Book contents
- A Regulatory Design for Financial Stability in Hong Kong
- A Regulatory Design for Financial Stability in Hong Kong
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Acknowledgments
- Abbreviations
- 1 Introduction
- Part I A Financial History of Hong Kong
- Part II The Regulatory Models of Financial Supervision
- Part III Contemporary Regulatory and Supervisory Approaches
- Part IV Banking Regulation and Supervision in Hong Kong
- Part V Resolution Regimes and Crisis Management Mechanisms
- 10 Deposit Protection and the Lender of Last Resort
- 11 Resolution Regimes and Systemically Important Banks
- 12 Central Clearing Counterparties and Derivatives
- Part VI Financial Market Integration with the Mainland
- Index
12 - Central Clearing Counterparties and Derivatives
Financial Regulation and Resolution Regime
from Part V - Resolution Regimes and Crisis Management Mechanisms
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 25 August 2022
- A Regulatory Design for Financial Stability in Hong Kong
- A Regulatory Design for Financial Stability in Hong Kong
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Acknowledgments
- Abbreviations
- 1 Introduction
- Part I A Financial History of Hong Kong
- Part II The Regulatory Models of Financial Supervision
- Part III Contemporary Regulatory and Supervisory Approaches
- Part IV Banking Regulation and Supervision in Hong Kong
- Part V Resolution Regimes and Crisis Management Mechanisms
- 10 Deposit Protection and the Lender of Last Resort
- 11 Resolution Regimes and Systemically Important Banks
- 12 Central Clearing Counterparties and Derivatives
- Part VI Financial Market Integration with the Mainland
- Index
Summary
During the 2008–9 global financial crisis, credit default swaps created conduits in the financial system which facilitated the transmission of systemic risk. In response, the Financial Stability Board recommended over-the-counter derivative clearing through a central clearing counterparty. Although the Securities and Futures Commission is the designated supervisor and resolution authority for Hong Kong’s central clearing counterparty, OTC Clear, its supervisory ambit, capacity, and powers are insufficient to mitigate systemic risk and manage financial stability. This chapter argues that a securities supervisor is not the optimal supervisor or resolution authority for OTC Clear. Central clearing counterparties require credit and liquidity risk management which aligns more with banking supervision and central banking. This is supported by the dominance of foreign exchange and interest rate derivatives being traded in Hong Kong. The optimal resolution authority for OTC Clear is the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, being the resolution authority for systemically important banks, having monetary authority expertise that aligns with foreign exchange and interest rate risks, experience in mitigating credit and liquidity risks, and being designed to manage financial stability.
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- A Regulatory Design for Financial Stability in Hong Kong , pp. 239 - 260Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2022