Skip to main content Accessibility help

We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.

Close cookie message
×
Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-gbm5v Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-25T18:34:44.915Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
Series:   Elements in Economics of European Integration

Completing a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 January 2023

Iain Begg
Iain Begg
Affiliation:
London School of Economics and Political Science

Summary

This Element examines efforts to strengthen Economic and Monetary Union in the European Union, especially over the last decade, asking if enough has been done to render it more sustainable and resilient. Drawing on a survey of 111 leading experts on the economics and politics of EMU, this Element reviews the wide-ranging reforms undertaken since the crises of the early 2010s and assesses whether they go far enough. Although it concludes that much has been done to push the euro towards being a more complete currency, it identifies remaining flaws and challenges which EU leaders need to resolve.
Get access

Keywords

future of EMUgovernance of the EurozoneEurozone crisesfiscal union in Europebanking union in Europe
Type
Element
Information
Series: Elements in Economics of European Integration
Online ISBN: 9781108963503
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication: 23 February 2023

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Acocella, N. (2020) The European Monetary Union: Europe at the Crossroads, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Aizenmann, J. (2016) ‘Optimal currency area: A 20th century idea for the 21st century?’, National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Working Paper No. 22097.Google Scholar
Alesina, A., Favero, C. and Giavazzi, F. (2019) Austerity: When It Works and When It Doesn’t, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Amtenbrink, F. (1999) The Democratic Accountability of Central Banks: A Comparative Study of the European Central Bank, Oxford: Hart.Google Scholar
Angeloni, I. (2020) Beyond the Pandemic: Reviving Europe’s Banking Union, London: Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR), https://voxeu.org/content/beyond-pandemic-reviving-europe-s-banking-union.Google Scholar
Ardy, B., Begg, I., Hodson, D., Maher, I. and Mayes, D. G. (2006) Adjusting to EMU, Basingstoke: Palgrave.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Arnold, N., Balakrishnan, R., Barkbu, B. et al. (2022) ‘Reforming the EU fiscal framework: Strengthening the fiscal rules and institutions’, International Monetary Fund (IMF) Discussion Paper DP/2022/014, Washington, DC: IMF.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Baldwin, R. and Giavazzi, F. eds. (2015) The Eurozone Crisis: A Consensus View of the Causes and a Few Possible Solutions, Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) e-book, http://voxeu.org/content/eurozone-crisis-consensus-view-causes-and-few-possible-solutions.Google Scholar
Bastian, J., Begg, I. and Fritz-Vannahme, J. (2011) Making the European Union Work: Issues for Economic Governance Reform, Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung.Google Scholar
Bayoumi, T., Eichengreen, B. and von Hagen, J. (1997), ‘European monetary unification: Implications of research for policy, implications of policy for research’, Open Economies Review, 8, 71–91.Google Scholar
Begg, I. (2009) ‘Regulation and supervision of financial intermediaries in the EU: The aftermath of the financial crisis’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 47(5), 1107–28.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Begg, I. (2014) ‘Fiscal policy transparency’, in Forssbaeck, J. and Oxelheim, L. eds., The Oxford Handbook of Economic and Institutional Transparency, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 98–115.Google Scholar
Begg, I., Benedetto, G., Belicka, D. et al. (2022) The Next Revision of the Financial Regulation and the EU Budget Galaxy, Report to the European Parliament, www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2022/721500/IPOL_STU(2022)721500_EN.pdf.Google Scholar
Belke, A. and Klose, J. (2013) ‘Does the ECB rely on a Taylor rule during the financial crisis? Comparing ex-post and real time data with real time forecasts’, Economic Analysis and Policy, 41(2), 147–71.Google Scholar
Bénassy-Quéré, A., Brunnermeier, M. K., Enderlein, H. et al. (2018) ‘Reconciling risk sharing with market discipline: A constructive approach to euro area reform’, Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) Policy Insight No. 91, London: CEPR.Google Scholar
Bernanke, B. (2015) The Courage to Act: A Memoir of a Crisis and Its Aftermath, New York: W.W. Norton.Google Scholar
Bickerton, C. J., Hodson, D. and Puetter, U. (2015) The New Intergovernmentalism: States and Supranational Actors in the Post-Maastricht Era, Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bilbiie, F., Monacelli, T. and Perotti, R. (2021) ‘Fiscal policy in Europe: Controversies over rules, mutual insurance, and centralization’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 35(2), 77–100.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Blanchard, O., Leandro, A. and Zettelmeyer, J. (2021) ‘Redesigning EU fiscal rules: From rules to standards’, Working Paper 21–1, Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE).Google Scholar
Blanchard, O. and Pisani-Ferry, J. (2022) ‘Fiscal support and monetary vigilance: Economic policy implications of the Russia-Ukraine war for the European Union’, Bruegel Policy Contribution 06/2022, Brussels: Bruegel.Google Scholar
Blanchard, O., Sapir, A. and Zettelmeyer, J. (2022) ‘The European Commission’s fiscal rules proposal: A bold plan, with flaws that can be fixed’, Peterson Institute for International Economics blog, https://www.piie.com/blogs/realtime-economics/european-commissions-fiscal-rules-proposal-bold-plan-flaws-can-be-fixedGoogle Scholar
Blinder, A., Jordan, T. J., Kohn, D. and Mishkin, F. (2013) Exit Strategy, Geneva Report on the World Economy 15, London: Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR).Google Scholar
Bordo, M. D., Markiewicz, A. and Jonung, L. (2011) ‘A fiscal union for the euro: Some lessons from history’, National Bureau for Economic Research (NBER) Working Paper No. 17380, www.nber.org/papers/w17380.Google Scholar
Brunnermeier, M. K., James, H. and Landau, J.-P. (2016) The Euro and the Battle of Ideas, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Buti, M. (2020) ‘Enhancing Europe’s economic global power’, Global Policy, 11(1), 147–50.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Buti, M., Giudice, G. and Leandro, J. (2018) ‘Deepening EMU requires a coherent and well-sequenced package’, Voxeu, https://voxeu.org/article/deepening-emu-requires-coherent-and-well-sequenced-package.Google Scholar
Buti, M., Giudice, G. and Leandro, J. eds. (2020) Strengthening the Institutional Architecture of the Economic and Monetary Union, VoxEU.org book, London: Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR), https://voxeu.org/content/strengthening-institutional-architecture-economic-and-monetary-union.Google Scholar
Campos, N., De Grauwe, P. and Ji, Y. eds. (2018) The Political Economy of Structural Reforms in Europe, Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cecchetti, S. and Schoenholtz, K. (2016) ‘A primer on helicopter money’, Voxeu/CEPR, https://cepr.org/voxeu/columns/primer-helicopter-money.Google Scholar
Chang, M. (2018) ‘The creeping competences of the European Central Bank during the euro crisis’, Credit and Capital Markets, 51(1), 41–53.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cohen, B. J. (1994) ‘Beyond EMU: The problem of sustainability’, in Eichengreen, B. and Frieden, J. eds., The Political Economy of European Monetary Unification, Boulder, CO: Westview, ch. 8.Google Scholar
Cohen, B. J. (2015) Currency Power: Understanding Monetary Rivalry, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cohen, B. J. (2018) Currency Statecraft: Monetary Rivalry and Geopolitical Ambition, Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Darling, A. (2012) Back from the Brink: 1,000 days at No.11, London: Atlantic Books.Google Scholar
Darvas, Z. and Leandro, A. (2015) ‘The limitations of policy coordination in the euro area under the European semester’, Bruegel Policy Contribution 2015/19. Brussels: Bruegel.Google Scholar
Davoodi, H., Elger, P., Fotiou, A. et al. (2022) ‘Fiscal councils dataset: The 2021 update’, International Monetary Fund (IMF) Working Paper 22/11, Washington, DC: IMF.Google Scholar
De Grauwe, P. (2013) ‘Design failures in the Eurozone: Can they be fixed?’ LSE ‘Europe in Question’ Discussion Paper Series No. 57/2013.Google Scholar
De Grauwe, P. (2022) Economics of Monetary Union, 14th ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
De Larosière, J. [chairman], Balcerowicz, L., Issing, O. et al. (2009) The High-Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU: Report, Brussels, 25.02.2009, https://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/pages/publication14527_en.pdf.Google Scholar
Delors, J. (1989) ‘Report on economic and monetary union in the European Community’, Brussels, 17.04.1989, http://aei.pitt.edu/1007/.Google Scholar
Demetriades, P. (2020) Central Bank Independence and the Future of the Euro, Newcastle-upon-Tyne: Agenda.Google Scholar
Deroose, S., Carnot, N., Pench, L. R. and Mourre, G. (2018) ‘EU fiscal rules: Root causes of its complexity’, Voxeu, https://cepr.org/voxeu/columns/eu-fiscal-rules-root-causes-its-complexity.Google Scholar
Dyson, K. and Featherstone, K. (1999) The Road to Maastricht: Negotiating Economic and Monetary Union, Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Efstathiou, K. and Wolff, G. B. (2018) ‘Is the European semester effective and useful?’, Bruegel Policy Contribution 2018/09. Brussels: Bruegel.Google Scholar
Eichengreen, B. (2011) Exorbitant Privilege: The Rise and Fall of the Dollar, Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Eichengreen, B. (2014) ‘The Eurozone crisis: The theory of optimum currency areas bites back’, Notenstein Academy White Paper Series, https://eml.berkeley.edu/~eichengr/Swiss%20Bank%20White%20Paper%20No%202%20Text-1.pdf.Google Scholar
Eichengreen, B. (2015) Hall of Mirrors: The Great Depression, the Great Recession, and the Uses – and Misuses – of History, Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
European Commission (2012) ‘A blueprint for a deep and genuine economic and monetary union launching a European debate’, Commission Communication, COM(2012) 777 final, Brussels, 28.11.2012.Google Scholar
European Commission (2015a) ‘Making the best use of the flexibility within the existing rules of the Stability and Growth Pact’, COM (2015)12, Brussels, 13.01.2015.Google Scholar
European Commission (2015b) ‘Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 806/2014 in order to establish a European Deposit Insurance Scheme’, COM(2015)586, Strasbourg, 24.11.2015.Google Scholar
European Commission (2016) ‘Vade Mecum on the Stability and Growth Pact: 2016 Edition’ European Economy Institutional Paper 021.Google Scholar
European Commission (2018a) ‘Towards a stronger international role of the euro’, COM(2018) 796, https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/com-2018-796-communication_en.pdf.Google Scholar
European Commission (2018b) ‘Vade Mecum on the Stability and Growth Pact’, Institutional Paper 75, Brussels: European Commission.Google Scholar
European Commission (2019) ‘Vade Mecum on the Stability and Growth Pact’, Institutional Paper 101, Brussels: European Commission.Google Scholar
European Commission (2020) ‘Economic governance review’, COM(2020) 55, Brussels, 5.2.2020, https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/economy-finance/com_2020_55_en.pdf.Google Scholar
European Commission (2022a) ‘Communication on orientations for a reform of the EU economic governance framework’ COM(2022) 583, Brussels, 11.09.2022 https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2022-11/com_2022_583_1_en.pdfGoogle Scholar
European Commission (2022b) Fiscal Sustainability Report 2021, European Economy Institutional Paper 171, Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union.Google Scholar
European Council (2012a) ‘Towards a genuine economic and monetary union: Report by President of the European Council, Herman van Rompuy’, EUCO120/12, Brussels, 26 June 2012.Google Scholar
European Council (2012b) ‘Towards a genuine economic and monetary union’, Brussels, 5 December 2012.Google Scholar
European Fiscal Board (2020) Annual Report 2020, Brussels: European Commission, https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/efb_annual_report_2020_en_0.pdf.Google Scholar
Fabbrini, F. (2016) Economic Governance in Europe: Comparative Paradoxes and Constitutional Challenges, Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Feld, L. P., Fuest, C., Haucap, J. et al. (2021) ‘The monetary policy strategy of the European Central Bank: Review and recommendations’, Kronberger Kreis-Studien No. 67, Berlin: Stiftung Marktwirtschaft.Google Scholar
Ferran, E. and Babis, V. S. G. (2015) ‘The European single supervisory mechanism’, Journal of Corporate Law Studies, 13(2), 255–85.Google Scholar
Fuest, C. and Peichl, A. (2012) ‘European fiscal union: What is it? Does it work? And are there really “no alternatives”?’, IZA Policy Paper, 39, Bonn: IZA.Google Scholar
Goodhart, C. A. E. (1980) Money Information and Uncertainty, Boston, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Gorter, J., Jacobs, J. and de Haan, J. (2008) ‘Taylor rules for the ECB using expectations data’, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 110(3), 473–88.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hamilton, A. (1790) ‘First report on the public credit’, Communicated to the House of Representatives, 14 January 1790, Treasury Department, https://archive.schillerinstitute.com/economy/2015/hamilton-first_report_on_the_public_credit.pdf.Google Scholar
Heipertz, M. and Verdun, A. (2010) Ruling Europe: The Politics of the Stability and Growth Pact, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
High-Level Group on Post-Covid Economic and Social Challenges (2022) A New Era for Europe: How the European Union Can Make the Most of Its Pandemic Recovery, Pursue Sustainable Growth and Promote Global Stability, Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union.Google Scholar
Hodson, D. (2011) Governing the Euro Area in Good Times and Bad, Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hodson, D. (2021) ‘The institutions of economic and monetary union: From the euro crisis to Covid-19’, in Hodson, D., Puetter, W., Saurugger, S. and Peterson, J. eds., The Institutions of the European Union, Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Howarth, D. and Schild, J. (2022) ‘Torn between two lovers: German policy on economic and monetary union, the New Hanseatic League and Franco-German bilateralism’, German Politics, 31(2), 323–43.Google Scholar
Issing, O., Gaspar, V., Angeloni, I. and Tristani, O. (2001) Monetary Policy in the Euro Area Strategy and Decision-Making at the European Central Bank, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Jabko, N. (2015) ‘The elusive economic government and the forgotten fiscal union’, in Matthijs, M. and Blyth, M. eds., The Future of the Euro, Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Jones, E., Kelemen, R. D. and Meunier, S. (2021) ‘Failing forward? Crises and patterns of European integration’, Journal of European Public Policy, 28(10), 1519–36.Google Scholar
Jonung, L. and Drea, E. (2010) ‘It can’t happen, it’s a bad idea, it won’t last: U.S. economists on the EMU and the euro, 1989–2002’, Econ Journal Watch, 7(1), 4–52.Google Scholar
Kaji, S. (2020) ‘Strength in contradiction: Europe as a living example for peaceful prosperity’, Global Policy, 11(1), 151–4.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kenen, P. B. (1992) EMU After Maastricht, Washington, DC: Group of Thirty.Google Scholar
Koester, G. and Sondermann, D. (2018) ‘A euro area macroeconomic stabilisation function: Assessing options in view of their redistribution and stabilisation properties’, ECB Occasional Paper No. 216.Google Scholar
Krugman, P. (2012) ‘Revenge of the optimum currency area’, in Acemoglu, D., Parker J. and Woodford, M. eds., NBER Macroeconomics Annual, 27.Google Scholar
Lane, P. R. (2012) ‘The European sovereign debt crisis’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 26(3), 49–68.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Leiner-Killinger, N., Lopez-Perez, V., Steigert, R. and Vitali, G. (2007) ‘Structural reforms in EMU and the role of monetary policy: A survey of the literature’, ECB Occasional Paper No. 66.Google Scholar
MacDougall, G. D. A. (1977) Report of the Study Group on the Role of Public Finance in European Integration, Luxembourg: OOPEC.Google Scholar
Maduro, M., Martin, P., Piris, J.-C. et al. (2021) ‘Revisiting the EU framework: Economic necessities and legal options’, Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) Policy Insight. No. 114, London: CEPR.Google Scholar
Marsh, D. (2016) Europe’s Deadlock: How the Euro Crisis Could Be Solved – And Why It Still Won’t Happen, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.Google Scholar
Matthijs, M. and Blyth, M. (2015) ‘Conclusion: The future of the euro – possible futures, risk and uncertainties’, in Matthijs, M. and Blyth, M. eds., The Future of the Euro, Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
McNamara, K. R. (1998) The Currency of Ideas: Monetary Politics in the European Union, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.Google Scholar
Mundell, R. (1961) ‘A theory of optimum currency areas’, American Economic Review, 51(4), 657–65.Google Scholar
Papaconstantinou, G. (2019) Whatever It Takes: The Battle for Post-Crisis Europe, Newcastle-upon-Tyne: Agenda.Google Scholar
Papademos, L. (2014) ‘A better EMU blueprint’, International Economy, Winter, 34–7.Google Scholar
Pench, L. R., Ciobanu, S., Zgala, M. and Manescu, C. B. (2019) ‘Beyond fiscal rules: How domestic fiscal frameworks can contribute to sound fiscal policy’, Voxeu, https://cepr.org/voxeu/columns/beyond-fiscal-rules-how-domestic-fiscal-frameworks-can-contribute-sound-fiscal-policy.Google Scholar
Pisani-Ferry, J. (2014) The Euro Crisis and Its Aftermath, Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Pisani-Ferry, J. (2018) ‘Euro area reform: An anatomy of the debate’, Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) Policy Insight 95, London: CEPR.Google Scholar
Pisani-Ferry, J. (2020) ‘European Union recovery funds: Strings attached, but not tied up in knots’, Policy Contribution 2020/19, Brussels: Bruegel.Google Scholar
Pomfret, R. (2021) The Road to Monetary Union, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Puetter, U. (2012) ‘Europe’s deliberative intergovernmentalism: The role of the Council and European Council in EU economic governance’, Journal of European Public Policy, 19(2), 161–78.Google Scholar
Puetter, U. (2021) ‘Who leads the euro zone? From crisis management to future reform’, Journal of European Public Policy, 28(1), 880–5.Google Scholar
Rehn, O. (2020) Walking the Highwire: Rebalancing the European Economy in Crisis, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.Google Scholar
Savage, J. D. and Howarth, D. (2018) ‘Enforcing the European semester: The politics of asymmetric information in the excessive deficit and macroeconomic imbalance procedures’, Journal of European Public Policy, 25(2), 212–30.Google Scholar
Schelkle, W. (2018) The Political Economy of Monetary Solidarity: Understanding the Euro Experiment, Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Schmidt, V. A. (2020) Europe’s Crisis of Legitimacy: Governing by Rules and Ruling by Numbers in the Eurozone, Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Schmidt, V. A. (2021) ‘Europe’s (euro) crisis of legitimacy’, in Wallace, H., Koutsiaras, N. and Pagoulatos, G. eds., Europe’s Transformations: Essays in Honour of Loukas Tsoukalis, Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Schimmelfennig, F. (2015) ‘Liberal intergovernmentalism and the euro area crisis’, Journal of European Public Policy, 22, 177–95.Google Scholar
Schimmelfennig, F. and Winzen, T. (2020) Ever Looser Union? Differentiated European Integration, Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Schoenmaker, D. (2013) ‘An integrated financial framework for the banking union: Don’t forget macro-prudential supervision’, European Economy Economic Papers 492.Google Scholar
Schuknecht, L. (2014) ‘The empire strikes back: Why Germany’s exports and current account surpluses benefit other countries’, International Economy, Fall, www.international-economy.com/TIE_F14_Schuknecht.pdf.Google Scholar
Sinn, H.-W. (2014) The Euro Trap, Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Snaith, H. (2014) ‘Narratives of optimum currency area theory and Eurozone governance’, New Political Economy, 19(2), 183–200.Google Scholar
Stiglitz, J. (2016) The EURO and Its Threat to the Future of Europe, London: Penguin.Google Scholar
Thygesen, N., Beetsma, R., Bordignon, M. et al. (2020) ‘Reforming the EU fiscal framework: Now is the time’, Voxeu, https://voxeu.org/article/reforming-eu-fiscal-framework-now-time.Google Scholar
Tobin, J. (2001) ‘Currency unions: Europe versus the United States’, Policy Options, May, 31–3.Google Scholar
Tsoukalis, L. (2016) In Defence of Europe: Can the European Project Be Saved?, Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Verdun, A. (2019) ‘The European Central Bank’, Oxford Research Encyclopaedia Politics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, https://oxfordre.com/politics/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228637-e-254?print=pdf.Google Scholar
Wallace, P. (2016) The Euro Experiment, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Weiler, J. (2013) ‘In the face of crisis: Input legitimacy, output legitimacy and the political messianism of European integration’, Journal of European Integration, 34(7), 825–41.Google Scholar
Werner, P. (1970) ‘Report to the Council and Commission on the realisation by stages of economic and monetary union in the Community’, Supplement to Bulletin 11–1970 of the European Communities, https://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/pages/publication6142_en.pdf.Google Scholar
Wessels, W., Schramm, L. and Kunstein, T. (2022) The European Council as a Crisis Manager: The EU’s Fiscal Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic, Baden-Baden: Nomos.Google Scholar
Wieser, T. (2021) ‘The post-coronavirus fiscal policy questions Europe must answer’, Bruegel blog post, www.bruegel.org/2021/02/the-post-coronavirus-fiscal-policy-questions-europe-must-answer/.Google Scholar
Wyplosz, C. (2012) ‘Fiscal rules: Theoretical issues and historical experiences’, National Bureau for Economic Research (NBER) Working Paper 17884, www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w17884/w17884.pdf.Google Scholar
Wyplosz, C. (2020) ‘The Euro area after Covid-19’, European Parliament Monetary Dialogue Papers, November, www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/214969/01.WYPLOSZ_final.pdf.Google Scholar
Wyplosz, C. (2022a) ‘Reform of the Stability and Growth Pact: The Commission’s proposal could be a missed opportunity’ VOXEU Column, 17/11/2022, https://cepr.org/voxeu/columns/reform-stability-and-growth-pact-commissions-proposal-could-be-missed-opportunityGoogle Scholar
Wyplosz, C. (2022b) ‘The euro is fragile; that’s OK’, European Policy Analysis 13/2022, Stockholm: Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies.Google Scholar
Zaretsky, A. M. (1998) ‘Yes, this EMU will fly, but will it stay aloft?’, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Regional Economist, July, 1–6.Google Scholar

Save element to Kindle

To save this element to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Completing a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union
  • Iain Begg, London School of Economics and Political Science
  • Online ISBN: 9781108963503
Available formats
×

Save element to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Completing a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union
  • Iain Begg, London School of Economics and Political Science
  • Online ISBN: 9781108963503
Available formats
×

Save element to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Completing a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union
  • Iain Begg, London School of Economics and Political Science
  • Online ISBN: 9781108963503
Available formats
×