2 - Reason and Revelation (1948)

Summary

To clarify the issue, we replace “reason – revelation” by “philosophy – revelation.”

By the problem of reason and revelation I understand the problem of philosophy and revelation. “Reason” is neutral: the rights of reason would seem to be recognized by believers in revelation and by unbelievers alike. We rise above the level of neutrality, or of triviality, we enter the arena of conflict, if we confront revelation with a particular interpretation of reason – with the view that the perfection of reason and therefore the perfection of man is philosophy. Philosophy is incompatible with revelation: philosophy must try to refute revelation, and, if not revelation, at any rate theology must try to refute philosophy.

Revelation must try to prove the absurdity of philosophy.

Speaking as a non-theologian to theologians, I shall not presume to define revelation. Only one point must be made. Regardless of whether revelation is understood as revelation of a teaching or as a happening, the claim of revelation becomes noticeable first through a teaching based on revelation. Faith in revelation necessarily issues in preaching or proclaiming the message of revelation and therefore ultimately in a teaching – if in a teaching which always falls short of its task. Those who present that teaching cannot disregard the claim of philosophy which is incompatible with the claim of revelation. And they cannot leave it at anathem[at]izing or at forbidding philosophy: they have to refute its claims. This necessity creates a serious problem.