Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Notes on Contributors
- Introduction: Thought as Language
- Seeing through Language
- ‘The only sure sign…’: Thought and Language in Descartes
- Words and Pictures
- Social Externalism and Conceptual Diversity
- The Explanation of Cognition
- Thought Without Language: Thought Without Awareness?
- Philosophy, Thought and Language
- The Flowering of Thought in Language
- Talking to Cats, Rats and Bats
- Analyticity, Linguistic Rules and Epistemic Evaluation
- How to Do Other Things With Words
- Bibliography: Twentieth-Century Philosophical Texts on Thought and Language
- Index
The Flowering of Thought in Language
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 04 August 2010
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Notes on Contributors
- Introduction: Thought as Language
- Seeing through Language
- ‘The only sure sign…’: Thought and Language in Descartes
- Words and Pictures
- Social Externalism and Conceptual Diversity
- The Explanation of Cognition
- Thought Without Language: Thought Without Awareness?
- Philosophy, Thought and Language
- The Flowering of Thought in Language
- Talking to Cats, Rats and Bats
- Analyticity, Linguistic Rules and Epistemic Evaluation
- How to Do Other Things With Words
- Bibliography: Twentieth-Century Philosophical Texts on Thought and Language
- Index
Summary
Our first mental endowment was instinct. Then came thought, and later language. Thanks to language, thought then proceeded to flourish. Such was our phylogeny. Ontogeny, then, true to form, recapitulates the sequence in the development of each child. By instinct a child a few days old will show anxiety when an object moving steadily to a screen and behind it fails to emerge on schedule at the far edge. Also new-borns are said to respond emotionally to emotional facial expressions and even to imitate them.
A further innate endowment, and an elaborate one, is manifest in one's standards of perceptual similarity. This relation is basic to all learning, so some of it has to be innate. We are born with standards of perceptual similarity, which then develop and change in the course of experience.
I treat perceptual similarity as a relation between stimulations, or sensory intakes. The similarity is subjective, each individual having his own standards, but it is objectively testable for each individual by reinforcement and extinction of responses. It does not match up with receptual similarity, that is, mere identity or proximity of the nerve endings that were triggered on the two occasions. Perceptual similarity is illustrated rather by our readiness to equate the various perspectives of an object, prior even to probing it. It is a striking case of innate knowledge, however inarticulate.
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- Information
- Thought and Language , pp. 171 - 176Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1998