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An Analysis of U.S. Dairy Policy Deregulation using an Imperfect Competition Model

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  15 September 2016

Nobuhiro Suzuki ,
Harry M. Kaiser ,
John E. Lenz  and
Olan D. Forker
Nobuhiro Suzuki
Affiliation:
National Research Institute of Agricultural Economics, Japanese Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, and a Visiting Fellow at Cornell University, 1991–1993
Harry M. Kaiser
Affiliation:
Department of Agricultural Economics, Cornell University
John E. Lenz
Affiliation:
Department of Agricultural Economics, Cornell University
Olan D. Forker
Affiliation:
Department of Agricultural Economics, Cornell University
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Abstract

An imperfect competition model of the U.S. milk market is developed for analyzing the impacts of dairy policy deregulation. Estimated degree-of-competition parameters indicate that the U.S. milk market has become more competitive over time. The usefulness of the model is demonstrated by showing the relative differences of dynamic simulation results of the imperfect competition model with the results of a conventional exogenous fluid differential model.

Type
Agricultural, Resource, and Environmental Policies in the 1990s
Information
Agricultural and Resource Economics Review , Volume 23 , Issue 1 , April 1994 , pp. 84 - 93
Copyright
Copyright © 1994 Northeastern Agricultural and Resource Economics Association 

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