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Series:   Elements in Epistemology

The Epistemic Consequences of Paradox

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 June 2022

Bryan Frances
Bryan Frances
Affiliation:
United Arab Emirates University

Summary

By pooling together exhaustive analyses of certain philosophical paradoxes, we can prove a series of fascinating results regarding philosophical progress, agreement on substantive philosophical claims, knockdown arguments in philosophy, the wisdom of philosophical belief (quite rare, because the knockdown arguments show that we philosophers have been wildly wrong about language, logic, truth, or ordinary empirical matters), the epistemic status of metaphysics, and the power of philosophy to refute common sense. As examples, this Element examines the Sorites Paradox, the Liar Paradox, and the Problem of the Many – although many other paradoxes can do the trick too.
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Keywords

paradoxmetaphysicswisdomphilosophical progresscommon sense
Type
Element
Information
Series: Elements in Epistemology
Online ISBN: 9781009052948
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication: 28 July 2022

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The Epistemic Consequences of Paradox
  • Bryan Frances, United Arab Emirates University
  • Online ISBN: 9781009052948
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The Epistemic Consequences of Paradox
  • Bryan Frances, United Arab Emirates University
  • Online ISBN: 9781009052948
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The Epistemic Consequences of Paradox
  • Bryan Frances, United Arab Emirates University
  • Online ISBN: 9781009052948
Available formats
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