Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Editors' preface
- Preface
- Introduction: Toward the Marshall Plan: from New Era designs to New Deal synthesis
- 1 Searching for a “creative peace”: European integration and the origins of the Marshall Plan
- 2 Paths to plenty: European recovery planning and the American policy compromise
- 3 European union or middle kingdom: Anglo–American formulations, the German problem, and the organizational dimension of the ERP
- 4 Strategies of transnationalism: the ECA and the politics of peace and productivity
- 5 Changing course: European integration and the traders triumphant
- 6 Two worlds or three: the sterling crisis, the dollar gap, and the integration of Western Europe
- 7 Between union and unity: European integration and the sterling–dollar dualism
- 8 Holding the line: the ECA's efforts to reconcile recovery and rearmament
- 9 Guns and butter: politics and diplomacy at the end of the Marshall Plan
- Conclusion: America made the European way
- Bibliography
- Index
1 - Searching for a “creative peace”: European integration and the origins of the Marshall Plan
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 31 October 2009
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Editors' preface
- Preface
- Introduction: Toward the Marshall Plan: from New Era designs to New Deal synthesis
- 1 Searching for a “creative peace”: European integration and the origins of the Marshall Plan
- 2 Paths to plenty: European recovery planning and the American policy compromise
- 3 European union or middle kingdom: Anglo–American formulations, the German problem, and the organizational dimension of the ERP
- 4 Strategies of transnationalism: the ECA and the politics of peace and productivity
- 5 Changing course: European integration and the traders triumphant
- 6 Two worlds or three: the sterling crisis, the dollar gap, and the integration of Western Europe
- 7 Between union and unity: European integration and the sterling–dollar dualism
- 8 Holding the line: the ECA's efforts to reconcile recovery and rearmament
- 9 Guns and butter: politics and diplomacy at the end of the Marshall Plan
- Conclusion: America made the European way
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
The marshall plan rested squarely on an American conviction that European economic recovery was essential to the long-term interests of the United States. These interests were interdependent and mutually reinforcing, so much so that public officials saw little need to rank them in the order that subsequent historians have tried to establish. They included economic interests. Policymakers in the Truman administration were convinced that a “dynamic economy” at home required American trade and investment abroad, which in turn required the reconstruction of major trading partners in Europe and their reintegration into a multilateral system of world trade. These requirements summed up a world view rooted in political conviction as well as in economic interests. American leaders envisioned an open international economy founded on the principles of liberal capitalism, such as free trade and equal opportunity. But they also equated these principles with democratic forms of government, associated autarkic economic policies with totalitarian political regimes, and assumed that “enemies in the market place” could not be “friends at the council table.” “The political line up followed the economic line up,” as Cordell Hull once put it.
Strategic interests paralleled those of an economic and political nature. American policymakers viewed European markets, sources of supply, manpower resources, and industrial capacity as strategic assets that must not be controlled by a hostile power or coalition. The recent war had demonstrated the threat to American security inherent in such a development and the concomitant need to preserve American access to Europe's resources while denying them to potential rivals.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- The Marshall PlanAmerica, Britain and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947–1952, pp. 26 - 53Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1987
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