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Series:   Elements in Public Economics

The Economics and Regulation of Network Industries

Telecommunications and Beyond

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 September 2021

Ingo Vogelsang
Ingo Vogelsang
Affiliation:
Boston University

Summary

Have you ever wondered how your telephone company or Internet service provider can give you access to almost all people in the world, or how electricity suppliers can compete with each other if there is only one electric supply line passing through your street? This Element deals with the economics and public regulation of such network industries. It puts particular emphasis on the specific economic concepts used for analyzing them and on the regulatory reform movement and the compatibility of regulation and competition. Worldwide most of these industries have changed dramatically in recent years, telecommunications in particular. Network industries mostly exhibit economies of scale in production and similar economies in consumption. Both of these properties cause market power problems that often require industry-specific regulation. However, due to technological and market changes network policies have moved on from end-user regulation to wholesale regulation and in some cases to deregulation.
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Keywords

network industryeconomies of scale and scopenetwork effectsincentive regulationderegulation
Type
Element
Information
Series: Elements in Public Economics
Online ISBN: 9781108775410
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication: 04 November 2021

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