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Chapter 12 - False negatives

from Part III - In favor of safety over sensitivity

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 September 2012

By
Steven Luper
Edited by
Kelly Becker  and
Tim Black
Kelly Becker
Affiliation:
University of New Mexico
Tim Black
Affiliation:
California State University, Northridge
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Summary

In Philosophical Explanations, Robert Nozick suggested that knowing that some proposition, p, is true is a matter of being "sensitive" to p's truth value. This chapter criticizes Nozick's view of knowledge as "sensitivity" to truth-value. It begins with a review of Nozick's notion of sensitivity and his analysis thereof. The chapter suggests that Nozick's tracking account and the adherence account are both fatally flawed. Given that truth sensitivity is constituted by truth adherence, one might have expected that falsity sensitivity would amount to falsity adherence. The truth adherence condition, which is part of the tracking account and the adherence account, is false. The chapter considers four accounts of epistemic sensitivity. If knowledge is indeed inconsistent with false negatives, we will need to reconsider the avoidance and the combined safety accounts.

Keywords

Meno problemprobabilistic approachsensitivity-based approachestruth-trackingvalue of knowledge
Type
Chapter
Information
The Sensitivity Principle in Epistemology , pp. 207 - 226
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2012

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  • False negatives
  • Edited by Kelly Becker, University of New Mexico, Tim Black, California State University, Northridge
  • Book: The Sensitivity Principle in Epistemology
  • Online publication: 05 September 2012
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511783630.016
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  • False negatives
  • Edited by Kelly Becker, University of New Mexico, Tim Black, California State University, Northridge
  • Book: The Sensitivity Principle in Epistemology
  • Online publication: 05 September 2012
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511783630.016
Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • False negatives
  • Edited by Kelly Becker, University of New Mexico, Tim Black, California State University, Northridge
  • Book: The Sensitivity Principle in Epistemology
  • Online publication: 05 September 2012
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511783630.016
Available formats
×