Book contents
- Demystifying Treaty Interpretation
- Cambridge Studies in International and Comparative Law: 188
- Demystifying Treaty Interpretation
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Preface
- Abbreviations
- 1 The Province of the Rules of Treaty Interpretation
- 2 The Interpreter’s Self
- 3 The Genealogy of the Contemporary Regime of Treaty Interpretation
- 4 Textualism
- 5 Intentionalism
- 6 What’s the Purpose of ‘Object and Purpose’?
- 7 Supplementary Means
- 8 The Magic of Systemic Integration
- 9 Inferential Reasoning and Its Consequences
- 10 Time and Treaty Interpretation
- 11 Text, Author, and Interpretive Control
- 12 Power, Persuasion, and Authority
- Annex Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969
- Index
- Cambridge Studies in International and Comparative Law
5 - Intentionalism
A Lost Cause?
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 07 March 2024
- Demystifying Treaty Interpretation
- Cambridge Studies in International and Comparative Law: 188
- Demystifying Treaty Interpretation
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Preface
- Abbreviations
- 1 The Province of the Rules of Treaty Interpretation
- 2 The Interpreter’s Self
- 3 The Genealogy of the Contemporary Regime of Treaty Interpretation
- 4 Textualism
- 5 Intentionalism
- 6 What’s the Purpose of ‘Object and Purpose’?
- 7 Supplementary Means
- 8 The Magic of Systemic Integration
- 9 Inferential Reasoning and Its Consequences
- 10 Time and Treaty Interpretation
- 11 Text, Author, and Interpretive Control
- 12 Power, Persuasion, and Authority
- Annex Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969
- Index
- Cambridge Studies in International and Comparative Law
Summary
Intentionalism is the least investigated approach to treaty interpretation. It is often discredited by international legal scholars on the basis of various pragmatic arguments. It is also normatively discouraged as a threat to the stability and predictability of treaty rules. At the same time, even a cursory glance at the case law of international courts and tribunals would be sufficient to realize that treaty interpretation discourse in practice is replete with references to the parties’ intention. This chapter situates the reluctance of international legal scholars about intentionalism in the broader intellectual history of international law and shows that most objections to intentionalism rest on a mentalist understanding of intention that has been severely criticized in philosophy. It also argues that given intentionalism’s close connection with consensualism, it is unrealistic to believe that it can be dismissed in practice.
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- Information
- Demystifying Treaty Interpretation , pp. 101 - 117Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2024