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Nash equilibrium in nonzero-sum games of optimal stopping for Brownian motion
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 26 June 2017
Abstract
We present solutions to nonzero-sum games of optimal stopping for Brownian motion in [0, 1] absorbed at either 0 or 1. The approach used is based on the double partial superharmonic characterisation of the value functions derived in Attard (2015). In this setting the characterisation of the value functions has a transparent geometrical interpretation of 'pulling two ropes' above 'two obstacles' which must, however, be constrained to pass through certain regions. This is an extension of the analogous result derived by Peskir (2009), (2012) (semiharmonic characterisation) for the value function in zero-sum games of optimal stopping. To derive the value functions we transform the game into a free-boundary problem. The latter is then solved by making use of the double smooth fit principle which was also observed in Attard (2015). Martingale arguments based on the Itô–Tanaka formula will then be used to verify that the solution to the free-boundary problem coincides with the value functions of the game and this will establish the Nash equilibrium.
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- Copyright © Applied Probability Trust 2017
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