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References

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 February 2023

Scott de Marchi  and
Michael Laver
Scott de Marchi
Affiliation:
Duke University, North Carolina
Michael Laver
Affiliation:
New York University
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The Governance Cycle in Parliamentary Democracies
A Computational Social Science Approach
 , pp. 198 - 207
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2023

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  • References
  • Scott de Marchi, Duke University, North Carolina, Michael Laver, New York University
  • Book: The Governance Cycle in Parliamentary Democracies
  • Online publication: 02 February 2023
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009315449.014
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  • References
  • Scott de Marchi, Duke University, North Carolina, Michael Laver, New York University
  • Book: The Governance Cycle in Parliamentary Democracies
  • Online publication: 02 February 2023
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009315449.014
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  • References
  • Scott de Marchi, Duke University, North Carolina, Michael Laver, New York University
  • Book: The Governance Cycle in Parliamentary Democracies
  • Online publication: 02 February 2023
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009315449.014
Available formats
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