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3 - Social and Normative Facts

from I - Metatheory and Methodology

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 April 2021

By
Carsten Heidemann
Edited by
Bartosz Brożek ,
Jaap Hage  and
Nicole Vincent
Bartosz Brożek
Affiliation:
Jagiellonian University, Krakow
Jaap Hage
Affiliation:
Universiteit Maastricht, Netherlands
Nicole Vincent
Affiliation:
Macquarie University, Sydney
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Summary

To talk of ‘ought-facts’ is apt insofar as any manifestation of an Ought seems to be connected with some kind of objectivity. And if facts are simply ‘true thoughts’, there is nothing strange about saying, for example, ‘It is a fact that, under circumstances c, x ought to be the case’. Taking ought-facts to be facts sui generis does not entail, however, that they can be reduced to natural facts, or brute social facts (or some other kind of non-normative facts). On the contrary, the case might be argued that natural facts depend for their objectivity on irreducible normativity, namely, obligations to think in a certain way.

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Chapter
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Law and Mind
A Survey of Law and the Cognitive Sciences
 , pp. 50 - 54
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2021

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References

Kant, I. (1923). Logik. In Kants gesammelte Schriften, ed. Jäsche, B., vol. 9. Berlin: Königlich Preußische Akademie der Wissenschaften.Google Scholar
Kant, I. (1992). The Jäsche Logic. In Lectures on Logic, trans. and ed. J. M. Young. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Moore, G. E. (1903). Principia Ethica. London: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Putnam, H. (1990). Why Is a Philosopher? In Putnam, H., Realism with a Human Face. Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Rickert, H. (1921). Der Gegenstand der Erkenntnis, 4th and 5th ed. Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr.Google Scholar

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