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Two Problems of Approach to the Permanent Court of International Justice*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 April 2017

Manley O. Hudson*
Affiliation:
Harvard Law School

Extract

In its attempt to forge a lien between the process of pacific settlement outlined in the Covenant of the League of Nations and the judicial process provided for by the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice, the Special Assembly of the League of Nations dealing with the Chaco dispute has broken some new ground. The effort made in its report of November 24,1934, was not successful, or not wholly so; but it may have established a precedent which will serve in the future, and for this reason it seems to deserve some special attention.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © American Society of International Law 1935

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Footnotes

*

A study prepared for a publication in tribute to Professor Karl Strupp.

References

1 Records of the Special Assembly (League of Nations Official Journal, Supplement No. 132), pp. 43-51.

2 The recommendations in the Assembly's report were not accepted by Paraguay, but the report may have led to certain provisions in the Buenos Aires Protocol of June 12, 1935, looking toward a possible submission of the Chaco dispute to the Permanent Court of International Justice. However, those provisions amount to little more than an agreement to agree to go to the Court. See League of Nations Document C.270.M.137.1935.VII.

3 This was attributed by M. Osusky (Czechoslovakia) to the lack of data. Records of the Special Assembly, p. 24.

4 Ibid., p. 49.

5 Though it may be difficult to see how the provisions of this Declaration were relevant to a consideration of the question upon which the Court was to give judgment. For the text of the Declaration, see League of Nations Official Journal, Special Supplement No. 124, p. 147.

6 See Hudson, Permanent Court of International Justice (1934), § 407.

7 Publications of the Court, Series E, No. 10, p. 157.

8 Records of the Special Assembly, p. 32.

9 Article 35 of the Rules is badly drafted. It provides in the first paragraph that “when a case is brought before the Court by means of a special agreement (par un compromis), the latter, or the document notifying the Court of the agreement, shall mention: etc.” This language is not in harmony with the provision in Article 40 of the Statute, which envisages only notifications of special agreements and applications for bringing cases before the Court.

10 Series E, No. 9, p. 65; No. 10, p. 39; No. 11, p. 43. The point ought to be covered by the Rules, and a revision of the Rules in this respect seems desirable.

11 League of Nations Document A. (Extr.)1.1934.VII.

12 Records of the Special Assembly, p. 26.

13 Records of the Special Assembly, p. 51.

14 The Assembly resolution of March 11,1932, relating to the Committee set up to follow the Manchurian situation, empowered the Committee to propose to the Assembly, if necessary, that it make a request for an advisory opinion. League of Nations Official Journal, Special Supplement No. 101, p. 88. This involved no question of delegation.

15 Series B, No. 5, p. 27.

16 See Hudson, Permanent Court of International Justice (1934), § 454.

17 The Supreme Court of the United States has recently made this clear in Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan (1935), 293 U. S. 388.

18 Records of the First Assembly, Committees, I, pp. 534, 563.

19 League of Nations Official Journal, 1935, p. 170. See also Journal of the Sixteenth Assembly (1935), p. 121.