Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-gvvz8 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-28T02:05:54.408Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

U.S. Law and the Iran-Contra Affair

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 February 2017

David J. Scheffer
David J. Scheffer*
Affiliation:
Of the New York and District of Columbia Bars
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content.
Image of the first page of this content. For PDF version, please use the ‘Save PDF’ preceeding this image.'
Type
Current Developments
Information
American Journal of International Law , Volume 81 , Issue 3 , July 1987 , pp. 696 - 723
Copyright
Copyright © American Society of International Law 1987

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 Virtually every issue of the New York Times and the Washington Post, commencing Nov. 8, 1986 and continuing through December 1986, published front-page news reports on the unfolding Iran-contra affair. See also President’s Special Review Board, The Tower Commission Report 84, 480–507 (Bantam Books, Inc. & Times Books, Inc., 1987) [hereinafter Tower Report].

2 Press reports on these issues appeared regularly (and often daily) in the New York Times and the Washington Post beginning in November 1986 and continuing through April 1987. See also Tower Report, supra note 1, at 55–61, 338–50, 450–79.

3 In November 1986, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence launched separate investigations. Wash. Post, Nov. 29, 1986, at A1, col. e; Wash. Post, Nov. 10, 1986, at A1, col. e. The Senate committee made its findings public on Jan. 29, 1987, in Senate Select Comm. On Intelligence, Preliminary Inquiry into the Sale of Arms to Iran and Possible Diversion of Funds to the Nicaraguan Resistance, S. Rep. No. 7, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) [hereinafter Senate Intelligence Rep.]. The House Foreign Affairs Committee held four public hearings in addition to several closed ones in November and December 1986. For the public hearings, see The Foreign Policy Implications of Arms Sales to Iran and the Contra Connection: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986) [hereinafter House Hearings]. The President’s Special Review Board was established on Dec. 1, 1986, pursuant to Executive Order No. 12,575 (see Tower Report, supra note 1, at 100) and reported its findings on Feb. 26, 1987 (see id.). On Dec. 4, 1986, the Attorney General applied to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, Independent Counsel Division, pursuant to the Ethics in Government Act, 28 U.S.C. §592(c)(1) (1982), for the appointment of an independent counsel regarding Iranian arms shipments and diversion of funds. The Attorney General’s application was approved shortly thereafter and Lawrence Walsh was appointed independent counsel on Dec. 19, 1986. See House Hearings, supra, at 293–98; Wash. Post, Dec. 20, 1986, at A1, col. d. The Senate established the Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition on Jan. 6, 1987, S. Res. 23, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) [hereinafter Senate Iran Committee]. The House established the Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran on Jan. 7, 1987, H. Res. 12, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) [hereinafter House Iran Committee].

4 In particular, investigations have been undertaken by the independent counsel, the Senate Iran Committee and the House Iran Committee.

5 Tower Report, supra note 1, at 75–79. The commission’s members were John Tower, Chairman, Edmund Muskie and Brent Scowcroft. They were assisted by a staff of 23, including five attorneys. See id. at 521.

6 Id. at 77.

7 Id. at 78.

8 Id. at 78–79.

9 See 18 U.S.C. §§956–970 (1982), and, in particular, 18 U.S.C. §960 (1982), better known as the first “neutrality act” (1 Stat. 381–84 (1794)). The latter has been the subject of extensive litigation (see 18 U.S.C.A. §960 (1976 & Supp. 1987)).

10 For summary discussions of funding and expenditure laws that may apply, see House Hearings, supra note 3, at 210–11, 224–38.

11 22 U.S.C. §§2751–2796c (1982 & Supp. III 1985, as amended by an Act to require that congressional vetoes of certain arms export proposals be enacted into law, Pub. L. No. 99–247, 100 Stat. 9 (1986); by the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99–399, 100 Stat. 853 (1986); by the Continuing Appropriations Act, 1987, Pub. L. No. 99-591, 100 Stat. 3341 (1986); by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1987, Pub. L. No. 99-661, 100 Stat. 3816 (1986)).

12 50 U.S.C. App. §§2401–2420 (1982 & Supp. Ill 1985, as amended by the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-399, 100 Stat. 853 (1986); by the Export Administration Act of 1979, Authorization, Pub. L. No. 99-633, 100 Stat. 3522 (1986)).

13 22 U.S.C. §§2151–2429a (1982 & Supp. III 1985, as amended by the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99–399, 100 Stat. 853 (1986); by the Comprehensive Anti–Apartheid Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99–440, 100 Stat. 1086 (1986); by the Special Foreign Assistance Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99–529, 100 Stat. 3010 (1986); by Pub. L. No. 99–550, 100 Stat. 3067 (1986); by the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99–570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986); by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1987, Pub. L. No. 99–661, 100 Stat. 3816 (1986)).

14 50 U.S.C.A. §§401–432 (Supp. 1987).

15 Act of July 17, 1868, ch. 249, §3,15 Stat. 224 (1868) (current version at 22 U.S.C. §1732 (1982)).

16 22 U.S.C. §2754 (1982).

17 The other four criteria are that the sale or lease must be “for internal security,” or “to permit the recipient country to participate in regional or collective arrangements or measures consistent with the Charter of the United Nations,” or “otherwise to permit the recipient country to participate in collective measures requested by the United Nations for the purpose of maintaining or restoring international peace and security,” or “for the purpose of enabling foreign military forces in less developed friendly countries to construct public works and to engage in other activities helpful to the economic and social development of such friendly countries.” Id.

18 Pub. L. No. 99-399, 100 Stat. 853 (1986) [hereinafter Antiterrorism Act].

19 Id. §509(a), 100 Stat, at 874. This amendment to the AECA is known as the “Berman-Hyde amendment” in recognition of its coauthors, Rep. Howard Berman (D., Cal.) and Rep. Henry Hyde (R., Ill.). For the legislative history, see H.R. Rep. No. 494, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1891; H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 783, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 75 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1948.

20 22 C.F.R. §121 (1986); 15 C.F.R. ch. III, pt. 370, Supp. 2 (1987).

21 49 Fed. Reg. 2836 (1984). Following the Secretary of State’s determination, existing antiterrorism export controls were applied to Iran. A “validated license” issued by or under the authority of the Office of Export Administration, Department of Commerce (15 C.F.R. §372.2(a) (1987)) is required for the export of any goods or technology to Iran subject to control for national security reasons, regardless of value, provided it is destined for a military end–use or end–user. Such validated licenses “will generally be denied.” The export of Munitions List items to Iran also was subject to a general policy of denial during this period. Dep’t St. Bull., No. 2092, November 1984, at 68.

22 In October 1986, the United States sold 500 U.S. TOW missiles and various HAWK missile system spare parts to Iran, and apparently contemplated further sales. See Tower Report, supra note 1, at 389–435, 448–49; Senate Intelligence Rep., supra note 3, at 34.

23 AECA §40(b), Berman-Hyde amendment, supra note 19.

24 Interview with Robert Boyer, Senior Staff Consultant, House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, in Washington, D.C. (Apr. 27, 1987) [hereinafter Boyer interview].

25 22 U.S.C. §2753(f)(1) (1982), as amended by Pub. L. No. 99-83, §503(b)(1985), 22 U.S.C. §2753(f)(l) (Supp. III 1985).

26 22 U.S.C. §2753(f)(2) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). As a matter of course, reports pertaining to foreign affairs that are submitted to the Speaker of the House are transmitted to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.

27 Boyer interview, supra note 24.

28 AECA §3(a)(1), 22 U.S.C. §2753(a)(1) (1982).

29 AECA §3(a)(2), 22 U.S.C. §2753(a)(2) (Supp. III 1985).

30 AECA §3(a)(3), 22 U.S.C. §2753(a)(3) (Supp. III 1985).

31 AECA §3(a)(4), 22 U.S.C. §2753(a)(4) (1982).

32 AECA §3(a), 22 U.S.C. §2753 (Supp. III 1985).

33 Id.

34 Boyer interview, supra note 24. The Tower Report, supra note 1, establishes that U.S.-supplied weapons were transferred by Israel to Iran.

35 “Major defense equipment” means any item of significant military equipment on the U.S. Munitions List having a nonrecurring research and development cost of more than $50 million or a total production cost of more than $200 million. AECA §47(6), 22 U.S.C. §2794(6) (Supp. III 1985).

36 For a definition, see AECA §47(3), 22 U.S.C. §2794(3) (1982).

37 AECA §3(d)(1), 22 U.S.C. §2753(d)(1) (1982).

38 Id. The President’s certification becomes effective 30 days after the date of submission of his certification to Congress, unless Congress has enacted, within that 30-day period, a law prohibiting the proposed transfer. However, the President’s consent to the proposed transfer can become effective immediately, provided he states in his certification that an emergency exists that requires such consent “in the national security interests of the United States.” AECA §3(d)(2), 22 U.S.C. §2753(d)(2) (1982). The President may not consent to similar transfers of similar threshold levels by private individuals under export license unless, at least 30 calendar days before giving such consent, he submits to the Speaker and to the Foreign Relations Committee a report containing the information that would be required for a governmental transfer. AECA §3(d)(3), 22 U.S.C. §2753(d)(3) (1982).

39 Boyer interview, supra note 24.

40 AECA §3(c)(1)(B), 22 U.S.C. §2753(c)(1)(B)(1982).

41 AECA §3(c)(2), 22 U.S.C. §2753(c)(2)(1982).

42 AECA §3(c)(3)(B), 22 U.S.C. §2753(c)(3)(B) (1982).

43 Boyer interview, supra note 24.

44 AECA §3(e), 22 U.S.C. §2753(e) (1982).

45 AECA §2(b), 22 U.S.C. §2752(b) (Supp. III 1985).

46 AECA §36(a), 22 U.S.C. §2776(a) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).

47 Boyer interview, supra note 24. However, the President may submit a report in classified form of (1) letters of offer to sell any major defense equipment for $1 million or more that have not been accepted or have been canceled unless the offer has been the subject of an unclassified certification under AECA §36(b)(1), and (2) material transmitted in classified form under AECA § 36(b)(1) or (c)( 1).

48 AECA §36(b)(1), 22 U.S.C. §2776(b)(1) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).

49 Boyer interview, supra note 24. If a private individual applies for a license to export any major defense equipment sold under a contract valued at $14 million or more or of defense articles sold under a contract valued at $50 million or more, before issuing the license the President must transmit to the Speaker and to the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee an unclassified numbered certification specifying the foreign country or international organization to which the export will be made, the dollar amount of the items to be exported and a description of the items to be exported. The dollar amount and the description may be classified “if the public disclosure thereof would be clearly detrimental to the security of the United States.” AECA §36(c)(1), 22 U.S.C. §2776(c)(1) (1982). Such a license cannot be issued until at least 30 calendar days after Congress receives the President’s certification and will not be issued if Congress, within that 30-day period, enacts a joint resolution prohibiting the proposed export. An exception to congressional review and prohibition arises if the President states in his certification that “an emergency exists which requires the proposed export in the national security interests of the United States” and sets forth in the certification “a detailed justification for his determination, including a description of the emergency circumstances which necessitate the immediate issuance of the export license and a discussion of the national security interests involved.” AECA §3(c)(2), 22 U.S.C. §2776(c)(2) (1982). President Reagan did not submit any certification to Congress regarding any application for any license to export to Iran any major defense equipment valued at $14 million or more or any defense articles valued at $50 million or more. Boyer interview, supra note 24.

50 AECA §38(a)(1), 22 U.S.C. §2778(a)(1) (1982).

51 AECA §38(a)(2), 22 U.S.C. §2778(a)(2) (1982).

52 AECA §38(b)(2), 22 U.S.C. §2778(b)(2) (1982).

53 AECA §38(c), 22 U.S.C. §2778(c) (Supp. III 1985).

54 See note 12 supra.

55 For definitions of a “good” and “technology,” see EAA §16(3), (4), 50 U.S.C. App. §2415(3), (4) (Supp. III 1985).

56 EAA §§4(b) and 6(l), 50 U.S.C. App. §§2403(b) and 2405(0 (Supp. III 1985).

57 EAA §4, 50 U.S.C. App. §2403 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).

58 EAA §5, 50 U.S.C. App. §2404 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).

59 EAA §6, 50 U.S.C. App. §2405 (Supp. III 1985).

60 49 Fed. Reg. 2836(1984).

61 Berman-Hyde amendment, supra note 19.

62 15 C.F.R. §385.1(b)(1) (1987) (Cuba); id. §385.7(b) (Libya); id. §385.4(d) (People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen, Syria and Iran).

63 See note 21 supra.

64 15 C.F.R. §385.4(d)(3)(i) (1987).

65 Id. §385.4(d)(1).

66 Id. §385.4(e).

67 Antiterrorism Act, supra note 18, §509(b).

68 EAA §6(j)(l), 50 U.S.C. App. §2405(j)(1) (Supp. III 1985).

69 Boyer interview, supra note 24.

70 EAA §6(j)(2), 50 U.S.C. App. §2405(j)(2) (Supp. III 1985).

71 FAA §620(A)(a), 22 U.S.C. §2371(a) (Supp. III 1985).

72 49 Fed. Reg. 2836 (1984).

73 FAA §620(A)(b), 22 U.S.C. §2371(b) (Supp. III 1985).

74 Boyer interview, supra note 24.

75 FAA §614(a)(1), 22 U.S.C. §2364(a)(1) (1982).

76 FAA §614(a)(2), 22 U.S.C. §2364(a)(2) (1982).

77 FAA §614(a)(3), 22 U.S.C. §2364(a)(3)(1982).

78 Boyer interview, supra note 24.

79 22 U.S.C. §2304 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).

80 FAA §502B(a)(2), 22 U.S.C. §2304(a)(2) (Supp. III 1985).

81 U.S. Dep’t of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1985, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 1234–45 (Joint Coram. Print 1986); Dep’t of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1986, S. Prt. No. 10, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 1156–65 (1987).

82 22 U.S.C. §2364 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).

83 Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-169, §403, 99 Stat. 1002, 1006 (1985); Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1987, Pub. L. No. 99-569, §602(a), 100 Stat. 3190, 3203 (1986) (amending NSA by adding §503, 50 U.S.C.A. §415 (Supp. 1987)).

84 Pub. L. No. 99-169, §403, and Pub. L. No. 99-569, §602(a), both supra note 83.

85 NSA §503(a)(3), 50 U.S.C.A. §415(a)(3) (Supp. 1987).

86 H.R. Rep. No. 106(1), 99th Cong., 1st. Sess. 7–12 (1985); and H.R. Conf. Rep. NO. 373, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1985), both reprinted in 1985 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 952– 63.

87 1985 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 955.

88 Id.

89 Id. at 956–57.

90 See note 15 supra.

91 Antiterrorism Act, supra note 18; International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-83, title V, 99 Stat. 190, 219-27 (1985).

92 22 U.S.C. §1732 (1982). Since the American hostages in Lebanon were not being held by the Government of Iran, the Hostage Act would not appear to provide authority for the arms deals to Iran. In addition, the Supreme Court recently explained that the legislative intent behind the Hostage Act of 1868 was concern “with the activity of certain countries refusing to recognize the citizenship of naturalized Americans traveling abroad, and repatriating such citizens against their will. . . . These countries were not interested in returning the [U.S.] citizens in exchange for any sort of ransom.” The Court also concluded that the legislative history of the Hostage Act was “somewhat ambiguous” on the question whether Congress had contemplated enabling the President to suspend claims such as those against Iran in connection with the Iran hostage crisis of 1979–1981, “or rather simply [to take] reprisals directed against the offending foreign country and its citizens,.” Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 676–77 (1981) (citations omitted). See also House Hearings, supra note 3, at 211–13.

93 Boyer interview, supra note 24.

94 22 U.S.C. §2753(f) (Supp. III 1985).

95 Berman-Hyde amendment, supra note 19.

96 50 U.S.C. App. §2405(j)(1) (Supp. III 1985).

97 22 U.S.C. §2371 (Supp. III 1985).

98 22 U.S.C. §1732 (1982).

99 22 U.S.C. §2753(f) (Supp. III 1985).

100 22 U.S.C. §2780 (1982).

101 49 Fed. Reg. 2836 (1984).

102 22 U.S.C. §2364 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).

103 22 U.S.C. §2371 (Supp. III 1985).

104 22 U.S.C. §1732 (1982).

105 22 U.S.C. §2753(f) (Supp. III 1985).

106 Berman-Hyde amendment, supra note 19.

107 50 U.S.C. App. §2405(j)(1) (Supp. III 1985).

108 15 C.F.R. §385.4 (1987); 51 Fed. Reg. 20,468 (1986).

109 15 C.F.R. §385.4(d)(3)(i) (1987).

110 22 U.S.C. §2371 (Supp. III 1985).

111 22 U.S.C. §2304(a)(2) (Supp. III 1985).

112 50 U.S.C.A. §415(a)(3) (Supp. 1987).

113 22 U.S.C. §2753(f) (Supp. III 1985).

114 See text at note 38 supra.

115 22 U.S.C. §2776(b)(1) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).

116 Berman-Hyde amendment, supra note 19.

117 50 U.S.C. App. §2405(j)(2) (Supp. III 1985).

118 22 U.S.C. §2371 (Supp. III 1985).

119 22 U.S.C. §2364(a)(1) (1982).

120 22 U.S.C. §2364(a)(2) (1982).

121 22 U.S.C. §2364(c) (1982).

122 22 U.S.C. §2753(f) (Supp. III 1985).

123 Berman-Hyde amendment, supra note 19.

124 50 U.S.C. App. §2405(j) (Supp. III 1985).

125 22 U.S.C. §2371 (Supp. III 1985).

126 22 U.S.C. §2364(a)(1) (1982).

127 22 U.S.C. §2364(c) (1982).

128 50 U.S.C.A. §415(a)(1) (Supp. 1987).

129 22 U.S.C. §1732 (1982).

130 N.Y. Times, Nov. 26, 1986, at A1, col. 6; Wash. Post, Nov. 26, 1986, at A1, col. b; Tower Report, supra note 1, at 51–55.

131 Continuing Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1985, Pub. L. No. 98-473, §8066(a), 98 Stat. 1837, 1935 (1984). The first Boland amendment covered only fiscal year 1983 and read:

None of the funds provided in this [Department of Defense Appropriations] Act may be used by the Central Intelligence Agency or the Department of Defense to furnish military equipment, military training or advice, or other support for military activities, to any group or individual, not part of a country’s armed forces, for the purpose of overthrowing the Government of Nicaragua or provoking a military exchange between Nicaragua and Honduras.

Further Continuing Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 97–377, §793, 96 Stat. 1830, 1865 (1982).

132 130 Cong. Rec. H11979 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 1984) (statement of Rep. Boland); Serafino, N., U.S. Assistance to Nicaraguan Guerrillas: Issues for the Congress 3–4 Google Scholar (Cong. Research Serv. Order Code IB84139, 1986).

133 Pub. L. No. 98-618, §801, 98 Stat. 3298, 3304 (1984).

134 Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1985, Pub. L. No. 98–525, §1540, 98 Stat. 2492, 2637–38 (1984). For legislative history, see 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 4174,4322–23.

135 See Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1985, supra note 134, as amended by Pub. L. No. 99-145, §306(a) and (b), 99 Stat. 617 (1985), and Pub. L. No. 99-661, §322, 100 Stat. 3816 (1986). See 130 Cong. Rec. S7642-43 (daily ed. June 19, 1984) (statements of Senators Denton and Nunn).

136 International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-83, §722(g), 99 Stat. 190, 254–55 (1985); Supplemental Appropriations, Fiscal Year 1985, Pub. L. No. 99–88, 99 Stat. 293, 324–25 (1985).

137 Exec. Order No. 12,530, 50 Fed. Reg. 36,031 (1985).

138 Supplemental Appropriations, Fiscal Year 1985, Pub. L. No. 99–88, §104(a), 99 Stat. 293, 326 (1985).

139 Pub. L. No. 99-83, §722(d), 99 Stat, at 254. The Pell amendment remains in force through fiscal years 1986 and 1987.

140 H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 237, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 143 (1985), reprinted in 1985 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 158, 252.

141 OAS Charter, 2 UST 2394, TIAS No. 2361, 119 UNTS 3.

142 Pub. L. No. 99-83, §722(e), 99 Stat, at 254. This provision, the “Kerry amendment,” remains in force through fiscal years 1986 and 1987.

143 Pub. L. No. 99-169, §105, 99 Stat. 1002, 1003 (1985).

144 Id. See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 373, supra note 86, at 15–16. The House and Senate conferees denied “all funding requested by the Administration for the paramilitary covert action program for Nicaragua. . . . The CIA Reserve for Contingencies will not . . . be available to fund [military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua].”

145 H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 373, supra note 86, at 16.

146 Id.

147 Id.

148 Further Continuing Appropriations, Fiscal Year 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-190, §8050, 99 Stat. 1185, 1211 (1985).

149 Pub. L. No. 99-569, §106, 100 Stat. 3190, 3191 (1986).

150 H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 952, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 20–21 (1986).

151 Continuing Appropriations, Fiscal Year 1987, Pub. L. No. 99–591 (§206 of an Act making appropriations for military construction for the Department of Defense for fiscal year ending Sept. 30, 1987, and for other purposes [hereinafter military construction bill], 100 Stat. 3341–299 (1986)).

152 Wash. Post, Oct. 24, 1986, at A20, col. a; Wash. Post, Oct. 25, 1986, at A17, col. a; White House Fact Sheet, Summary of President’s Request to Congress on Aid to the Nicaraguan Democratic Resistance, Feb. 25, 1986, reprinted in U.S. Policy Toward Nicaragua: Aid to Nicaraguan Resistance Proposal: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 129–30 (1986).

153 Pub. L. No. 99-591, supra note 151 (§9045 of an Act making appropriations for the Department of Defense for the fiscal year ending Sept. 30, 1987, and for other purposes, 100 Stat. 3341-109 (1986); and §209(c) of military construction bill, supra note 151,100 Stat. 3341-301 (1986)).

154 Pub. L. No. 99–661, §1351, 100 Stat. 3816, 3995 (1986). The Act further provides that if funds appropriated or otherwise made available to the Department of Defense for any fiscal year are authorized by law for such assistance, those funds must come from amounts appropriated or otherwise made available to the Department of Defense for procurement (other than ammunition).

The specific source of such funds must be reported to Congress. Id.

155 NSA § 101(a), 50 U.S.C. §402(a) (1982).

156 22 U.S.C. §2562 (Supp. III 1985). There has been no reported evidence that Kenneth Adelman, the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency during 1985 and 1986, attended any NSC meetings relating to the arms deals with Iran.

157 NSA §101(c), 50 U.S.C. §402(c) (1982).

158 Exec. Order No. 12,333, §1.2(a), 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941 (1981), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. §401 (1982) [hereinafter EO 12,333].

159 NSA §101(a), 50 U.S.C. §402(a) (1982).

160 NSA §101(b), 50 U.S.C. §402(b) (1982).

161 EO 12,333, supra note 158, § 1.2(b).

162 Id. §3.4(h).

163 Id. § 1.4(d).

164 Id. § 1.5(d).

165 Id. § 1.8(e).

166 Id. §1.11(c).

167 Section 2.8 of Executive Order No. 12,333 requires that nothing in the order “shall be construed to authorize any activity in violation of the Constitution or statutes of the United States.”

168 EO 12,333, supra note 158, §3.1.

169 22 U.S.C. §2422 (1982).

170 Id.

171 Tower Report, supra note 1, at 213–31.

172 Id. at 217, 228.

173 NSA §501(a), 50 U.S.C. §413(a) (1982).

174 FAA §662, 22 U.S.C. §2422 (1982). See also NSA §503(a)(1), 50 U.S.C.A. §415(a)(1) (Supp. 1987).

176 S. Rep. No. 730, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 4192, 4199.

176 NSA §501(a)(1)(A), 50 U.S.C. §413(a)(1)(A) (1982).

177 NSA §501(a)(1)(B), 50 U.S.C. 8413(a)(1)(B) (1982).

178 NSA §501(b), 50 U.S.C. §413(b) (1982).

179 S. Rep. No. 730, supra note 175, at 12, 1980 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 4202.

180 NSA §501(a)(2), 50 U.S.C. §413(a)(2) (1982).

181 NSA §501(a)(3), 50 U.S.C. §413(a)(3) (1982).

182 NSA §501(a), 50 U.S.C. §413(a) (1982).

183 S. Rep. No. 730, supra note 175, at 6, 1980 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 4197.

184 S. Rep. No. 730, supra note 175, at 10, 1980 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 4200.

185 NSA §501(c), 50 U.S.C. §413(c) (1982).

186 The Casey Accords of June 6, 1984, entitled “Procedures Governing Reporting to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) on Covert Action,” and an addendum dated June 17, 1986, entitled “Addendum to Procedures Governing Reporting to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on Covert Action” [hereinafter Casey Addendum], were made public in February 1987 during the Senate nomination hearings of Robert Gates for the position of Director of Central Intelligence. The author obtained copies of the Casey Accords and the Casey Addendum from the Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

187 NSA §501(a)(1)(B), 50 U.S.C. §413(a)(1)(B) (1982).

188 Casey Addendum, supra note 186.

189 NSA §501(e), 50 U.S.C. §413(e) (1982).

190 H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 1350, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1980). reprinted in 1980 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 4207, 4213.

191 Tower Report, supra note 1, at 213–31.

192 Id. at 107.