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Series:   Elements in the Philosophy of Religion

God and Morality

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 April 2019

Anne Jeffrey
Anne Jeffrey
Affiliation:
University of South Alabama

Summary

This Element has two aims. The first is to discuss arguments philosophers have made about the difference God's existence might make to questions of general interest in metaethics. The second is to argue that it is a mistake to think we can get very far in answering these questions by assuming a thin conception of God, and to suggest that exploring the implications of thick theisms for metaethics would be more fruitful.
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Keywords

theismmoral valuemoral obligationnormativitymoral epistemologymoral motivation
Type
Element
Information
Series: Elements in the Philosophy of Religion
Online ISBN: 9781108567701
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication: 09 May 2019

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God and Morality
  • Anne Jeffrey, University of South Alabama
  • Online ISBN: 9781108567701
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God and Morality
  • Anne Jeffrey, University of South Alabama
  • Online ISBN: 9781108567701
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God and Morality
  • Anne Jeffrey, University of South Alabama
  • Online ISBN: 9781108567701
Available formats
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