Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Illustrations
- Dedication
- Preface
- Abbreviations
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Edward II and Mortimer’s Invasion (1307–1327)
- 3 The King’s Navy
- 4 Mortimer, the Admirals and Scotland (1327–1331)
- 5 Edward III, the Navy and the Disinherited (1331–1335)
- 6 The King’s Ships: Logistics and Structure
- 7 England, France, Scotland and the War at Sea (1336)
- 8 Walter Manny, Cadzand and Antwerp (1337–1339)
- 9 Merchant Shipping in English Fleets
- 10 Tactics, Strategy and the Battle of Sluys (1340)
- 11 The Organisation of Impressed Fleets
- 12 Brittany and the War at Sea (1340–1342)
- 13 The Crecy Campaign and Calais (1342–1347)
- 14 Mastery of the Channel (1347–1350)
- 15 The Battle of Winchelsea (1350)
- 16 Barges and Truces (1353–1357)
- 17 Edward III and Resistance to the Navy
- 18 The Fleet of 1359 and the Winchelsea Raid (1357–1360)
- 19 Years of Peace, Years of Decay (1360–1369)
- 20 The Decline of the Fleet in the Final Years of Edward III
- 21 Failure and Fiasco: Knolles and La Rochelle (1369–1373)
- 22 Edward III’s Final Years (1373–1377)
- Appendix I English Admirals in the Reign of Edward III
- Appendix II Royal Ships Used by Edward III
- Bibliography
- Index
- Warfare in History
8 - Walter Manny, Cadzand and Antwerp (1337–1339)
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 14 March 2023
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Illustrations
- Dedication
- Preface
- Abbreviations
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Edward II and Mortimer’s Invasion (1307–1327)
- 3 The King’s Navy
- 4 Mortimer, the Admirals and Scotland (1327–1331)
- 5 Edward III, the Navy and the Disinherited (1331–1335)
- 6 The King’s Ships: Logistics and Structure
- 7 England, France, Scotland and the War at Sea (1336)
- 8 Walter Manny, Cadzand and Antwerp (1337–1339)
- 9 Merchant Shipping in English Fleets
- 10 Tactics, Strategy and the Battle of Sluys (1340)
- 11 The Organisation of Impressed Fleets
- 12 Brittany and the War at Sea (1340–1342)
- 13 The Crecy Campaign and Calais (1342–1347)
- 14 Mastery of the Channel (1347–1350)
- 15 The Battle of Winchelsea (1350)
- 16 Barges and Truces (1353–1357)
- 17 Edward III and Resistance to the Navy
- 18 The Fleet of 1359 and the Winchelsea Raid (1357–1360)
- 19 Years of Peace, Years of Decay (1360–1369)
- 20 The Decline of the Fleet in the Final Years of Edward III
- 21 Failure and Fiasco: Knolles and La Rochelle (1369–1373)
- 22 Edward III’s Final Years (1373–1377)
- Appendix I English Admirals in the Reign of Edward III
- Appendix II Royal Ships Used by Edward III
- Bibliography
- Index
- Warfare in History
Summary
The king returned to Scotland in late 1336, spending early December fortifying Bothwell Castle. This policy of building fortifications would soon prove futile, as he lacked the funds to pay extensive garrisons and they were overrun whenever he left Scotland. On his return in mid-December he brought home the corpse of John of Eltham who had died in combat (the only thing Sir Thomas Gray would have considered ‘a fine death’) on 16 September. Edward III’s military ethos was characterised by daring and leadership from the front. This was the essential catalyst for many unlikely victories, but the high rate of attrition amongst English captains proved damaging in the long term. By the autumn of 1336 the strategic focus of the war was changing, with French forces attacking Gascon outposts. Philip VI had already antagonised the English over a number of issues. A further dispute arose over Robert of Artois, his 50-year-old brother-in-law, whom he had persecuted relentlessly since Artois’ banishment in 1332. Artois had fled to Edward’s court in 1334, from which he threatened rebellion and sorcery against the French king and became increasingly influential over Edward. Philip eventually demanded Artois’ extradition, but from Edward’s seneschal in Gascony rather than Edward himself. By doing so he portrayed himself as Edward’s liege lord, implying authority over England. He knew this would lead to war.
Edward’s strategy continued to be influenced by Mortimer’s invasion. Artois claimed to have influence in France and thought that his presence in an invasion fleet could provoke a rebellion. Edward had observed the destabilising power of internal rebellion at first hand and approved Artois’ plan. He wedded this to a plan to wage a land campaign on French territory in an alliance with Low Country and German princes, as his grandfather had done. In December 1336 Edward sent messengers to the potentates of Hainault, Guelders, Juliers and Namur and the Bishop of Liege, to enlist their aid. The attempt to build a coalition was only partly by choice. Edward III was beholden to parliament for funds and had to devise a plan that would meet the members’ approval. The idea of a coalition was comforting in its familiarity. Members would recall granting funds to similar expeditions, making grants more likely.
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- Edward III and the War at SeaThe English Navy, 1327-1377, pp. 66 - 81Publisher: Boydell & BrewerPrint publication year: 2011