Element contents
Series: Elements in Philosophy of Law
The Nature of Authority
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 04 December 2024
Summary
The Nature of Authority provides a comprehensive theory of the nature of authoritative guidance. It argues that the following claims exhaust the constitutive properties of authoritative tellings: authoritative tellings (1) tell subjects what to do; (2) give rise to reasons to comply; (3) are issued by personal beings and govern the behavior of personal beings; (4) are issued by rationally competent beings and govern the behavior of rationally competent beings; (5) are issued under a claim of right that counts as plausible in virtue of being grounded in a system to which subjects acquiesce as governing their behavior; (6) are issued by beings with the power to impose their will on subjects with respect to what they do; (7) create obligations to comply; and (8) are backed by a threat of detriment that is reasonably contrived to deter enough noncompliance to enable the system to minimally achieve its ends.
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- Series: Elements in Philosophy of LawOnline ISBN: 9781009255790Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication: 09 January 2025
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