8 - Robust Modest R-Libertarianism and Deontic Anchors

Summary

THE PROBLEM AND THE OUTLINES OF A SOLUTION

Just as one might reasonably deny that an agent can be responsible for performing an action if its occurrence is a matter of luck, so one might reasonably deny that an agent can perform an action that is morally right, or wrong, or obligatory if its occurrence is a matter of luck. How, for example, can one be under an obligation to open the magical safe if there is an equal probability of its opening or not opening even upon dialing the right combination? It might be replied that, assuming the person can (physically) dial any combination, is relevantly situated, has the cooperation of nature, and is lucky, the person can open the safe. After all, there is a world accessible to the person in which she succeeds in opening the safe even on the first try. Perhaps, it might be added, it would frequently be difficult to discharge our moral obligations if the accomplishment of our actions were luck infused, but that is a different concern than the one of whether there could be moral obligations in the first place.

However, this sort of response is dubious. If moral rightness, wrongness, and obligatoriness require control, and if the safe's opening is not even under one's proximal control, then it is really not “up to” one at all whether the safe opens.