Element contents
Series: Elements in Philosophy of Mind
Irrationality
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 22 January 2025
Summary
This Element surveys contemporary philosophical and psychological work on various forms of irrationality: akrasia, strange beliefs, and implicit bias. It takes up several questions in an effort to better illuminate these more maligned aspects of human behaviour and cognition: what is rationality? Why is it irrational to act against one's better judgement? Could it ever be rational to do so? What's going wrong with beliefs in conspiracy theories, those arising from self-deception, or those which are classed as delusional? Might some of them in fact be appropriate responses to evidence? Are implicit biases irrational when they conflict with our avowed beliefs? Or might they be rational insofar as they track social realities?
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- Series: Elements in Philosophy of MindOnline ISBN: 9781009641883Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication: 20 February 2025
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Video Abstract: Elements in Philosophy of Mind Irrationality: Ema Sullivan-Bissett
This Element is free online from 27th January 2025 - 24th February 2025
This Element is free online from 27th January 2025 - 24th February 2025
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