Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of figures
- List of tables
- Acknowledgments
- List of acronyms
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Building a better model of bureaucratic control
- 3 Administration by regulation
- 4 Principal's preference, organizational structure and the likelihood of control
- 5 Hybrid organizations and the alignment of interests
- 6 The limits of congressional control: agent structure as constraint
- 7 Regulating hybrids: structure and control
- 8 Conclusion
- Appendix: background of organizations studied
- Interview subjects
- References
- Index
- References
References
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 22 September 2009
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of figures
- List of tables
- Acknowledgments
- List of acronyms
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Building a better model of bureaucratic control
- 3 Administration by regulation
- 4 Principal's preference, organizational structure and the likelihood of control
- 5 Hybrid organizations and the alignment of interests
- 6 The limits of congressional control: agent structure as constraint
- 7 Regulating hybrids: structure and control
- 8 Conclusion
- Appendix: background of organizations studied
- Interview subjects
- References
- Index
- References
Summary

- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- The Politics of Quasi-GovernmentHybrid Organizations and the Dynamics of Bureaucratic Control, pp. 214 - 234Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2003