Chapter 5 - On His Majesty's Service

Summary

The Royal Navy that contemplated the War of 1812 in North America was a far cry from Britain's once-potent instrument of imperial supremacy. Dazzled by Nelson's glorious victory at Trafalgar, British politicians failed to see the navy's inability to close the everwidening cracks in the colonial system. In British North America, years of Admiralty neglect compounded by a serious shortage of manpower and a dearth of naval supplies in the Halifax Dockyard, thwarted the efforts of successive admirals on the Atlantic station to remedy the situation.

This chapter will discuss how, despite its many weaknesses, the Royal Navy played a pivotal role in both beginning and ending the War of 1812. The navy's policy of impressment helped draw America into the war and served as a constant irritant throughout the hostilities. Naval morale suffered when the United States Navy's unexpectedly strong performance forced the Admiralty to abandon traditional fleet actions for a tedious blockade of American ports interrupted by disastrous individual ship duels. Fortunately, prize money and financial incentives such as salvage, head money, ransom, and joint capture ensured that naval crews maintained their commitment to capturing American and foreign prizes.

Prior to 1812, Royal Navy forces were concentrated in Europe, leaving only a few ships to protect Britain's far-flung colonies. Lack of a strong naval presence at the start of the war encouraged and emboldened American privateers for the first few months and caused inhabitants of New Brunswick and Nova Scotia to fear for their security. Mediocre commanders matched the shrunken state of the squadron almost throughout the war. Within weeks of the American declaration of war, Admiral Sir John Borlase Warren replaced the weak and indecisive Vice-Admiral Herbert Sawyer. An Admiral of the White, Warren was a successful squadron commander but he lacked experience with larger forces and was “not more than a competent strategist.” Yet his new command of the combined Atlantic and West Indies stations stretched from Newfoundland to the Caribbean.

Striving to make do with a fleet that was undermanned, ill-supplied, and in disrepair, Sawyer was incapable of pressing any advantage his ships obtained in the first year of the war, contenting himself with “sportive thrusts” against the American coast.