Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-gvvz8 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-28T00:29:23.405Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

5 - The Transition from the Logical Maxim to the Supreme Principle of Pure Reason

from Part I - From Reason to Metaphysics

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 November 2018

Marcus Willaschek
Affiliation:
Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität Frankfurt
Get access

Summary

To understand why rational thinkers, according to Kant, are naturally led to accept the Supreme Principle as true, we must answer two questions: why does the Logical Maxim have to become a principle of pure reason – that is, why is it rationally necessary to make regulative use of the Supreme Principle? And why does this lead to the illusion that the Supreme Principle is an objectively valid constitutive principle (i.e., a true descriptive statement about everything there is)? Chapter 5 offers answers to these questions. The latter question in particular requires a discussion of Kant’s account of transcendental illusion and the role of transcendental realism in bringing about this kind of illusion. The central idea is that transcendental realism implies that there is a correspondence between reason and reality; therefore, a tacit commitment to transcendental realism can explain why regulative principles of reason will naturally be taken to be constitutive principles that are true descriptions of reality itself. Even though transcendental realism is a weighty metaphysical claim, it can plausibly be attributed to common sense or ‘universal human reason.’ The chapter closes with a discussion of why, according to Kant, the Supreme Principle is valid for things in themselves.

Type
Chapter
Information
Kant on the Sources of Metaphysics
The Dialectic of Pure Reason
, pp. 127 - 156
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2018

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×