Chapter 2 - Carnap Is Not against Metaphysics

Summary

Carnap is commonly considered a great opponent of metaphysics. For good reason, as he made numerous derogatory remarks about metaphysics and metaphysicians. But what does Carnap reject when he rejects metaphysics? I distinguish between Early Carnap (before 1930) and Late Carnap (after 1930) and argue that Late Carnap does not reject a specific set of questions or views. Rather, he rejects a particular methodology that he regards as conflicting with empiricism. For example, in “Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology,” Carnap does not reject the thesis that numbers exist as meaningless. Instead, he defends the acceptance of numbers against empiricist concerns. But if merely the methodology and not the subject matter is the problem, then metaphysics can perhaps be saved by fixing the methodology. Indeed, I contend, much of contemporary metaphysics is, from Late Carnap’s perspective, in good standing.