Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Foreword
- Message from the Director
- Preface
- Chapter 1 Trade, Terrorists, Shipping, and Cargo Containers
- Chapter 2 Al-Qaeda's “Navy”
- Chapter 3 A Maritime Terror Strike — Where and How?
- Chapter 4 Mega-Terror — Radiological and Nuclear
- Chapter 5 Catastrophic Terrorism and its Potential Impact on Global Trade
- Chapter 6 Costs and Benefits of Enhanced Security
- Chapter 7 How Secure?
- Chapter 8 Proliferation Security Initiative
- Chapter 9 Sea Change and Recommendations
- Notes
- References
- About the Author
Chapter 8 - Proliferation Security Initiative
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 21 October 2015
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Foreword
- Message from the Director
- Preface
- Chapter 1 Trade, Terrorists, Shipping, and Cargo Containers
- Chapter 2 Al-Qaeda's “Navy”
- Chapter 3 A Maritime Terror Strike — Where and How?
- Chapter 4 Mega-Terror — Radiological and Nuclear
- Chapter 5 Catastrophic Terrorism and its Potential Impact on Global Trade
- Chapter 6 Costs and Benefits of Enhanced Security
- Chapter 7 How Secure?
- Chapter 8 Proliferation Security Initiative
- Chapter 9 Sea Change and Recommendations
- Notes
- References
- About the Author
Summary
It is against this background of significant crime and lax regulation in international shipping — and the industry's vulnerability to abuse by terrorists — that US President George Bush launched the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) on 31 May 2003. Variously referred to as a compact or political arrangement, it is a programme of pre-emptive interdiction designed to intercept illicit exports related to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) anywhere in the world, whether by sea, air or land.
The definition of WMD encompasses nuclear, chemical and biological arms, related materials and associated delivery systems. The latter would evidently include a ballistic missile linked to a WMD warhead, but not a missile to carry a conventional explosive charge. The PSI is a response to the growing concern that countries or criminal organizations hostile to America will pass WMD-related materials to terrorists who may use them to attack the US, its allies or friendly countries around the world.
The PSI is intended to build on and reinforce existing arms control treaties and multilateral arrangements, as well as national export controls on sensitive materials, including “dual use” items that can be used for legitimate civilian industrial purposes or for WMDs. The PSI aims to stop trafficking in WMD-related materials between “rogue” states and terrorist groups that its members feel pose the most immediate threat to global and regional security. North Korea and Iran are primary sources of proliferation concern to PSI members, according to US officials.
The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
There are five countries that are accorded international legitimacy as nuclear-weapon states under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), that entered into force in 1970. They are the US, Britain, France, Russia and China. Three of the five — the US, Britain and France — are founder members of the PSI. The other two — China and Russia — are more ambiguous in their attitude to the PSI. But neither opposes the programme and each is prepared to give it some support. These five nuclear weapon states are important because they are also the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council with the right to veto Council decisions.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- A Time Bomb for Global TradeMaritime-Related Terrorism in an Age of Weapons of Mass Destruction, pp. 97 - 107Publisher: ISEAS–Yusof Ishak InstitutePrint publication year: 2004