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Series:   Elements in the Philosophy of Religion

God and Human Freedom

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 July 2019

Leigh C. Vicens  and
Simon Kittle
Leigh C. Vicens
Affiliation:
Augustana University, South Dakota
Simon Kittle
Affiliation:
Leopold-Franzens-Universität Innsbruck, Austria

Summary

This Element considers the relationship between the traditional view of God as all-powerful, all-knowing and wholly good on the one hand, and the idea of human free will on the other. It focuses on the potential threats to human free will arising from two divine attributes: God's exhaustive foreknowledge and God's providential control of creation.
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Keywords

free willGoddivine foreknowledgedivine providencethe problem of evil
Type
Element
Information
Series: Elements in the Philosophy of Religion
Online ISBN: 9781108558396
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication: 04 July 2019

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God and Human Freedom
  • Leigh C. Vicens, Augustana University, South Dakota, Simon Kittle, Leopold-Franzens-Universität Innsbruck, Austria
  • Online ISBN: 9781108558396
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God and Human Freedom
  • Leigh C. Vicens, Augustana University, South Dakota, Simon Kittle, Leopold-Franzens-Universität Innsbruck, Austria
  • Online ISBN: 9781108558396
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God and Human Freedom
  • Leigh C. Vicens, Augustana University, South Dakota, Simon Kittle, Leopold-Franzens-Universität Innsbruck, Austria
  • Online ISBN: 9781108558396
Available formats
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