Book contents
- The Knowledge Argument
- Classic Philosophical Arguments
- The Knowledge Argument
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Contributors
- Introduction: The Enduring Significance of Jackson’s Knowledge Argument
- 1 The Knowledge Argument Is an Argument about Knowledge
- 2 There’s Nothing about Mary
- 3 Acquaintance, Parsimony, and Epiphenomenalism
- 4 Acquaintance and Phenomenal Concepts
- 5 The Knowledge Argument Meets Representationalism about Colour Experience
- 6 The Mary-Go-Round
- 7 Concept Mastery, Social Externalism, and Mary’s New Knowledge
- 8 Mary’s Powers of Imagination
- 9 The Knowledge Argument Is Either Indefensible or Redundant
- 10 Grounding, Analysis, and Russellian Monism
- 11 Phenomenal Knowledge Why: The Explanatory Knowledge Argument against Physicalism
- 12 The Knowledge Argument and the Self
- 13 What Uninformed Mary Can Teach Us
- Bibliography
- Index
4 - Acquaintance and Phenomenal Concepts
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 09 September 2019
- The Knowledge Argument
- Classic Philosophical Arguments
- The Knowledge Argument
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Contributors
- Introduction: The Enduring Significance of Jackson’s Knowledge Argument
- 1 The Knowledge Argument Is an Argument about Knowledge
- 2 There’s Nothing about Mary
- 3 Acquaintance, Parsimony, and Epiphenomenalism
- 4 Acquaintance and Phenomenal Concepts
- 5 The Knowledge Argument Meets Representationalism about Colour Experience
- 6 The Mary-Go-Round
- 7 Concept Mastery, Social Externalism, and Mary’s New Knowledge
- 8 Mary’s Powers of Imagination
- 9 The Knowledge Argument Is Either Indefensible or Redundant
- 10 Grounding, Analysis, and Russellian Monism
- 11 Phenomenal Knowledge Why: The Explanatory Knowledge Argument against Physicalism
- 12 The Knowledge Argument and the Self
- 13 What Uninformed Mary Can Teach Us
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
In this chapter I defend the view that to know what it is like to experience a phenomenal property is just to be consciously acquainted with it, to experience it. Knowledge of what it is like is not knowledge that. It is not conceptual/propositional at all. It does not require thought, or the deployment of concepts. Nor is it knowledge what in the sense of, for example, knowing what time it is, or knowing what the positive square root of 169 is, which is also conceptual. And it is not some kind of know-how. It is, I will argue, simple acquaintance with, being familiar with, a phenomenal property. To know what a particular kind of experience is like is to be familiar with the phenomenal property or properties that characterize it; and to be familiar with such properties is just to experience them. Acquaintance is the fundamental mode of knowledge of phenomenal properties instantiated in experience, it is knowing what it is like; and all it requires is the experience itself.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- The Knowledge Argument , pp. 87 - 101Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2019
- 5
- Cited by