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The 2016 Judicial Activity of the International Court of Justice

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 September 2017

Christine Gray
Christine Gray*
Affiliation:
Professor of International Law at the University of Cambridge.
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Current Developments
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American Journal of International Law , Volume 111 , Issue 2 , April 2017 , pp. 415 - 436
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Copyright © 2017 by The American Society of International Law 

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References

1 Question of the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf Between Nicaragua and Colombia Beyond 200 Nautical Miles from the Nicaraguan Coast (Nicar. v. Colom.), Preliminary Objections, Judgment (Int'l Ct. Justice Mar. 17, 2016) [hereinafter Delimitation Case]. All the materials of the Court cited in this report are available on its website, http://www.icj-cij.org.

2 Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicar. v. Colom.), Judgment, 2012 ICJ Rep. 624 (Nov. 19) [hereinafter Territorial & Maritime Case]. Judge Owada in his Separate Opinion set out some of the background of the 2012 case; he pointed out that Nicaragua had only introduced its request for the delimitation of the outer continental shelf very late in the proceedings. Delimitation Case, supra note 1, Sep. Op. Owada, J., paras. 10–16.

3 The American Treaty on Pacific Settlement, Apr. 30, 1948, 30 UNTS 55 (entered into force June 5, 1949). Article XXXI provides that the parties recognize as compulsory the jurisdiction of the Court “as long as the present Treaty is in force.”

4 Delimitation Case, supra note 1, Judgment, paras. 116–25.

5 The Court rejected the fourth preliminary objection—that Nicaragua was seeking to appeal the 2012 Judgment—unanimously with very little discussion. Id., paras. 89–90. It saw no need to decide on the second preliminary objection to Nicaragua's claim that the Court had continuing jurisdiction based on the 2012 Judgment; it had already decided that it had jurisdiction under the Pact of Bogotá and so it was unnecessary to decide whether an additional ground of jurisdiction existed. Id., paras. 91–94.

6 Id., para. 18.

7 Id., para. 21.

8 Id., paras. 19–48.

9 Id., para. 34.

10 Id., para. 44.

11 Id.

12 Id., paras. 47–88. The Court regarded this as an objection to admissibility rather than to jurisdiction. Id., para 48. On the difference between the two, see Shany, Yuval, Jurisdiction and Admissibility, in The Oxford Handbook of International Adjudication 779 (Romano, Cesare, Alter, Karen & Shany, Yuval eds., 2014)Google Scholar.

13 Delimitation Case, supra note 1, para. 49 (quoting Territorial & Maritime Dispute, supra note 2, para. 17) (emphasis added).

14 Id., para. 55. See id., Sep. Op., Owada, J., and id., Sep. Op., Greenwood, J. for fuller discussion of this doctrine.

15 Id., Joint Diss. Op., Yusuf, Cançado Trindade, Xue, Gaja, Bhandari, Robinson, JJ., Brower, J. ad hoc, para. 2 [hereinafter Joint Diss. Op.]. For an opposing view, see id., Sep. Op., Owada, J., paras. 17–29.

16 Id., paras. 63–67.

17 Id., paras. 68–71. The Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) was a body of scientific experts whose task it was to recommend the outer limit of the continental shelf of states, partly in order to establish the division between the shelf and the common heritage of mankind, the deep-sea bed.

18 Id., para. 74.

19 Id., Joint Diss. Op., para. 16.

20 Id., Joint Diss. Op. Judge Greenwood challenged this interpretation. See id., Sep. Op., Greenwood J., paras. 18–19.

21 Id., Judgment, para. 82.

22 Some judges expressed disquiet about this part of the judgment. Judge Robinson asked what was the basis for requiring a submission under Article 76, given that Colombia was not a party to UNCLOS, and given that in 2012, the Court had said that the applicable law was customary international law. Id., Decl., Robinson, J. Judge Donoghue expressed similar concerns in her Dissenting Opinion in the 2012 Judgment, Territorial & Maritime Case, supra note 2, Diss. Op., Donoghue, J., and again in the current case, Delimitation Case, supra note 1, Diss. Op., Donoghue, J., para. 48.

23 Delimitation Case, supra note 1, Judgment, paras. 85–88.

24 Id., Joint Diss. Op., para. 20.

25 Id., Joint Diss. Op., para. 59; see also id., Diss. Op., Donoghue, J., paras. 42–45.

26 The delimitation of the outer continental shelf has come up before the UNCLOS dispute settlement bodies, but only in the special geographical and geomorphological situation of the Bay of Bengal. Infra notes 32, 33.

27 Delimitation Case, supra note 1, Sep. Op., Greenwood, J., para. 6. Judge Greenwood and Judge Donoghue point out that the question of the delimitation of the outer shelf between Nicaragua and certain Colombian islands had not been raised in the 2012 Judgment and so could not be covered by any claim of res judicata. Id., Sep. Op., Greenwood, J., paras. 12–14; id., Diss. Op., Donoghue, J., para. 43.

28 The eight dissenting judges argued that it was illogical to treat only the first requirement in Article 76 as a prerequisite. Id., Joint Diss. Op., paras. 50–51; id., Diss. Op., Donoghue, J., paras. 47–51.

29 Id., Sep. Op., Owada, J., paras 33–39.

30 Territorial & Maritime Case, supra note 2, para. 126.

31 Delimitation Case, supra note 1, paras. 101–04.

32 See, e.g., Huang, Yao & Liao, Xuexia, Natural Prolongation and Delimitation of Continental Shelf Beyond 200nm: Implications of the Bangladesh/Myanmar Case, 4 Asian J. Int'l L. 281 (2014)Google Scholar; Magnusson, Bjarni Mar, Is There a Temporal Relationship Between Delineation and Delimitation of the Continental Shelf Beyond 200nm?, 28 Int'l J. Marine & Coastal L. 465 (2013)Google Scholar; Delimitation Case, supra note 1, Decl., Gaja, J. Judge Bhandari argued in his Declaration that the Court should not proceed to the merits phase without a recommendation by the CLCS.

33 See discussion by Judge Donoghue: Delimitation Case, supra note 1, Diss. Op., Donoghue, J., para. 31.

34 Id., Judgment, para. 104.

35 Id., para. 110.

36 Alleged Violations of Sovereign Rights and Maritime Spaces in the Caribbean Sea (Nicar. v. Colom.), Judgment (Int'l Ct. Justice Mar. 17, 2016) [hereinafter Alleged Violations Case].

37 Id., paras. 20–48.

38 Id., para. 50.

39 Id., paras. 53–54, 61–66.

40 Id., paras. 55–60.

41 Id., paras. 49–79.

42 Id., para. 73.

43 Id., para. 74.

44 Id., Diss. Op., Caron, J. ad hoc, paras. 14–17.

45 Id., Diss. Op., Caron, J. ad hoc,

46 Id., Diss. Op., Caron, J. ad hoc,

47 Id., para. 76.

48 It had earlier avoided pronouncement on alleged violations of Article 2(4) in Land and Maritime Boundary Between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria), 2002 ICJ Rep. 303, and more recently in Certain Activities Carried out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicar.), Judgment, 2015 ICJ Rep. 665, para. 97 (Dec. 16). See critical account by Ranganathan, Surabhi, The 2015 Judicial Activity of the International Court of Justice, 110 AJIL 504, 520–21 (2016)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

49 Alleged Violations Case, supra note 36, Judgment, para. 80.

50 Id., paras. 88–91.

51 Id., paras. 92–101. It had earlier avoided the same question in Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicar. v. Hond.), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment, 1988 ICJ Rep. 95, para. 65 (Dec. 20).

52 Alleged Violations Case, supra note 36, Judgment, para. 95.

53 Id., paras. 102–03.

54 Id., para. 104.

55 Id., Sep. Op., Cançado Trindade, J. The question of the Court's inherent power had also arisen, and been avoided, in the 2016 Delimitation Case, supra note 5. See Brown, Chester, The Inherent Powers of International Courts and Tribunals, 76 Brit. Y.B. Int'l L. 195 (2005)Google Scholar.

56 Alleged Violations Case, supra note 36, Judgment, para. 105.

57 As Judge ad hoc Caron pointed out in id., Diss. Op., Caron, J., para. 74.

58 Id., Judgment, para. 109.

59 Id., Decl., Bhandari, J.

60 Obligations Concerning Negotiations Relating to Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and to Nuclear Disarmament (Marsh Is. v. UK; Marsh. Is. v. India: Marsh. Is. v. Pak.), Judgment (Int'l Ct. Justice Oct. 5, 2016) [hereinafter RMI v. UK; RMI v. India; RMI v. Pakistan].

61 Apart from the UK, India, and Pakistan, these are the United States, China, Russia, France, North Korea, and Israel (which does not openly acknowledge its possession of nuclear weapons).

62 The RMI made a declaration under Article 36(2) on March 15, 2013, deposited it with the UN secretary-general on April 24, 2013, and brought the cases a year later. The RMI invited the six other nuclear weapons states to accept the jurisdiction of the Court under Article 38 of the ICJ Statute. China expressly rejected this invitation and the other states made no reply. RMI v. UK, supra note 60, Judgment, paras. 1, 22.

63 Nuclear Tests Cases (Austl. v. Fr.) 1974 ICJ Rep. 253 (Dec. 20); (N.Z. v. Fr.) 1974 ICJ Rep. 457 (Dec. 20).

64 Request for an examination of the situation in accordance with paragraph 63 of the Court's judgment of December 20, 1974 in the Nuclear Tests Case (N.Z. v. Fr.), Order, 1995 ICJ Rep. 288 (Sept. 22).

65 Legality of the Use or Threat of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion,1996 ICJ Rep. 226, para. 105(E) (July 8) [hereinafter Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion]. “[I]n view of the current state of international law, and of the elements of fact at its disposal, the Court cannot conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which the very survival of a State would be at stake.” See Gleider Hernandez, The International Court of Justice and the Judicial Function 266–67 (2014).

66 Legality of the Use or Threat of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 65, Decl., Bedjaoui, J.

67 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, 21 UST 483, 729 UNTS 161 (entered into force Mar. 5, 1970). The UK has been a party since its entry into force in 1970; the RMI acceded to the treaty in 1995.

68 RMI v. UK, supra note 60, Judgment, paras. 11–12.

69 RMI v. India, supra note 60, Judgment, para. 1; RMI v. Pakistan, supra note 60, Judgment, para. 1.

70 RMI v. UK, supra note 60, Sep. Op., Owada, J.; Decls. Abraham, J., Xue, J., Donoghue, J., Gaja, J.

71 RMI v. Pakistan, supra note 60, Judgment, para. 6. Pakistan did not seek the appointment of an ad hoc judge; it did not make any oral pleadings.

72 Judge Tomka voted with the minority that there was a dispute, but joined the majority in holding that the Court could not proceed to the merits (on the basis that the case was inadmissible because of the absence of the other nuclear powers in the proceedings). RMI v. UK, supra note 60, Sep. Op., Tomka, J., paras. 33–41.

73 RMI v. UK, supra note 60, Diss. Op., Yusuf, J., para. 2.

74 Id., para. 32.

75 Id., paras. 48–60.

76 Id.; see also RMI v. Pakistan, supra note 60, Decl., Yusuf, J., paras. 23–30.

77 See RMI v. UK, Application Instituting Proceedings, para. 82 (Int'l Ct. Justice Apr. 24, 2016) [hereinafter RMI v. UK, Application].

78 Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 65, para. 99.

79 Id., para. 105(2)(F).

80 See RMI v. UK, supra note 60, Judgment, para. 44. For a history of the tests, see RMI. v. UK, Verbatim Record, ICJ Doc. CR 2016/5, at 11, paras. 21–29 (Int'l Ct. Justice Mar. 11, 2016) [hereinafter RMI v. UK, Verbatim Record].

81 RMI v. UK, Application, supra note 77, para. 85.

82 RMI v. UK, RMI Memorial, paras. 26–28, 103–10 (Int'l Ct. Justice Mar. 16, 2015) [hereinafter RMI v. UK, RMI Memorial].

83 Id., para. 28. In its cases against India and Pakistan, the RMI argued that the erga omnes obligation was customary in nature. RMI v. Pak., RMI Memorial, para. 33 (Int'l Ct. Justice Jan. 12, 2015).

84 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company Limited (Belg. v. Spain), Judgment, 1970 ICJ Rep. 32, para. 33 (Feb. 5).

85 Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belg. v. Sen.), Judgment, 2012 ICJ Rep. 422, para. 67 (July 20) [hereinafter Belg. v. Sen.].

86 RMI v. Pak., Pakistan Counter-Memorial, para. 8.50–8.51 (Int'l Ct. Justice Dec. 1, 2015) [hereinafter RMI v. Pakistan, Pakistan Counter-Memorial]. See also RMI v. Pakistan, supra note 60, Diss. Op., Cançado Trindade, J., para. 17.

87 RMI v. India, India Counter-Memorial, paras. 27, 34–42 (Int'l Ct. Justice Sept. 16, 2015) [hereinafter RMI v. India, India Counter-Memorial].

88 RMI v. UK, UK Preliminary Objections, paras. 83–103 (Int'l Ct. Justice June 15, 2015) [hereinafter RMI v. UK, UK Preliminary Objections]; RMI v. India, India Counter-Memorial, supra note 87, paras. 27–42.

89 RMI v. UK, UK Preliminary Objections, supra note 88, paras. 104–12; RMI v. India, India Counter-Memorial, supra note 87, paras. 88–92.

90 RMI v. UK, supra note 60, Sep. Op., Tomka, J., paras. 31–41.

91 RMI v. UK, supra note 60, Decl., Xue, J., para. 9.

92 Belg. v. Sen., supra note 85, Diss. Op., Xue, J., paras. 12–23.

93 Interestingly she had not raised this concern in Whaling in the Antarctic (Austl. v. Japan: N.Z. Intervening), 2014 ICJ Rep. 226 (Mar. 31).

94 RMI v. UK, supra note 60, Diss. Op., Crawford, J., paras. 20–22.

95 Similarly, the Court had not raised this issue in the Whaling case, supra note 93. See Christine Gray, The 2014 Judicial Activity of the ICJ, 109 AJIL 583 (2015).

96 RMI v. UK, RMI Memorial, supra note 82, paras. 95–102.

97 RMI v. UK, Verbatim Record, supra note 80, paras. 1–21.

98 See Federica Paddeu, Multilateral Disputes in Bilateral Settings: International Practice Lags Behind Theory, 76 CLJ 1 (2017), for a critical account.

99 See Gleider Hernandez, supra note 65, at 224–29; Tams, Christian & Tzanakopoulos, Antonios, Barcelona Traction at 40, 23 Leiden J. Int'l L. 781 (2010)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

100 RMI v. UK, supra note 60, Judgment, paras. 26, 36–40. Judge Yusuf was very critical of this “legal relic,” an old and controversial concept, used to distinguish political disputes from legal ones. RMI v. UK, supra note 60, Diss. Op., Yusuf, J., paras. 10–13.

101 RMI v. India, supra note 60, Judgment, para. 22; RMI v. Pakistan, supra note 60, Judgment, para. 22.

102 RMI v. UK, supra note 60, Judgment, paras. 37–40. Judge Owada in his Separate Opinion, RMI v. UK, supra note 60, Sep. Op., Owada, J., para. 9, calculated that there had been nineteen cases on this question in the history of the PCIJ and ICJ. On the increasing trend for the Court to refer to its own jurisprudence, see Wolfgang Alschner & Damien Charlotin, The Growing Complexity of the ICJ's Self-Citation Network: Institutional Achievement or Access-to-Justice Concern? (University of Cambridge Faculty of Law Research Paper No. 59/2016, 2016).

103 Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georg. v. Russ.), Preliminary Objections, Judgment 2011 ICJ Rep. 70, paras. 61, 87, 104 (Apr. 1). These paragraphs do not obviously support the Court's position as to the existence of an awareness test. Moreover Georgia v. Russia was not an Optional Clause case. The Court in the Marshall Islands cases did not consider whether it was appropriate to refer to Article 36(1) cases as authoritative with regards to the question whether there was a dispute under Article 36(2). See RMI v. UK, supra note 60, Sep. Op., Tomka, J., para. 10.

104 RMI v. UK, supra note 60, Judgment, paras. 52, 57.

105 Judge Crawford noted this fact, and also argued convincingly that the Alleged Violations case was actually not authority for the objective awareness requirement that the Court derived from it. RMI v.UK, supra note 60, Diss. Op., Crawford, J., paras. 4–6.

106 RMI v. UK, UK Preliminary Objections, supra note 88, paras. 6, 29–44.

107 RMI v. UK, supra note 60, Judgment, para. 45.

108 See also the strong rejections of the UK's position in RMI v. UK, supra note 60, Sep. Op., Tomka, J., para. 12; Diss. Op., Cançado Trindade, J., para. 13. However, as Judge Bedjaoui pointed out, the Court later revived the notification requirement in the new guise of the “awareness test.” RMI v. UK, supra note 60, Diss. Op., Bedjaoui, J., paras. 26–27.

109 Unlike the UK, India and Pakistan had spoken and voted in favor of disarmament. The dissenting judges nevertheless said that their conduct in maintaining and upgrading their nuclear weapons since 1998 allowed the inference that there was a dispute.

110 RMI v. UK, supra note 60, Judgment, paras. 48–52.

111 Id., para. 52.

112 The UK had put forward this test in its Preliminary Objections. RMI v. UK, Preliminary Objections, supra note 88, para. 44.

113 RMI v. UK, supra note 60, Diss. Op., Sebutinde, J., para. 29; Diss. Op., Cançado Trindade, J., paras. 18–19; Diss. Op., Crawford, J., para. 26; Diss. Op., Bedjaoui, J., paras. 28–29.

114 RMI v. UK, supra note 60, Diss. Op., Bedjaoui, J., paras. 59–68.

115 RMI v. UK, supra note 60, Judgment, para. 56.

116 Id., para. 57.

117 RMI v. UK, supra note 60, Diss. Op., Robinson, J., para. 68.

118 RMI v. UK, supra note 60, Diss. Op., Bedjaoui J. ad hoc, paras. 70–87.

119 RMI v. UK, supra note 60, Judgment, para. 42 (italics added).

120 See, e.g., RMI v. UK, supra note 60, Sep. Op., Tomka, J., paras. 18–32; Diss. Op., Bedjaoui, J., para. 32; Diss. Op., Robinson, J., paras 41, 45–46, 49; Diss. Op., Crawford, J., para. 11.

121 See RMI v. UK, supra note 60, Diss. Op., Bennouna, J., para. 3; Diss. Op., Yusuf, J., paras 21, 22; Diss. Op., Crawford, J., paras. 4–6, 19; Diss. Op., Robinson, J., paras. 26–40; Diss. Op., Sebutinde, J., paras. 15, 30; Diss. Op., Cançado Trindade, J., para. 20. Even one of the judges in the majority, Judge Bhandari, did not agree with this test. RMI v. UK, supra note 60, Sep. Op., Bhandari, J., paras. 9–15.

122 See, e.g., RMI v. UK, supra note 60, Diss. Op., Yusuf, J., para. 15; Diss. Op., Bennouna, J., paras. 5–6.

123 RMI v. UK, supra note 60, Diss. Op., Robinson, J., para. 24; see also Diss. Op., Sebutinde, J., paras. 30–31; Diss. Op., Bedjaoui, J., para. 31; Diss. Op., Crawford, J., paras. 4–6.

124 RMI v. UK, supra note 60, Diss. Op., Robinson, J., para. 24.

125 RMI v. UK, supra note 60, Diss. Op., Yusuf, J., para. 24; Diss. Op., Bennouna, J., para. 4; Sep. Op., Tomka, J., paras. 25–26; Diss. Op., Robinson, J., paras. 52–55.

126 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, (Nicar. v. U.S.), Jurisdiction and Admissibility,1984 ICJ Rep. 392 (Nov. 26).

127 RMI v. UK, supra note 60, Diss. Op., Bedjaoui, J., paras 37, 48, 70–71. See also, RMI v. UK, Verbatim Record, ICJ Doc. CR/2016/9, at 12, paras. 7–9 (Int'l Ct. Justice Mar. 16, 2016).

128 RMI v. UK, supra note 60, Decl., Abraham, J., para. 4.

129 Id., para. 9.

130 Id., para. 10.

131 Id., para. 12.

132 See Judge Shigeru Oda and The Path to Judicial Wisdom 147–62 (Edward McWhinney & Mariko Kawano eds., 2006).

133 Pakistan relied on its domestic jurisdiction reservation to make the doubtful claim that “Pakistan's nuclear programme is a matter of Pakistan's defence policy, which falls within Pakistan's domestic jurisdiction. It is not to be called into question by any court … .” RMI v. Pakistan, Pakistan Counter-Memorial, supra note 86, para. 7.45.

134 RMI v. UK, supra note 60, Decls., Gaja, J.; Xue, J., para 9; Sep. Op., Bhandari, J., paras. 14–16.

135 Immunities and Criminal Proceedings (Eq. Guinea v. Fr.), Judgment (Int'l Ct. Justice Dec. 7, 2016) [hereinafter Eq. Guinea v. Fr.].

136 See Eq. Guinea v. Fr., Verbatim Record, ICJ Doc. CR 2016/15, at 21, para. 21 (Int'l Ct. Justice Oct. 18, 2016).

137 Eq. Guinea v. Fr., Verbatim Record, ICJ Doc. CR 2016/17, at 6, para. 12 (Int'l Ct. Justice Oct. 19, 2016).

138 LaGrand Case (Ger. v. U.S.), Judgment, 2001 ICJ Rep. 466, paras. 92–110 (June 27).

139 Eq. Guinea v. Fr., Order, paras. 31–50 (Int'l Ct. Justice Dec. 7, 2016) [hereinafter Eq. Guinea v. Fr., Order].

140 Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), Preliminary Objections, 1996 ICJ Rep. 803, paras 24–31 (Dec. 12).

141 Eq. Guinea v. Fr., Order, supra note 139, Sep. Op., Xue, J.; Decl., Gevorgian, J.; Sep. Op., Kateka, J. ad hoc.

142 Eq. Guinea v. Fr., Order, supra note 139, Decl., Gaja, J.

143 Eq. Guinea v. Fr., Order, supra note 139, paras. 51–69.

144 Id., para. 71.

145 Id., para. 78.

146 Belg. v. Sen., Provisional Measures, Order, 2009 ICJ Rep. 140, paras. 57–60 (May 28).

147 Eq. Guinea v. Fr., Order, supra note 139, paras. 82–91.

148 Id., para 86.

149 Judge ad hoc Kateka objected to this form of words. Eq. Guinea v. Fr., Order, supra note 139, Sep. Op., Kateka, J. ad hoc, para. 30.

150 RMI v. UK, Verbatim Record, ICJ Doc. CR 2016/3, at 31, paras. 55–59 (Int'l Ct. Justice Mar. 9, 2016). The UK had already modified its optional clause declaration, supra note 127.

151 RMI v. UK, Verbatim Record, supra note 80, at 48, paras. 15–17.

152 RMI v. India, India Counter-Memorial, supra note 87, para. 5.

153 RMI v. Pakistan, Pakistan Counter-Memorial, supra note 86, paras. 3.1–3.5.

154 Delimitation Case, Verbatim Record, ICJ Doc. CR 2015/26, at 9, para. 14 (Int'l Ct. Justice Oct. 5, 2015).