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Chapter 2 - Trust and Behavioral Economics

Exploration of Trust Based on Game Theory

from Part I - Fundamental Level of Trust

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 December 2021

By
Devdeepta Bose  and
Colin Camerer
Edited by
Frank Krueger
Frank Krueger
Affiliation:
George Mason University, Virginia
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Summary

This chapter explores the role of trust in facilitating economic transactions. We cover seminal and more recent research suggesting how the game-theoretic approach in economics relies on trust to explain market transactions between two parties – individuals and firms. We also study how the experimental results of the trust game (and assorted variations) introduced by economists helps better our understanding of how trust affects the underlying dynamic in dyadic transactions. Relationships between trust levels in society and macroeconomic growth are also explored.

Keywords

Trust Gamelubricant in market transactionsgame theory
Type
Chapter
Information
The Neurobiology of Trust , pp. 36 - 53
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2021

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