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9 - The Robust Reason Account

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 September 2019

Stefano Bertea
Stefano Bertea
Affiliation:
University of Leicester
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Summary

In Chapter 9 I intend to firm up the revisionary Kantian conception of legal obligation. This I will do by, on the one hand, clarifying the relation between that picture and a specific family of views of legal obligation – the robust reason account – and, on the other hand, emphasizing the distinctively legal dimension of the kind of requirement just described.

Keywords

natural law theorylegal rationalismBeyleveldBrownswordDuffpractical difference thesis
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Chapter
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A Theory of Legal Obligation , pp. 263 - 299
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2019

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  • The Robust Reason Account
  • Stefano Bertea, University of Leicester
  • Book: A Theory of Legal Obligation
  • Online publication: 20 September 2019
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108566216.010
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  • The Robust Reason Account
  • Stefano Bertea, University of Leicester
  • Book: A Theory of Legal Obligation
  • Online publication: 20 September 2019
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108566216.010
Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • The Robust Reason Account
  • Stefano Bertea, University of Leicester
  • Book: A Theory of Legal Obligation
  • Online publication: 20 September 2019
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108566216.010
Available formats
×