Determinants of Security Taxes
- 4 Colombia’s Targeted Security Taxes
- 5 Costa Rica’s “Soft” Security Taxes
- 6 El Salvador’s Failed and Diffuse Security Taxes
- 7 Mexico’s Uneven Taxation
- 8 Conclusion
- References
- Index
4 - Colombia’s Targeted Security Taxes
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 02 June 2022
- Contemporary State Building
- Contemporary State Building
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Latin America’s Elite Security Taxes
- 3 A Theory of Elite Taxation and the Determinants of Security Taxes
- 4 Colombia’s Targeted Security Taxes
- 5 Costa Rica’s “Soft” Security Taxes
- 6 El Salvador’s Failed and Diffuse Security Taxes
- 7 Mexico’s Uneven Taxation
- 8 Conclusion
- References
- Index
Summary
Focusing on Colombia’s “Democratic Security Taxes,” Chapter 4 is the first of four case studies illustrating causal logic of elite taxation in the adoption of security taxes. Since 2002, the government in that country has adopted a series of taxes on the wealthy to address a deplorable public-safety situation. The revenue from the taxes has played a central role in funding efforts considered successful in reducing violent crime. With a historically difficult conflict and traditional set of elites, Colombia is a least likely case in which elites would have become invested in financing the strengthening of the state. Moreover, with the approval of elite-funded security taxes on multiple occasions across administrations, the Colombian case allows us to study the conditions under which this investment in state building becomes sustained over time.
- Type
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- Information
- Contemporary State Building , pp. 70 - 86Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2022