Conclusion: the double puzzle of Eastern enlargement

Summary

The preferences of the states involved in Eastern enlargement and the initial EC and NATO decision-making process on enlargement strongly contradict the expectations derived from the sociological-institutionalist process hypotheses of habitual and normative action.

(H1 and N1) In the EC case, the CEECs' immediate and general request for membership corresponds to the hypothesis of habitual action but the membership bids of CEEC governments with authoritarian tendencies are not compatible with the hypothesis of normative action. The failure of the sociological-institutionalist process hypotheses is most obvious in the NATO case: even the most reform-minded CEEC governments did not regard joining NATO as a corollary of their democratic identity, values, and norms or as a taken-for-granted response to the post-Cold War challenges. Rather, initially they preferred neutrality or collective security to alliance membership.

(H2 and N2) The enlargement preferences of EU and NATO member states were not uniform. There was strong and persistent divergence with regard to the desirability of (fast) enlargement and the selection of new members both among and within the member states. Whereas a minority of actors may have been motivated by the community values and norms in their preference for a strong commitment to admitting democratic CEECs, the general distribution of preferences cannot be accounted for by collective rules.

(H3 and N3) In the immediate post-Cold War period, lasting roughly from 1989 to 1993, the Western organizations did not offer membership or commit themselves in principle to the admission of liberal-democratic CEECs.