Book contents
- Guilt by Location
- Guilt by Location
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Epigraph
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Acknowledgments
- Abbreviations
- 1 Weaponizing Displacement in Civil Wars
- 2 Conceptualizing and Describing Strategic Displacement
- 3 A Sorting Theory of Strategic Displacement
- 4 Cross-National Evidence, 1945–2017
- 5 Forced Relocation in Uganda
- 6 Comparative Evidence of the Sorting Logic
- 7 Depopulation in Syria
- 8 The Politics of Wartime Displacement
- Appendix A SDCC Dataset
- Appendix B A Multivariate Analysis of Strategic Displacement
- References
- Index
4 - Cross-National Evidence, 1945–2017
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 12 December 2024
- Guilt by Location
- Guilt by Location
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Epigraph
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Acknowledgments
- Abbreviations
- 1 Weaponizing Displacement in Civil Wars
- 2 Conceptualizing and Describing Strategic Displacement
- 3 A Sorting Theory of Strategic Displacement
- 4 Cross-National Evidence, 1945–2017
- 5 Forced Relocation in Uganda
- 6 Comparative Evidence of the Sorting Logic
- 7 Depopulation in Syria
- 8 The Politics of Wartime Displacement
- Appendix A SDCC Dataset
- Appendix B A Multivariate Analysis of Strategic Displacement
- References
- Index
Summary
This chapter uses the Strategic Displacement in Civil Conflict dataset to conduct a cross-national analysis of displacement by state actors, who it finds are the predominant perpetrators. The statistical tests provide an indirect test of the arguments by revealing where strategic displacement in general, and forced relocation in particular, tends to occur, and by identifying the factors associated with the use of these strategies across conflicts. It also evaluates the observable implications of several alternative explanations for state-induced displacement, including ethnic nationalism, rebel threat/desperation, and collective punishment. The results show that, consistent with the theory, different displacement strategies occur in different contexts and seem to follow different logics. Cleansing is more likely in conventional civil wars, where territorial conquest takes primacy, while forced relocation is more likely in irregular wars, where information and identification problems are most acute. The evidence indicates that cleansing follows a logic of punishment. The results for relocation, however, are consistent with the implications of the assortative theory: It is more likely to be employed by resource-constrained incumbents fighting insurgencies in “illegible” areas – rural, peripheral territories – and when incumbents lack group-level information about wartime loyalties.
Keywords
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Guilt by LocationForced Displacement and Population Sorting in Civil Wars, pp. 88 - 118Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2024