5 - Method
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 23 December 2009
Summary
The central principle of his philosophy, Hegel announces at the start of the Phenomenology, is that of subjectivity. “In my view, which can be justified only by the exposition of the system itself, everything turns on grasping and expressing the True, not only as Substance, but equally as Subject” (17). Notice the double task: to grasp and to express. This means, first, that the goal of philosophical inquiry must be conceived of as an inquiry into the nature of subjectivity. But it also means, second, that philosophical inquiry must simultaneously take the form of subjectivity, exhibiting the nature of subjectivity itself. The object of philosophical inquiry is now the subject, but for this very reason, philosophical inquiry cannot stand about from its object in a traditional contemplative stance. For this would undermine the Hegelian claim that philosophy is concerned with the subject and not with objects external to the subject. Rather, philosophy must be simply the expression of the subject itself. But what kind of expression? What exactly is the subject, and how must its nature be manifested in philosophy itself?
CONTEMPLATIVE AND ACTIVE SUBJECTIVITY
We have already seen that the concern with subjectivity is not new: it is a dominant theme of modern philosophy from Descartes to Kant. But Hegel thinks that only his philosophy can rid this tradition of its incoherencies and misunderstandings.
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- Hegel's 'Phenomenology of Spirit'An Introduction, pp. 62 - 76Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2008