Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-p9bg8 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-27T06:45:50.260Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

The Second Labour Government and the Politics of Electoral Reform, 1929–1931

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 July 2014

John D. Fair
Get access

Extract

In his pioneering study of the British electoral system, David Butler notes that “One of the main problems of the historian of the second Labour Government is to discover what action the Liberals took to exact the fullest return for their support in the division lobbies.” Owing to the preponderance of economic issues in this period, however, scant attention has been focused on the constitutional question of electoral reform which had the greatest bearing on the relationship between the Liberal and Labour parties in Parliament. Robert Skidelsky's Politicians and the Slump, the most thorough economic and political analysis of the Second Labour Government, is curiously jejune on this subject. Recent biographers of Ramsay MacDonald and David Lloyd George, the Labour and Liberal protagonists, describe in detail a series of joint enterprises between the parties, but they fail to delineate the precise nature of their relationship in light of the critical electoral reform question. And Butler was never able to come to close quarters because of a paucity of primary sources. Now, however, it is possible to merge these separate strands, along with a neglected Conservative view, into a comprehensive explanation of the Liberal-Labour nexus.

Despite much suspicion by contemporaries, especially among Conservatives in Parliament and the press, of a supposed Lib-Lab “bargain, ” it was repeatedly denied by prominent Liberal and Labour members. In light of the inability of historians to produce even a shred of evidence to the contrary and the glaring lack of legislative cooperation, it must be concluded that there was never any formal alliance between the two parties. Nevertheless a strong, and as yet unspecified, attachment did exist as a result of the unique parliamentary circumstances emerging from the general election of 1929. What emerges is an unattractive picture of political manuevering, calumny, and subterfuge where the potential allies worked at cross-purposes—the object of the Government being to create conditions favorable to retaining office while the Liberals desired some greater prospect for attaining office in the future. Despite their interdependence, the party leaders were never able to reach an agreement on the vital issue of electoral reform, which would involve some possible sacrifice of their individual ends. The result was a process of mutual destruction which contributed to the fall of the Second Labour Government and opened the way for a Conservative bid for power.

Type
Research Article
Information
Albion , Volume 13 , Issue 3 , Fall 1981 , pp. 276 - 301
Copyright
Copyright © North American Conference on British Studies 1981

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 Butler, D.E., Electoral System in Britain, 1918-1951 (Oxford, 1953), pp. 58–83Google Scholar. Dr. Butler's study, originally prepared as a doctoral thesis in 1951, has served as a reliable basis for this study of the more political aspects of the subject.

2 See Skidelsky, Robert, Politicians and the Slump, The Labour Government of 1929-1931 (London, 1967), pp. 329–33.Google Scholar

3 Marquand, David, Ramsay MacDonald (London, 1977), pp. 525–603Google Scholar; and Campbell, John, Lloyd George, The Goat in the Wilderness, 1922-1931 (London, 1977), pp. 240–96Google Scholar. Since they relied on totally different bodies of sources, and published concurrently, neither scholar could benefit from the work of the other.

4 These denials are spread throughout the public and parliamentary utterances of the period so often and so consistently that they assume a genuine air. A half century later Malcolm MacDonald, the former Prime Minister's son, still insists that he is “certain that there was no ‘bargain’ or ‘pact’ between the Labour and Liberal parties at that time.” Letter from MacDonald to the author, July 25, 1980. I wish to thank the Rt. Hon. Malcolm MacDonald for allowing me to use this quote and to cite passages from his father's papers.

5 See Butler, D.E. and Sloman, Anne, British and Political Facts, 1900-1979 (London, 1980), pp. 141–42.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

6 See Jennings, W. Ivor, The British Constitution (Cambridge, 1966), pp. 20–28Google Scholar, on the strengths and weaknesses of both systems.

7 Interestingly, as Prime Minister in 1918 at the time of the report of the first Speaker's conference on electoral reform, Lloyd George had denounced proportional representation as a device for “bringing faddists of all kinds into Parliament and establishing groups and disintegrating parties.” Now at the head of a truncated Liberal Party trying to regain power, it had suddenly become a national necessity (The Times, June 14, 1929, p. 9Google ScholarPubMed).

8 Pethick-Lawrence to MacDonald, June 2, 1929, MacDonald Papers, Public Record Office, PRO 30/69/1300.

9 Annual Register, 1929, p. 51.Google ScholarPubMed

10 5 Parliamentary Debates, 229, Commons (July 2, 1929), p. 49.Google Scholar

11 Ibid. (July 3, 1929), p. 65.

12 Ibid., pp. 72-74, 123-25, & 158.

13 The Times, July 3, 1929, p. 17.Google Scholar

14 See Fair, John D., British Interparty Conferences, A Study of the Procedure of Conciliation in British Politics, 1867-1921 (Oxford, 1980).Google Scholar

15 MacDonald to Ullswater, July 25 & 30, 1929, MacDonald Papers, PRO 30/69/1300.

16 Churchill to Baldwin, June 29, 1929, Baldwin Papers, Cambridge University Library, 164/36-37.

17 Maclean to Gladstone, July 30, 1929, Gladstone Papers, British Library, Add. MSS 46474/218-22.

18 Withers to Fry, July 30, 1929, Baldwin Papers, 164/36-37.

19 Campbell makes a solid case that Baldwin and MacDonald were “spiritual” allies by this time. Lloyd George and Churchill, even prior to the latter's break over India in early 1931, were quite out of favor with the Conservative leader (Campbell, , Lloyd George, pp. 243–44 & 252–53Google Scholar).

20 The delegates included W.M. Adamson, Sir E.N. Bennett, J.S. Clarke, George Dallas, Ben Gardner, Dr. Marion Phillips, Joseph Westwood, and Lord Arnold from Labour; Captain R.C. Bourne, Lord Hugh Cecil, Sir Samuel Hoare, Sir Hugh O'Neill, Sir Basil Peto, A.N. Skelton, Major Oliver Stanley, and Lord Bayford from the Conservatives; and Megan Lloyd George, Sir Donald Maclean, Sir Herbert Samuel, Sir Archibald Sinclair, and Lord Craigmyle from the Liberal Party. C.G. Markbreiter, Assistant Secretary at the Home Office, served as secretary for the conference.

21 Hoare to Baldwin, April 28, 1930, Baldwin Papers, 52/267. During the course of their sittings Hoare reported to Neville Chamberlain that his colleagues were a “curious lot” and that “the powers that be must have taken names out of a hat. Linky [Lord Hugh Cecil] still rains letters upon me in favour of P.R. and Winston talks in apocalyptic phrases about the day of doom if we do not do a deal with the Liberals.” Hoare to Chamberlain, December 24, 1929, Chamberlain Paper, Birmingham University Library, NC 7/11/22/9. I am grateful to the university trustees for permission to use passages from the Chamberlain Papers and to Mr. B.S. Benedikz for his generous assistance in using them.

22 “The Second Labour Government, ” Templewood Papers, Cambridge University Library, VI:2. Also see Sinclair's notes in the Thurso Papers, Churchill College Library, 159/77. Virtually all extant printed materials for the conference can be found in the Thurso collection. I gratefully acknowledge the permission of Paul Paget, CVO, FAS, FRIBA, to use passages from the Templewood Papers.

23 Maclean to Gladstone, December 22, 1929, Gladstone Papers, Add. MSS 46474/339-43.

24 5 Parl. Debs., 233, Commons (December 19, 1929), pp. 1672–89.Google Scholar

25 Maclean further referred to Lloyd George's speech as “a brilliant uncompromising, provocative attack.” Maclean to Gladstone, December 22, 1929, Gladstone Papers, Add. MSS 46474/339-43. Hoare concurred that “L1.G's speech was the best I have ever heard him make.” Hoare to Chamberlain, December 24, 1929, Chamberlain Papers, NC 7/11/22/9.

26 Diaries, December 19, 1929, MacDonald Papers, PRO 30/69/1753. MacDonald's diaries are used in this study in accordance with his wish that they are “meant as notes to guide and revive memory as regards happenings and must on no account be published as they are.”

27 Marquand, , MacDonald, p. 528.Google Scholar

28 Diaries, February 3, 1929, MacDonald Papers, PRO 30/69/1753.

29 “Statement by JRM re position vis-a-vis Lloyd George, ” February 4, 1930, idid., PRO 30/69/1305.

30 Lloyd George to Margaret Lloyd George, February 20, 1930, in Morgan, Kenneth O., ed., Lloyd George Family Letters, 1885-1936 (Cardiff & Oxford, 1973), p. 210.Google Scholar

31 See dairies, February 20 & 26, 1930, MacDonald Papers, PRO 30/69/1753.

32 Diaries, March 9 & 18, 1930, Dalton Papers, London School of Economics, vol. 13/1. Extracts from the Dalton diaries are used with the permission of the British Library of Political and Economic Science.

33 Diaries, March 18, 1930, MacDonald Papers, PRO 30/69/1753. Lloyd George's choice of the naval conference as a pretext for not opposing the Government apparently stemmed from his talks with Henderson. It also placed him more in line with opinion in his own party. Dairies, March 22 & 23, 1930, Dalton Papers, vol. 13/1.

34 In a speech on March 27 at Epping, Churchill recognized “the key to the present political situation consisted in the reform of the electoral law” which he hoped would “enable the two non-Socialist parties to find a certain common measure of agreement.” But he thought it was “more than probable that some understanding had been reached behind the backs of Lord Ullswater's Conference” (The Times, March 28, 1930, p. 8Google Scholar).

35 “Labour-Liberal Entente Based On A Big Electoral Reform Bill, Memorandum by Lord Arnold, ” MacDonald Papers, PRO 30/69/5/166.

36 “Memo by J.R.M., ” ibid., PRO 30/69/5/166.

37 “Memorandum by Muir, May 8, 1930, Samuel Papers, House of Lords Record Office, A73/10.

38 Diaries, May 19, 1930, MacDonald Papers, PRO 30/69/1753.

39 “Diaries, May 20, 1930, Dalton Papers, vol. 13/1.

40 Diaries, May 21, 1930, MacDonald Papers, PRO 30/69/1753.

41 “Diaries, May 11, 1930, Dalton Papers, vol. 13/1.

42 “Further Developments of Electoral Reform, ” May 23, 1930, Templewood Papers, VI, 2. Unaware of the real reason for their schism, Hoare attributed it to “the action that we have adopted at the recent meetings. At the early meetings we riddled with criticisms both P.R. and the Alternative Vote. I think we may claim to have succeded in convincing the Socialists of the dangers of P.R., and the Liberals of A.V.”

43 “Electoral Reform, ” June 2, 1930, ibid.

44 Letter from Lord Ullswater to the Prime Minister, Conference on Electoral Reform, July 17, 1930, Parliamentary Papers, Cmd. 3636/1930.

45 “Electoral Reform, ” June 2, 1930, Templewood Papers, VI, 2.

46 Ibid.

47 “Memorandum, ” ibid.

48 “Electoral Reform No. 1, ” note by Hoare, Baldwin Papers, 52/272.

49 Ullswater to the Prime Minister, July 17, 1930, P.P., Cmd. 3636/1930.

50 Cabinet Minutes, June 4, 1930, CAB 23/64/31(30), Appendix.

51 5 Parl. Debs., 241, Commons (July 9, 1930), pp. 478–99.Google Scholar

52 Diaries, July 9, 1930, Dalton Papers, vol. 13/I.

53 Diaries, July 9, 1930, MacDonald Papers, PRO 30/69/1753.

54 Hoare to Ullswater, July 5, 1930, Templewood Papers, VI, 2.

55 “Electoral Reform, No. I, ” note by Hoare, Baldwin Papers, 52/272. Hoare later recalled that “Ullswater who had become an old man since the Speaker's Conference of 1918, was a thoroughly bad chairman.” “The Second Labour Government, ” Templewood Papers, VI, 2. “Lloyd George to MacDonald, August 22, 1930, Lloyd George Papers, House of Lords Record Office, G/13/2/6. No doubt a major reason for MacDonald's failure in this regard was his deep distrust of the Liberal leader. “Conferences with Ll.G. are like a piano with a false note. He might have the decency to stay away, ” he commented at the time of their second two party conference. Diaries, July 10, 1930, MacDonald Papers, PRO 30/69/1753. I am grateful to Mr. A. J. P. Taylor, on behalf of the Beaverbrook Foundation, to cite passages from the Lloyd George Papers.

57 Lothian to Sylvester and Rowntree, August 27, 1930, Lothian Papers, Scottish Record Office, Edinburgh, GD 40/17/251(501).

58 Addison to MacDonald, September 10, 1930, MacDonald Papers, 30/69/2/10.

59 McDonald to Lloyd George, September 12, 1930, ibid., PRO 30/69/1308.

60 Lloyd George to MacDonald, September 14, 1930, ibid.

61 Snowden, Viscount, Autobiography, 2 vols. (London, 1934), 2:884–85.Google Scholar

62 See “Note of a discussion at the Cabinet Meeting held on September 25th, 1930, ” Cabinet Minutes, CAB 23/90B, and Wilkie, James, “The Secret Deal that Kept Labour in Office, ” The Scotsman, April 6, 1974, p. 1.Google Scholar

63 Snowden, , Autobiography, 2: 888.Google Scholar

64 The Times, October 27, 1930, p. 14.Google ScholarPubMed

65 Butler, , Electoral System in Britain, pp. 65–66.Google Scholar

66 Sinclair to Butler, March 1, 1951, Butler Papers, Nuffield College, Oxford. (Permission to use the Sinclair correspondence was granted by the present Lord Thurso.) Lord Samuel, who saw this correspondence, later stated that he was in substantial agreement with it. Samuel to Sinclair, March 13, 1951, ibid. I am most grateful to Dr. Butler for allowing me to see these and other letters from his correspondence file.

67 Butler, , Electoral System in Britain, p. 65.Google Scholar

68 “Notes of Speeches, ” Oct. Nov. 1930, Lloyd George Papers, G/180. According to the aide who transcribed this message for Lloyd George, Ramsay Muir had written fully to him “reporting the doings of yesterday, but the letter is not at St. Donats. Neither is it at the local Post office. I am having a copy sent to Tenby.” In the absence of Muir's account, the telephone message is the only other extant record.

69 Cabinet Minutes, Nov. 17, 1930, CAB 23/65/68(30).

70 Lloyd George to Robert Alstead, November 20, 1930, Lloyd George Papers, G/32/1/40.

71 Memo, on talk with Lloyd George, November 11, 1930, Grigg Papers, Bodleian Library, Reel #4, M.S. Film 1002. I am grateful to Mr. John Grigg for allowing me to sec his father's papers and to use this passage.

72 Diaries, November 21, 1930, Chamberlain Papers, NC 2/22. Chamberlain confided to his sister that he “was not disposed to give electoral reform but if you said ‘a deal on seats’ I might see something in it.” N. Chamberlain to Ida Chamberlain, November 22, 1930, ibid., NC 18/1/718.

73 Diaries, December 1, 1930, Dalton Papers, vol. 13/I.

74 Ibid., December 5, 1930, N. Chamberlain to I. Chamberlain, December 5, 1930, Chamberlain Papers, NC 18/1/719.

75 The Times, December 6, 1930, p. 12.Google Scholar

76 See N. Chamberlain to I. Chamberlain, December 5, 1930, Chamberlain Papers, NC 18/1/719 and Dairies, December 6, 1930, ibid., NC 2/22.

77 Skidelsky, , Politicians and the Slump, p. 279Google Scholar, and Diaries, October 29 & December 4, 1930, MacDonald Papers, PRO 30/69/1753.

78 Ibid., December 3 & 5, 1930.

79 Ibid., March 1 & 16, 1931. Dalton relates that “LG having voted with us, goes home & finds Megan & Gwilym in front of the fire in their pyjamas! Neither had voted. It is said that he spanked them both.” Diaries, March 16, 1931, Dalton Papers, vol. 13/I.

80 Diaries, March 18, 1931, MacDonald Papers, PRO 30/69/1753.

81 MacDonald to Lloyd George, March 20, 1931, ibid., PRO 30/69/1176.

82 Diaries, April 28, 1931, Dalton Papers, vol. 13/I.

83 When Snowden introduced his third budget, Dalton called it “a clever get-out. It will carry us on & rally the Liberals. L-G as pleased as a child over the Land Tax. Frank Owen told me a few days ago that L.G. had told him that he would like ‘one more big fight before I die, ’ and the Land & the Lords looks likely to furnish it. There was the same thrill in his voice, & the very same phrase, tonight over the Land Tax, as over Addison's Land Visitation Bill, ‘it is a measure after my own heart!’ “ ibid., April 27, 1931.

84 Diaries, June 9, 14, & 16, 1931, MacDonald Papers, PRO 30/69/1753. Also see Diaries, Dalton Papers, June 15, 1931, vol. 13/I.

85 Diaries, June 16, 1931, ibid.

86 MacDonald to Snowden, June 16, 1931, MacDonald Papers, PRO 30/69/1311.

87 Diary, July 6, 1931, Chamberlain Papers, NC 2/22. These interchanges were effectively camoflauged by an attack that Lloyd George made “with astonishing venom and bitterness” on July 3 against Simon, who had recently defected to the Conservatives. “The Socialists rocked & rolled about with laughter and applause, ” Chamberlain recorded. “I thought it a sorry performance & wondered what the Socialists would have said if they had known that at the very moment they were applauding him L.G. was secretly negotiating with us!” N. Chamberlain to Hilda Chamberlain, ibid., NC 8/1/746.

88 Diaries, July 5, 1931, Bayford Papers, Conservative Central Office, Smith Square.

89 The comic climax of the electoral reform negotiations, involving no little espionage and counter-espionage, is described at length by Chamberlain in a letter to his sister Ida on July 25, 1931, Chamberlain Papers, NC 18/1/749.

90 On this see, Fair, John D., “The Conservative Basis for the National Goverment of 1931, ” The Journal of British Studies 20 (Fall, 1980): 142–64.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

91 Sinclair to Butler, February 26, 1951, Butler Papers.