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Bricker Amendment—Fallacies and Dangers

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 March 2017

John B. Whitton  and
J. Edward Fowler
John B. Whitton
Affiliation:
Princeton University
J. Edward Fowler
Affiliation:
Princeton University
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Extract

It would appear that the treaty-making procedure, long considered too cumbersome and too difficult, has suddenly become too easy. Almost from the beginning, the system whereby one-third plus one of the Senate membership can block any treaty, has been denounced as “undemocratic,” and as “government by minority.” In fact, as late as 1945 the House of Representatives approved a Constitutional Amendment to permit the approval of any treaty by a mere majority vote of the two Houses.

Type
Research Article
Information
American Journal of International Law , Volume 48 , Issue 1 , January 1954 , pp. 23 - 56
Copyright
Copyright © American Society of International Law 1954

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References

1 Colegrove, Kenneth, The American Senate and World Peace (New York: Vanguard Press, 1944), p. 13 Google Scholar.

2 H. J. Res. 60, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 91 Cong. Rec. 4440 (May 9, 1945).

3 Especially S. J. Res. 130, introduced by Senator John Bricker in 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 98 Cong. Rec. 907–914 (Feb. 7, 1952); S. J. Res. 1, introduced by Senator Bricker in 83d Cong., 1st Sess., 99 Cong. Rec. (Feb. 7, 1953); text proposed by the Committee on Peace and Law Through United Nations of the American Bar Association and approved by the House of Delegates Feb. 26, 1952, and S. J. Res. 43, introduced by Senator Watkins in 83d Cong.; 1st Sess. The text approved by the Senate Committee on the Judiciary June 4, 1953, after extensive hearings before its subcommittee on S. J. Res. 1 and S. J. Res. 43, reads:

“ (1) A provision of a treaty which conflicts with this Constitution shall not be of any force or effect.

“ (2) A treaty shall become effective as internal law in the United States only through legislation which would be valid in the absence of treaty.

“ (3) Congress shall have power to regulate all executive and other agreements with any foreign power or international organization. All such agreements shall be subject to the limitations imposed on treaties by this article.

“ (4) The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.”

4 U. S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Majority Report on Constitutional Amendment Relative to Treaties and Executive Agreements, Sen. Report 412 to accompany S. J. Res. 1, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1953), cited hereinafter as Majority Report.

5 Doe v. Braden (1853), 16 How. 636; Cherokee Tobacco Case (1871), 11 Wall. 616 at 621; Hauenstein v. Lynham (1880), 100 U. S. 483; Geofroy v. Riggs (1890), 133 U. S. 258; cited in Holman, Frank, “Treaty Law-Making: A Blank Check for Writing a New Constitution,” 36 American Bar Association Journal (1950), 708 Google Scholar; Majority Report, p. 3; and Ober, Frank, “The Treaty-Making and Amending Powers: Do They Protect Our Fundamental Rights?”, 36 American Bar Association Journal (1950), 718 Google Scholar.

6 (1920), 252 U. S. 416.

7 Ober, loc. cit.; Report of Committee on Peace and Law, 75 American Bar Association Reports (1950), 294 and Deutsch, Eberhard, “The Treaty-Making Clause: A Decision for the People of America,” 37 American Bar Association Journal (1951), 662 Google Scholar.

8 Elliot, Jonathan, Debates in the State Conventions (Washington: Jonathan Elliot, 1836)Google Scholar, Vol. III, p. 470.

9 Anderson, Chandler P., “The Extent and Limitations of the Treaty-Making Power under the Constitution,” this Journal, Vol. 1 (1907), p. 636 Google Scholar at p. 655. See also Butler, Charles Henry, The Treaty-Making Power of the United States (New York: Banks Law Publishing Co., 1902)Google Scholar, Vol. I, pp. 352–353.

10 Majority Report, p. 16; Holman, Frank, The Erroneous Arguments of the Opponents of a Constitutional Amendment on Treaties and Executive Agreements (Washington: American Bar Association, 1953), p. 22 Google Scholar, cited hereinafter as Holman, Erroneous Arguments; and Report of Committee on Peace and Law, 76 American Bar Association Reports (1951), 244.

11 Deutsch, loc. cit., p. 662, and statement of Alfred Schweppe, Chairman of Committee on Peace and Law, in U. S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Hearings on S. J. Res. 1 and S. J. Res. 43 Proposing an Amendment to the Constitution of the United States Relative to the Making of Treaties and Executive Agreements, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1953), pp. 59, 125, cited hereinafter as 1953 Hearings.

12 Farrand, Max, The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1911)Google Scholar, Vol. I, pp. 47, 54 and 61.

13 Farrand, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 417.

14 Public Utilities Commission v. Pollak (1952), 343 U. S. 451 at 461–463.

15 Toledo Newspaper Co. v. U. S. (1918), 247 U. S. 402 at 419–420 (overruled on other grounds); and Nye v. U. S. (1941), 313 U. S. 33 at 47–52.

16 Davis v. Beason (1890), 133 U. S. 333.

17 National Broadcasting Co. v. U. S. (1943), 319 U. S. 190 at 226–227.

18 Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath (1951), 341 U. S. 123 at 135–136, 199–200 (reversed on other grounds); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. Clark, 177 F. (2d) 79 at 84, 87–88 (C.A.D.C., 1949); Bailey v. Eichardson, 182 F. (2d) 46 at 49–60 (C.A.D.C., 1950).

19 Freedom of the press, Near v. Minnesota (1931), 283 U. S. 697; freedom of speech, Gitlow v. New York (1925), 268 U. S. 652; freedom of the press as to motion pictures, Burstyn v. Wilson (1952), 343 U. S. 495; freedom of religion, Murdock v. Pennsylvania (1943), 319 U. S. 105 at 108, and. McCollum v. Board of Education (1948), 333 U. S. 203.

20 177 F. (2d) 79 at 87 (C.A.D.C., 1949). See also: statement of Will Maslow at 1953 Hearings, pp. 306, 314–317; Zechariah Chafee, Jr., “Federal and State Powers Under the TIN Covenant on Human Eights,” Wisconsin Law Review (May, 1951), pp. 389, 441, 453; Perlman, Philip, “On Amending the Treaty Power,” 52 Columbia Law Review (1952), 846–847 CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and statement of Atty. Gen. Herbert Brownell at 1953 Hearings, p. 909.

21 Corwin, Edward S., National Supremacy (New York: Henry Holt, 1913), pp. 15–17 Google Scholar. For a detailed history of the limitations on the treaty power exercised by the Fifth Amendment see Cowles, Willard B., Treaties and Constitutional Law: Property Interferences and Due Process of Law (Washington: American Council on Public Affairs, 1941)Google Scholar.

22 Art. VI, Sec. 2.

23 Chan Ping v. U. S. (1889), 130 U. S. 581; The Cherokee Tobacco Case (1871), 11 Wall. 616; Head Money Cases (1884), 112 U. S. 580; Botiller v. Dominguez (1889), 130 U. S. 238; Fong Yue Ting v. U. S. (1893), 149 U. S. 698; Whitney v. Robertson (1888), 124 U. S. 190; and Moser v. U. S. (1951), 341 U. S. 41.

24 (1918), 246 U. S. 297 at 302. Cited in Majority Report, p. 15, and Committee on Peace and Law, Report, Feb. 1, 1953, p. 9. Emphasis supplied.

25 (1936), 299 U. 8. 304 at 319. Cited in Majority Report, p. 15.

26 Committee on Peace and Law, Report, Feb. 1, 1953, p. 9.

27 Statement of Frank Ober, member of Committee on Peace and Law, 1953 Hearings, p. 169, and Majority Report, p. 7.

28 Corwin, Edward S., The President: Office and Powers (New York: New York University Press, 1948), p. 207 Google Scholar. By the same author, The Constitution and What It Means Today (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1946), p. 119.

29 Moore, John Bassett, A Digest of International Law (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1906)Google Scholar, Vol. V, p. 241.

30 Charles Post, The Supreme Court and Political Questions ( Hopkins, Johns University Studies in Historical and Political Science, Series LIV, No. 4, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1936 Google Scholar), p. 94. See opinion of Mr. Justice McLean in Williams v. The Suffolk Insurance Co. (1839), 38 U. S. 414 at 420.

31 Corwin, Edward S., The Twilight of the Supreme Court (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1934), p. 111 Google Scholar.

32 Willoughby, Westel W., The Constitutional Law of the United States (2d ed., New York: Baker, Voorhis and Company, 1929)Google Scholar, Vol. III, p. 1326.

33 Post, op. tit., p. 122; and Willoughby, op. cit., p. 1336.

34 (1892), 143 II. S. 472 at 503; see also Cherokee Nation v. Georgia (1831), 5 Pet. 1, and Worcester v. Georgia (1832), 6 Pet. 515. Emphasis supplied.

35 (1803), 1 Cranch 137 at 176–180. Incidentally, the Constitution does not specify that unconstitutional Acts of Congress are without force and effect, no more than it states that unconstitutional treaties are invalid; and yet no one has suggested that the Constitution be amended so as to codify the rule of Marbury v. Madison.

36 Anderson, loc. cit., at p. 647. See also U. S. v. Minnesota (1926), 270 II. S. 181 at 207–208; Asakura v. Seattle (1924), 265 II. S. 332; Jones v. Walker (1803), 13 F.1062; Amaya et al. v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 158 F. (2d) 554 at 556 (C.A. 5, 1946, certiorari denied, 331 II. S. 808); II. S. v. Thompson, 258 F. 257 at 268 (E.D. Ark. 1919); Indemnity Insurance Co. of North America v. Pan American Airways, 58 F. Supp. 338 at 339–340 (S.D.N.Y. 1944); Moore, op. cit., Vol. V, pp. 166–169; Corwin, National Supremacy, pp. 14–15; and Wright, Quincy, Control of American Foreign Relations (New York: Macmillan Co., 1922), p. 81 Google Scholar.

37 (1920), 252 II. S. 416; statement of Frank Holman, 1953 Hearings, p. 146; Majority Report, p. 3; Schweppe, 1953 Hearings, p. 1235; and Holman, “Treaty Law-Making,” loc. cit., p. 709.

38 U. S. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp. (1936), 299 U. S. 304.

39 Holman, “Treaty Law-Making,” loc. cit., p. 709. Emphasis supplied.

40 Committee on Peace and Law, Report, Feb. 1, 1952, p. 9.

41 Statement of Eberhard Deutsch, 1953 Hearings, p. 116; idem, 37 American Bar Association Journal, 662; and Majority Report, p. 8.

42 Majority Report, pp. 16–17.

43 Majority Report, p. 6; Committee on Peace and Law, Report, Feb. 1, 1952, p. 9; statement of Frank Holman, 1953 Hearings, p. 148; and statement of George A. Finch, member of Committee on Peace and Law, 1953 Hearings, p. 1112.

44 (1936), 299 U. S. 304 at 315–316; cited in Report of Committee on Peace and Law, Feb. 1, 1952, p. 7.

45 Majority Report, p. 16.

46 Ober, 36 American Bar Association Journal, 718; statement at 1953 Hearings, p. 170.

47 Statement of George A. Finch, Proceedings, American Society of International Law, 1951, p. 137, and Majority Report, p. 14.

48 Majority Report, p. 17; Committee on Peace and Law, Report, Feb. 1, 1952, p. 12; and statement of Alfred Schweppe, 1953 Hearings, p. 1242.

49 Jefferson, Manual of Parliamentary Practice, cited in American Bar Association, Committee on Peace and Law, Reply to the “Memorandum of the Department of Justice on S. J. Res. 130, Eighty-Second Congress, Proposing an Amendment to the Constitution of the United States Relative to the Making of Treaties and Executive Agreements” in U. S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Hearings on S. J. Res. 130 Proposing an Amendment to the Constitution of the United States Relative to the Making of Treaties and Executive Agreements, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1952), p. 523; cited hereinafter respectively as Reply to Department of Justice and 1952 Hearings; Majority Report, p. 14; and Alfred Schweppe at 1953 Hearings, p. 1238.

50 Cowles, op. cit., pp. 8–9.

51 Corwin, National Supremacy, p. 19.

51a Corwin, National Supremacy, pp. 5–6. Cf. Burr, , “The Treaty-Making Power,” 51 Proceedings American Philosophical Society (1912), 271 Google Scholar.

52 Art. VI, Sec. 2; Art. I, Sec. 10. See opinion of Mr. Justice Stone in U. S. v. Darby (1941), 312 U. S. 100 at 124.

53 U. S. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp. (1936), 299 U. S. 304 at 318. See statement of James Madison as to the reasoning leading to inclusion of the supremacy clause in the Constitution, Farrand, op. cit., Vol. III, pp. 537–538.

54 Crandall, Samuel, Treaties, Their Making and Enforcement (2d ed., Washington: John Byrne and Company, 1916), p. 266 Google Scholar; Corwin, National Supremacy, p. 298; Perlman, loc. cit., p. 837; Henry Fraser, Treaties and Executive Agreements, Senate Doc. No. 244, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1944), pp. 8–13, 32–34; and Devlin, Robert, The Treaty Power under the Constitution of the United States (San Francisco: Bancroft-Whitney, 1908), p. 185 Google Scholar.

55 Arts. IV and V, 8 U. S. Stat. 80 (1783).

56 Art. V.

57 Art. XI, 8 U. S. Stat. 18 (1778).

58 Art. VI, 8 U. S. Stat. 36 (1782).

59 Art. VI, 8 U. S. Stat. 64 (1783).

60 Art. X, 8 U. S. Stat. 88 (1785).

61 See Crandall, op. cit., p. 266, and Fraser, op. ait., pp. 13–14.

62 Art. II, 1785 treaty with Prussia, 8 U. S. Stat. 84 (1785); Art. IX, treaty of 1782 with The Netherlands, 8 U. S. Stat. (1782); Art. IV, 1783 treaty with Sweden, 8 U. S. Stat. 78 (1783).

63 Convention with Prance of 1788, 8 U. S. Stat. 106 (1788).

64 Ware v. Hylton (1796), 3 Dall. 199, upholding the peace treaty, is the leading case on this point. Corwin, National Supremacy, pp. 74–77, The same treaty was upheld in Hopkirk v. Bell (1806), 3 Cranch 454, and Higginson v. Mein (1808), 4 Craneh 415.

65 Crandall, op. cit., p. 247; U. S. v. Fox (1875), 94 U. S. 315 at 320–321: “The title and modes of disposition of real property within the state, whether inter vivos or testamentary, are not matters placed under the control of Federal authority.” See Fairfax's Devisee v..Hunter's Lessee (1813), 7 Cranch 603; Chirac v. Chirac (1817), 2 Wheat. 259; Geofroy v. Eiggs (1890), 133 U. S. 258; and Hauenstein v. Lynham (1880), 100 U. S. 483.

66 Crandall, op. cit., pp. 250–251, and cases cited there.

67 Ibid., pp. 252–262, and Perlman, op. cit., p. 839.

68 Factor v. Laubenheimer (1933), 290 U. S. 276; Matter of Metzger (1847), 5 How. 176; Holmes v. Jennison (1840), 14 Pet. 540 at 569–570, 586–588; Neely v. Henkel (1901), 180 U. S. 109 at 123; and Charlton v. Kelly (1913), 299 U. S. 447.

69 Corwin, National Supremacy, pp. 95, 144.

70 Tellefsen v. Fee, 168 Mass. 188; Succession of Eabasse, 47 La. Ann. 1452; Matter of Lobrasciano, 38 Misc. Rep. (N.T.) 415; Matter of Fattosini, 33 Misc. Rep. 18; and Corwin, National Supremacy, pp. 134–135.

71 Statutes like the Acts of March 2, 1829, and Feb. 24, 1855, for implementing consular conventions of the United States (4 U. S. Stat. 359, and 10 ibid. 614), and the Trade-Mark Acts of 1870 and 1876 (16 ibid. 210, and 19 ibid. 141). Here the Acts of Congress were held unconstitutional as invading the reserved powers of the States, but the Court was careful to explain: “In what we have here said we wish to be understood as leaving untouched the whole question of the treaty-making power over trade-marks, and of the duty of Congress to pass any laws necessary to carry treaties into effect.” Trade-Mark Cases (1879), 100 U. S. 82 at 99; Corwin, National Supremacy, pp. 207–208; and Crandall, op. cit., pp. 240–241.

72 22 Stat. L. 215, Aug. 3, 1882.

73 Butler, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 85–87.

74 180 U. S. 109 (1901).

75 In re Ross (1891), 140 U. S. 453, and Baldwin v. Franks (1887), 120 U. S. 676, granting power to enact legislation for punishment of those guilty of depriving Chinese of rights guaranteed by a treaty of 1880. See Devlin, op. cit, pp. 171–172; Corwin, National Supremacy, pp. 291–292; and Anderson, loc. cit., pp. 662–663.

76 John Calhoun in Annals, 14th Cong., 1st Sess. (Jan. 9, 1816), p. 531, cited in Crandall, op. cit., pp. 246–247; Calhoun, Discourse on the Constitution and Government of the United States (Cralle, ed.), Vol. I, p. 202, cited in Moore, op. cit., Vol. V, p. 164; Opinion of Atty. Gen. Griggs on treaties for the regulation of fisheries, cited in Moore, op. cit., Vol. V, p. 161; 1907 statement of Mr. Wiliam Draper Lewis commenting on the San Francisco School Board controversy on the Japanese alien treaty, cited in Devlin, op. cit., p. 171; Elihu Root in Proceedings, American Society of International Law, 1907, pp. 278–279; Chandler P. Anderson, loc. cit., p. 657; Corwin, National Supremacy; Pomeroy, John N., Introduction to the Constitutional Law of the United States (Boston, 19th ed., 1888)Google Scholar, and Willoughby, Westel W., The Constitutional Law of the United States (New York, 1910)Google Scholar, Vol. I, p. 503.

77 Willoughby, The Constitutional Law of the United States (2d ed., 1929), Vol. I, p. 91.

78 Anderson, loc. cit., p. 639.

79 U. S. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp. (1936), 299 U. S. 304.

80 Magnusson, Jon, “Our Membership in the United Nations and the Federal Treaty Power Under the Constitution,” 34 Virginia Law Review (1948), 147 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Mr. Justice Matthews in Tick Wo v. Hopkins (1886), 118 U. S. 356 at 370.

81 Ware v. Hylton (1796), 3 Dall. 199.

82 Wright, op. cit., p. 123; Butler, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 383; and Corwin, National Supremacy, p. 123.

83 The Founding Fathers intended the Senate to perform that function. Farrand, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 393; and Elliot, op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 137.

84 Deutsch, loc. cit., p. 660.

85 Moore, op. cit., Vol. V, pp. 164–165, 175–179; Wright, op. tit., p. 93; Corwin, National Supremacy, pp. 210–212.

86 Colegrove, op. cit.; Stull Holt, W., Treaties Defeated by the Senate (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1933)Google Scholar; statement of Department of State, 1953 Hearings, p. 836: “A survey made by the Department of State in March, 1953 indicates the caution of the Senate in considering treaties. Of the 1,224 treaties submitted to the Senate from 1789 to 1953, … 28.8 per cent either failed of Senate approval or were approved subject to reservations and understandings.”

87 Hayden, Ralston, “The States' Rights Doctrine and the Treaty-Making Power,” 22 American Historical Review 571–585 (April, 1917)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

88 The French Consular Convention of 1853 is the best example of this practice. Under Art. VII of that treaty the President engaged to recommend to the particular States that if, pursuant to their then existing laws, Trench subjects were not then allowed to hold real estate in any State, that right might be conferred upon them. 10 U. S. Stat. 992, 996.

89 Potter, Pitman B., “Inhibitions upon the Treaty-Making Power of the United States,” this Journal, Vol. 28 (1934), pp. 456–474 Google Scholar; Edwards, Richard, “The Constitution, the Treaty Power, and Juridical Isolationism,” Pittsburgh Law Review (Winter, 1953), pp. 202–205 Google Scholar; and statement of Covey T. Oliver, 1953 Hearings, pp. 693–694.

90 Borchard, Edwin M., “Treaties and Executive Agreements—A Reply,” 54 Yale Law Journal (1945), 633 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Edwards, loo. cit., pp. 202–203; Potter, loc. cit., pp. 456–466; Manley O. Hudson in Proceedings, American Society of International Law, 1952, p. 8; and statement of Covey T. Oliver, 1953 Hearings, p. 688.

91 University of Illinois v. U. S. (1933), 289 U. S. 48 at 59, and U. S. v. California (1947), 332 U. S. 19.

92 Statement of George A. Finch, 1953 Hearings, pp. 1124, 1125.

93 Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 26, No. 675 (June 2, 1952), pp. 881–883; cited in ibid., p. 1125.

94 Santovincenzo v. Egan (1931), 284 U. S. 30; supra, pp. 33–34, and Cases cited there,* and Arthur Sutherland, Jr., “Restricting the Treaty Power,” 65 Harvard Law Review (June, 1952), 1335.

95 Asakura v, Seattle (1924), 265 U. S. 332.

96 Matter of Metzger (1847), 5 How. 176 at 188; Charlton v. Kelly (1913), 229 U. S. 447; Corwin, National Supremacy, p. 144: “it is apparent that, save for its possession of the treaty power, the power to extradite citizens of the United States … would not fall to the United States at all, but would remain with the States.”

97 Nielsen v. Johnson, 279 U. S. 47.

98 Statement of Elbert P. Tuttle, General Counsel of the Treasury, 1953 Hearings, pp. 1012–1017.

99 Majority Report, “Minority Views,” pp. 45–46.

100 Infra, p. 40.

101 Dickinson, Edwin DeWitt, “The Law of Nations as Part of the National Law of the United States, II,” 101 University of Pennsylvania Law Review (1953) 832 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

102 See especially: Finch, George A., “The Treaty-Clause Amendment: The Case for the Association,” 38 American Bar Association Journal (1952) 467–470 Google Scholar, 527–530; Committee on Peace and Law, Report, Feb. 1, 1952, p. 16; Majority Report, pp. 17–21; Committee on Peace and Law, Report, Feb. 1, 1953, pp. 11–12; statement of George A. Finch, 1952 Hearings, p. 326, and 1953 Hearings, pp. 1105, 1122–1126, 1130–1133, 1141–1149.

103 Statement of George A. Finch, 1953 Hearings, p. 1123.

104 Majority Report, p. 19; and Deutsch, Eberhard, “The Need for a Treaty Amendment: A Restatement and a Reply,” 38 American Bar Association Journal (1952) 795 Google Scholar. These proposals to “refer” legislation to the States for action are curious in the face of statements made by the same Committee on Peace and Law in 1949 in decrying the inadequacy of the Federal-State clause in the Covenant on Human Rights, which clause provided that the Federal Government should bring those provisions appropriate for action by the States, “with favorable recommendation, to the notice of the appropriate authorities of the states. …” Report of Committee on Peace and Law, 74 American Bar Association Reports (1949), 323–324: “If reference is made, it is useless because the states have no power whatsoever under our Constitution over foreign affairs. New York or California have no power to say that they will not accept certain portions of the human rights treaty. It is all or nothing, and if there is federal power in that field it is nothing for the states.” A year later the Committee still held the same opinion. 75 American Bar Association Reports (1950), 310: “The states of the United States have absolutely no power over international or foreign relations and affairs. It is idle to speak of referring such matters to states of the United States which have no power to act or to object.” (Emphasis supplied.)

105 Crandall, op. cit., p. 267. On July 21, 1953, the Senate gave its advice and consent to ratification of eight treaties of friendship, commerce etc. with Denmark, Ethiopia, Finland, Greece, Israel, Italy, Japan, and Western Germany. Under these treaties, Americans in those countries will enjoy numerous rights in return for the grant of similar rights to nationals of those countries within the United States. (82d Cong., 2d Sess., Senate Executives I, F, C, J, B, H, O, and N.) If the proposed amendment is adopted, such treaty provisions will be dependent upon favorable legislative action by each of the 48 States, which is to say that their force as internal law would be confined to the boundaries of each particular State. Moreover, not only would such legislation be always subject to repeal as to any State, at a moment's notice, but it would almost inevitably vary from State to State.

106 [1937] A. C. 326.

107 Statement of George A. Finch, 1953 Hearings, p. 1136; Reply to Department of Justice, p. 531; Committee on Peace and Law, Report, Feb. 1, 1952, pp. 15, 27–28, and Finch, “The Treaty-Clause Amendment,” loc. cit., p. 469.

108 Committee on Peace and Law, Report, Feb. 1, 1952, p. 15.

109 Chafee, Zechariah, “Stop Being Terrified of Treaties: Stop Being Scared of the Constitution,” 38 American Bar Association Journal (1952), 733–734 Google Scholar.

110 MacKenzie, N. A. M., “Canada and the Treaty-Making Power,” 15 Canadian Bar Review (1937), 453 Google Scholar; F. R. Scott, “The Consequences of the Privy Council Decisions,” ibid. 485; and Dorothy Kenyon, Address, New York County Lawyers Association, Proceedings of Public Joint Meeting of Committee on International Law and Committee on Federal Legislation, October 9, 1952 (mimeographed), p. 37.

111 Manley O. Hudson, Proceedings, American Society of International Law, 1952, p. 11. See also Scott, , “Centralization and Decentralization in Canadian Federalism,” 29 Canadian Bar Review (1951), 1095 Google Scholar.

112 Committee on Peace and Law, Report, Feb. 1, 1952, p. 14; Majority Report, p. 10; and Frank Holman, 1952 Hearings, p. 159.

113 (1829), 2 Pet. 253.

114 Report of Committee on Peace and Law, 75 American Bar Association Reports (1950), 292–293; statement of Eberhard Deutsch, 1952 Hearings, p. 52; Majority Report, p. 8.

115 (1829), 2 Pet. 253 at 314.

116 U. S. v. Percheman (1833), 7 Pet. 51. In the 1829 opinion Mr. Justice Marshall had added that, had the words, “are hereby confirmed,” been used, the article would have been self-executing.

117 Alona E. Evans, “Some Aspects of the Problem of Self-Executing Treaties,” Proceedings, American Society of International Law, 1951, pp. 73–74; and Wright, op. cit., p. 207.

118 Statement of Atty. Gen. Brownell at 1953 Hearings, p. 921; and see statement of Judge Putnam in United Shoe Machinery Co. v. Duplessis Shoe Machinery Co., 155 Fed. 842 at 845 (1st Cir. 1907).

119 For instance, Reply to Department of Justice, pp. 534–535; Report of Committee on Peace and Law, 75 American Bar Association Reports (1950), 295–296; Committee on Peace and Law, Report, Feb. 1, 1952, pp. 14–15; and Majority Report, pp. 9–10.

120 (1950) 217 Pac. (2d) 481.

121 (1952) 242 Pac. (2d) 617.

122 Statement of Frank Holman, 1952 Hearings, p. 153; and Majority Report, p. 9.

123 Reply to Department of Justice, p. 528; and Committee on Peace and Law, Report, Feb. 1, 1952, pp. 14–15.

124 Reply to Department of Justice, p. 528.

125 (1952) 242 Pac. (2d) 617 at 622; this Journal, Vol. 46 (1952), p. 559 at p. 563.

126 Charles Fairman, “Finis to Fujii,” this Journal, Vol. 46 (1952), p. 685; Oyama v. California (1948), 332 U. S. 633; and Takahashi v. Fish and Game Commission (1948), 334 U. S. 410.

127 Bernard Fensterwald, “Trojan Horse or Don Quixote's Windmill,” Federal Bar Journal (December, 1952); in 1953 Hearings, p. 775.

128 Fairman, loc. cit.; Preuss, Lawrence, “Some Aspects of the Human Rights Provisions of the Charter and Their Execution in the United States,” this Journal, Vol. 46 (1952), pp. 289–296 Google Scholar; and Manley O. Hudson, “Charter Provisions on Human Rights in American Law,” ibid., Vol. 44 (1950), pp. 543–548.

129 Holman, Frank, “International Proposals Affecting So-Called Human Rights,” 14 Law and Contemporary Problems 487 (Summer, 1949)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Majority Report, p. 12; and Reply to Department of Justice, p. 527.

130 George A. Finch, “The Treaty-Clause Amendment,” loc. cit., p. 470.

131 Report of Committee on Peace and Law, 75 American Bar Association Reports (1950), 313–320. These arguments have been convincingly answered by Professor Preuss after a careful examination of treaty law in the United Kingdom, The Netherlands, Belgium, Italy, Switzerland, Germany, Australia, and other countries. He contends that the arguments of the proponents are based upon “(1) a superficial examination of foreign practice, and, particularly, upon an exclusive reliance upon the formal texts of constitutional instruments; (2) a misunderstanding of the process by which treaties are given effect under foreign legal systems, and of the role played by the legislature in this process, especially in countries of parliamentary government; and (3) the influence of the dogmas of a dualistic and voluntaristic conception of international law which logically involves, or very nearly approaches, a negation of the very notion of international legal obligation.” Preuss, Lawrence, “On Amending the Treaty-Making Power: A Comparative Study of the Problem of Self-Executing Treaties,” 51 Michigan Law Review (1953) 1122 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

132 Report of Committee on Peace and Law, 74 American Bar Association Reports (1949) 487–488.

133 75 ibid. (1950) 291.

134 Finch, “The Treaty-Clause Amendment,” loc. cit., p. 468.

135 Lawrence Preuss, “The Execution of Treaty Obligations through Internal Law-System of the United States and of Some Other Countries,” Proceedings, American Society of International Law, 1951, pp. 82, 97.

136 Opinion Relative to the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations, Feb. 21, 1925, P.C.I.J., Series B, No. 10, p. 20; cited ibid., p. 97.

137 Wright, op. cit., pp. 256–262; McDougal, Myres S. and Arens, Bichard, “The Genocide Convention and the Constitution,” 3 Vanderbilt Law Review (1950) 687 Google Scholar.

138 Preuss, loc. cit. (supra, note 131), p. 1141. Emphasis supplied.

139 Deutsch, “The Need for a Treaty Amendment,” loc. cit., p. 795; Committee on Peace and Law, 1952 Hearings, p. 486; and Holman, Erroneous Arguments, p. 32.

140 Senator Lehman, on July 18, 1953, proposed such a revision of the Senate rules. 99 Cong. Rec. 9385 (July 18, 1953), unbound.

141 Memorandum of Parliamentarian of Senate, 98 Cong. Rec. 2602 (March 20, 1952); Dean, Arthur H., “The Bricker Amendment and Authority over Foreign Affairs,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 32 (1953), pp. 1, 15 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

142 Committee on Peace and Law, Report, Sept. 1, 1952, p. 14.

143 Catudal, Honoré, “Executive Agreements: A Supplement to the Treaty-Making Procedure,” 10 George Washington Law Review (1942) 656–657 Google Scholar. One spot check in 1951 indicated that about 85% of all agreements were of this type. Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Committee on Federal Legislation and Committee on International Law, “Report on S.J. Res. 1,” The Record of the Association of the Bar of the City of New Tork, Vol. 8, No. 4 (1953), p. 200, cited hereinafter as New York City Report on S.J. Res. 1.

144 For instance, the annexations of Texas in 1845 and of Hawaii in 1898, both being cases in which a treaty was defeated by the Senate, only to be deliberately replaced by a Congressional joint resolution.

145 Corwin, President: Office and Powers, p. 224.

146 McClure, Wallace, International Executive Agreements (New York: Columbia University Press, 1941), p. 277 Google Scholar; and Levitan, David, “Executive Agreements: A Study of the Executive in the Control of the Foreign Relations of the United States,” 35 Illinois Law Review (1940) 365–371 Google Scholar.

147 U. S. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp. (1936), 299 U. S. 304 at 318; Altaian & Company v. U. S. (1912), 224 U. S. 583; U. S. v. Belmont, (1937), 301 U. S. 324; and U. S. v. Pink (1942), 315 U. S. 203.

148 McClure, op. cit., p. 35.

149 See, generally; Crandall, op. cit., pp. 102–140; McClure, op. cit., passim; Catudal, loc. cit., pp. 653–669; Levitan, loc. cit., pp. 371–392; Department of State Memorandum Relating to the Making of International Agreements Other Than Treaties, 1953 Hearings, pp. 853–861; Corwin, President: Office and Powers, pp. 235–238, 413–415; and Willoughby (2d ed.), op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 537–547.

150 Department of State Memorandum, etc., 1953 Hearings, p. 861.

151 Majority Report, p. 27.

152 Sutherland, Arthur Jr., “Restricting the Treaty Power,” 65 Harvard Law Review (1952) 1324 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Association of the Bar of the City of New Tork, Committee on Federal Legislation and Committee on International Law, Report on S. J. Res. 130, April 28, 1952, p. 37, cited hereinafter as New York City Report on S. J. Res. 130.

153 Corwin, President: Office and Powers, p. 200.

154 Adrian S. Fisher, “Executive Powers in Foreign Relations,” Proceedings, American Society of International Law, 1951, p. 9.

155 Committee on Peace and Law, Report, Sept. 1, 1952, p. 13; and Majority Report, p. 25.

156 Statement of Frank Holman, 1953 Hearings, p. 1226; and statement of Alfred Schweppe, ibid., p. 1231.

157 Ibid., pp. 66, 1230; statement of George A. Finch, ibid., p. 1172, and Alfred Schweppe, 1952 Hearings, p. 44.

158 Majority Report, “Minority Views,” p. 48.

159 Majority Report, p. 24.

160 Statement of George A. Finch, 1953 Hearings, p. 1171.

161 Wright, op. cit., p. 41, and Crandall, op. cit., p. 2.

162 Wright, op. cit., pp. 54–55.

163 Ibid, p. 38.

164 Levitan, loc. cit., pp. 392–394; and McDougal, Myres S. and Lans, Asher, “Treaties and Congressional-Executive or Presidential Agreements: Interchangeable Instruments of National Policy,” 54 Yale Law Journal (1945) 319–331 Google Scholar.

165 The inconveniences and dangers which would ensue should the proposed amendment be adopted were emphasized in the Memorandum of the Parliamentarian of the Senate apropos of the reservation proposed by Senator Jenner to a clause of the United States-Japan Security Treaty of September 8, 1951. Commenting on this reservation, which was voted down 45–22, and would have required ratification by the Senate of administrative agreements under Art. III of the treaty, relating to the right to dispose of the Armed Forces of the United States, it was remarked that the reservation would destroy the “flexibility which would be impossible if formal treaties are used in each case. Also, it should be kept in mind that if our Government treats the administrative agreements as formal treaties, Japan will of necessity have to do the same thing. Under these circumstances, our position in Japan would be frozen subject to the action of the Japanese Diet and our own Senate. It would be difficult, in some cases impossible, to obtain such action quickly; and in the case of the Japanese Diet it might be impossible to obtain it at all.” Cong. Rec., Vol. 98, Pt. 2, p. 2603 (March 20, 1952).

166 Committee on Peace and Law, Report, Sept. 1, 1952, p. 14, and Majority Report, pp. 27–28.

167 U. S. v. Belmont (1937), 301 U. S. 324, and U. 8. v. Pink (1942), 315 V. S. 203. Cited in Committee on Peace and Law, Report, Sept. 1, 1952, p. 14, and statement of Alfred Schweppe, 1953 Hearings, pp. 1229–1230. This decision is thought to have “expanded the executive-agreement-making power in the same way that Missouri v. Holland … expanded the treaty-making power.” Majority Report, p. 31.

168 Ibid.

169 Joint Resolution of Aug. 4, 1939, 53 U. S. Stat. 1199. Arthur H. Dean, loc. cit., p. 16.

170 Chinese Exclusion Case (1889), 120 U. S. 581; Head Money Cases (1884), 112 U. S. 580.

171 Committee on Peace and Law, Report, Feb. 1, 1952, pp. 5–6.

172 United Nations, Economic and Social Council, Official Records: Fourteenth Session, Commission on Human Rights, Report of Eighth Session (New York: United Nations, 1952), p. 47. With respect to the Genocide Convention, see McDougal and Arens, loc. cit.; Jones, William, “The Genocide Convention and its Relation to the United States,” 25 Southern California Law Review (1952) 429–440 Google Scholar.

173 Committee on Peace and Law, Report, Feb. 1, 1952, p. 5.

174 Proceedings, American Society of International Law, 1929, p. 196; cited in Reply to Department of Justice, pp. 525–526; Majority Report, p. 4; Eberhard Deutsch, 1953 Hearings, p. 121; frank Holman, 1952 Hearings, p. 158.

175 Majority Report, p. 14.

176 Statement of Prank Ober, 1952 Hearings, p. 130.

177 Opening sentence of State Dept. Publication 3972, Foreign Affairs Policy Series 26, released September, 1950; cited in Committee on Peace and Law, Report, Feb. 1, 1952, p. 5; Reply to Department of Justice, pp. 522–523; Eberhard Deutsch, 1953 Hearings, p. 121; Frank Holman, ibid., p. 147; and elsewhere in the arguments of the Committee on Peace and Law.

178 Holman, Erroneous Arguments, p. 26.

179 McDougal, Myres S. and Leighton, Gertrude C., “The Rights of Man in the World Community: Constitutional Illusions Versus Rational Action,” 14 Law and Contemporary Problems (Summer 1949) 518 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

180 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “The International Law of the Future,” International Conciliation, No. 399 (April 1944), p. 293.

181 McDougal and Leighton, loc. cit., p. 512.

182 Ibid.

183 Elliot, op. cit, Vol. III, p. 471.

184 Lauterpacht, Hersch, International Law and Human Eights (New York: Praeger, Inc., 1950)Google Scholar, passim; Wright, , “National Courts and Human Rights—The Fujii Case,” this Journal, Vol. 45 (1951), p. 62 Google Scholar; Jessup, Philip C., A Modern Law of Nations (New York: Macmillan, 1948), pp. 87 Google Scholar ff.; McDougal and Leighton, loo. cit.; McDougal and Arens, loc. cit., pp. 687–688.

185 Carlston, Kenneth S., “The Genocide Convention: A Problem for the American Lawyer,” 36 American Bar Association Journal (1950) 208 Google Scholar; and Finch, George A., “The Genocide Convention,” this Journal, Vol. 43 (1949), p. 735 Google Scholar.

186 Report of Committee on Peace and Law, 74 American Bar Association Reports (1949) 330; Pinch, “The Genocide Convention,” loc. cit., p. 735; and Committee on Peace and Law, U. S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings Before a Subcommittee on the International Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1950), p. 220.

187 Deutsch, “The Need for a Treaty Amendment,” loc. cit., p. 796.

188 Report of Committee on Peace and Law, 74 American Bar Association Reports (1949) 323.

189 Reply to Department of Justice, p. 533.

190 Zechariah Chafee, “Federal and State Powers Under the UN Covenant on Human Eights,” Wisconsin Law Review (May, 1951), p. 411.

191 Ibid, p. 643.

192 Ibid, p. 412.

193 Story, Joseph, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, Vol. I, sec. 425 (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1858, 3d ed.), pp. 301–302 Google Scholar.