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Values in Science

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 June 2022

Kevin C. Elliott
Affiliation:
Michigan State University

Summary

This Element introduces the philosophical literature on values in science by examining four questions: (1) How do values influence science? (2) Should we actively incorporate values in science? (3) How can we manage values in science responsibly? (4) What are some next steps for those who want to help promote responsible roles for values in science? It explores arguments for and against the “value-free ideal” for science (i.e., the notion that values should be excluded from scientific reasoning) and concludes that it should be rejected. Nonetheless, this does not mean that value influences are always acceptable. The Element explores a range of strategies for distinguishing between appropriate and inappropriate value influences. It concludes by proposing an approach for managing values in science that relies on justifying, prioritising, and implementing norms for scientific research practices and institutions.
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Online ISBN: 9781009052597
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication: 23 June 2022

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