Book contents
- The Duty to Secure
- The Duty to Secure
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Acknowledgements
- Glossary
- Abbreviations
- Introduction
- 1 When Is Securitization Morally Required?
- 2 States and the Obligation to Securitize
- 3 Non-state Actors and the Obligation to Securitize
- 4 Sub-systemic Collective State Actors and the Obligation to Securitize
- 5 Systemic Actors and the Obligation to Securitize
- Conclusion
- References
- Index
3 - Non-state Actors and the Obligation to Securitize
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 15 February 2024
- The Duty to Secure
- The Duty to Secure
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Acknowledgements
- Glossary
- Abbreviations
- Introduction
- 1 When Is Securitization Morally Required?
- 2 States and the Obligation to Securitize
- 3 Non-state Actors and the Obligation to Securitize
- 4 Sub-systemic Collective State Actors and the Obligation to Securitize
- 5 Systemic Actors and the Obligation to Securitize
- Conclusion
- References
- Index
Summary
This chapter considers non-state actors. It argues that only organized, not simply aggregate, groups can have a moral duty to securitize. This chapter goes on to examine relevant sub-state actors’ duties to securitize insiders and outsiders. Sub-state actors are permitted to securitize only when the state they reside in fails in its duty to deliver security. In such cases, relevant actors have a pro tanto obligation to securitize insiders; however, in situations where a quasi-social contract is established this duty evolves into an overriding duty. Outsiders are not – unlike in all the other chapters of this book – people in other states, but rather people not represented by the sub-state actor. Here, a pro tanto obligation to securitize outsiders is largely based on capacity.
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- Information
- The Duty to SecureFrom Just to Mandatory Securitization, pp. 124 - 147Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2024