Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- List of contributors
- Introduction
- Part I Responsibility: some conceptual problems
- Part II Consent, choice, and contracts
- 4 Beyond foreseeability: consequential damages in the law of contract
- 5 Rights and remedies in a consent theory of contract
- 6 A bargaining theory approach to default provisions and disclosure rules in contract law
- Part III Risk, compensation, and torts
- Part IV Punishment
6 - A bargaining theory approach to default provisions and disclosure rules in contract law
from Part II - Consent, choice, and contracts
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 12 September 2009
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- List of contributors
- Introduction
- Part I Responsibility: some conceptual problems
- Part II Consent, choice, and contracts
- 4 Beyond foreseeability: consequential damages in the law of contract
- 5 Rights and remedies in a consent theory of contract
- 6 A bargaining theory approach to default provisions and disclosure rules in contract law
- Part III Risk, compensation, and torts
- Part IV Punishment
Summary
THE PROBLEM
Legal rules facilitate as well as constrain human freedom. H.L.A. Hart captures the difference between these two functions of law by distinguishing between primary and secondary rules. Primary rules impose obligations and thereby constrain behavior. Secondary rules empower individuals to create relations that confer rights and impose duties. Thus, the criminal law constrains individual liberty; the law of contracts enhances it.
Within this framework, the foundation of contracting is mutual agreement. Contractual duties are self-imposed. They are consequences of individuals authoritatively exercising their autonomy under private enabling rules. Coercive civil authority is justifiably employed to enforce contractual obligations because the parties have agreed so to constrain themselves. Of course, even if the parties to a contract agree to bind themselves to one another, it does not follow that they have agreed thereby to have their obligations to one another enforced by the state (or by any other third party).
The default rule
On the assumption that contracting parties are narrowly rational and fully informed, a contract between them that foresees and responds to all possible contingencies would be efficient, or Pareto optimal. That is the definition of a fully specified contract. Because a fully specified contract is efficient, it puts the parties to it in a position where neither can improve his or her lot except at the other's expense.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Liability and ResponsibilityEssays in Law and Morals, pp. 173 - 254Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1991
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