Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-7cvxr Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-27T07:35:58.082Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Concerning the Interpretation of Treaties1

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 May 2017

Charles Cheney Hyde
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

The interpretation of treaties is a part of the procedure of carrying out or realizing the act of contracting. This work would not be necessary if agreements between states were bare expressions of international good-will, like the arrangements of friendly monarchs to interchange visits. Because, however, treaties are deemed capable of realization and performance, the process is essential.

The method of interpretation consists in finding out the connection made by the parties to an agreement, between the terms of their contract and the objects to which it is to be applied. This involves two steps. One is to ascertain what has been called the “ standard of interpretation; ” that is, the sense in which various terms are employed. The other is to learn what are the sources of interpretation; this is, to find out where one may turn for evidence of that sense.

Type
Research Article
Information
American Journal of International Law , Volume 3 , Issue 1 , January 1909 , pp. 46 - 61
Copyright
Copyright © American Society of International Law 1909

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Footnotes

1

This article embodies a small section of a treatise on International Law which is in preparation for publication by Messrs. Little, Brown & Company, Boston.

References

1 This article embodies a small section of a treatise on International Law which is in preparation for publication by MessrsLittle, , Brown & Company, Boston Google Scholar.

2 See Wigmore, Evidence, IV, 3470.

3 The common law does not permit such latitude in the interpretation of legal acts. The rule prohibiting reliance on a sense “disturbing a clear meaning” of a term is an illustration. See Wigmore, Evidence, IV, 3476.

4 “When a treaty is executed in more than one language, each language being that of a contracting party, each document, so signed and attested, is to be regarded as an original, and the sense of the treaty is to be drawn from them collectively.” Moore, , Int. L. Dig., V, 252 Google Scholar, citing United States v. Arredondo, 6 Pet. 691, 710; also Mr. Hay, Secretary of State, to Mr. Beaupré, No. 331, Nov. 16, 1900, MS. Inst. Columbia, XIX, 123.

5 Int. Law, I, 282.

“Once freed from the primitive formalism which views the document as a self-contained and self-operative formula, we can fully appreciate the modern principle that the words of a document are never anything but dices to extrinsic things, and that therefore all the circumstances must be considered which go to make clear the sense of the words — that is, their associations with things.” Wigmore, , Evidence, IV, 3499 Google Scholar.

Among the systems of rules formulated for the interpretation of treaties, those of Vattel, Book II, Chap. XVII; Phillimore, II, 94-126; Hall (5th ed.), 335-343; and Woolsey, 173-174, have been frequently cited.

6 Evidence, IV, 3471. See also Scott’s Cases, Int. L., 426, note by the editor.

7 The treaty between the United States and Switzerland of November 25, 1860, provided for most-favored-nation treatment “in the importation, exportation, and transit” of their respective products. In 1898 the Swiss Government claimed that by virtue of Articles VIII, IX, X, and XII it was entitled to demand for Swiss importations into the United States such concessions as were accorded French importations under a reciprocity agreement between the United States and France of May 28, 1898. (Mr. Pioda, Swiss Minister, to Mr. Day, Secretary of State, June 29, 1898, U. S. For. Rel., 1899, 740). Mr. Day, Secretary of State, pointed out “that a reciprocity treaty is a bargain and not a favor, and that it therefore does not come within the scope of the most-favored-nation clause.” (Id., 740.) It was urged, however, by the Swiss Minister that according to the understanding of the signatory parties in 1860, expressly shown by the American plenipotentiary, Mr. Mann, who negotiated the treaty, that out of friendly regard for Switzerland no limitation should be attached to the most-favored-nation clause. (Id., 742.) Mr. Hay, Secretary of State, in a note to the Swiss Minister, November 21, 1898, admitted that the American Minister who conducted the negotiations agreed to the interpretation advanced by Switzerland, that the treaty was ratified in both countries with the distinct understanding that it should apply to reciprocity treaties. He, therefore, concluded “under these circumstances we believe it to be our duty to acknowledge the equity of the reclamation presented by your Government. Both justice and honor require that the common understanding of the high contracting parties at the time of the executing of the treaty should be carried into effect.” (Id., 747-748.)

In Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U. S. 258, at 271, the court says: “It is a general principle of construction with respect to treaties that they shall be liberally construed, so as to carry out the apparent intention of the parties to secure equality and reciprocity between them. As they are contracts between independent nations, in their construction words are to be taken in their ordinary meaning, as understood in the public law of nations, and not in any artificial or special sense impressed upon them by local law, unless such restricted sense is clearly intended.” See also United States v. Payne, 8 Fed. Rep. 883, 892; Strother v. Lucas, 12 Pet. 410, 436; United States v. Arredondo, 6 Pet. 691, 710, 741.

According to the convention of January 24, 1903, between the United States and Great Britain for the settlement of the Alaskan boundary dispute before a joint tribunal, it was agreed that the court should consider certain articles of the Russian-British treaty of February 28/16, 1825, and of the Russian-American treaty of March 30/18, 1867, and that “the tribunal shall also take into consideration any action of the several governments or of their respective representatives preliminary or subsequent to the conclusion of said treaties so far as the same tends to show the original and effective understanding of the parties in respect to the limits of their several territorial jurisdictions under and by virtue of the provisions of said treaties.” (U. S. For. Rel., 1903, 488, 491.) It was further agreed that seven specified questions as to the interpretation of the Russian-British treaty should be answered and decided by the tribunal. In the course of his instructive opinion on the fifth question Lord Alverstone, the president of the tribunal, said : “It is in my opinion correctly pointed out, on behalf of the United States, that the word ‘coast’ is an ambiguous term, and may be used in two, possibly more than two, senses. I think, therefore, we are not only entitled, but bound to ascertain as far as we can from the facts which were before the negotiators the sense in which they used the word ‘coast’ in the treaty. Before considering this latter view of the case, it is desirable to ascertain as far as possible from the treaty itself what it means, and what can be gathered from the language of the treaty alone. * * * This consideration, however, is not sufficient to solve the question; it still leaves open the interpretation of the word ‘coast’ to which the mountains were to be parallel.” (Proceedings of the Alaskan Boundary Tribunal, I, Part I, 36,37, 39.) See the opinions of the American members of the tribunal, Messrs. Root, Lodge, and Turner (id., I, Part I, 43, 48-49) ; opinion of Sir. L. Jetté (id., I, Part T, 65-79) ; Rules of Construction and Interpretation presented in argument of the United States (id., V, Part I, 6-11) ; evidence to be considered in the American case (id., V, Part I, 11). It is said in the United States counter-case that “the United States asserts that the intention of the parties to the treaty is vital to its true interpretation; that such intention between nations is the very essence of the agreement; and that any material variance from the intention must give place to an interpretation in accordance with it.” (Id., IV, Part I, 40.) In the counter-case of Great Britain it is said that “the function of the tribunal is to interpret the articles of the convention by ascertaining the intention and meaning thereof, and not to recast it. Any considerations showing that the words of the treaty must have been intended to bear a particular meaning, being a meaning which they are in themselves capable of bearing, may, of course, be legitimately presented.” (Id., IV, ‘Part III, 6.) See also argument of Great Britain (id., V, Part II, 37) ; oral argument of Mr. Taylor (id., VII, 578-579); Mr. Robinson (id., VII, 501-502, 506-507, 514-516); Mr. Watson (id., VI, 363-364) ; Judge Dickinson (id., VII, 731-732).

8 Ralston’s Reports, Venezuelan Arbitrations of 1903, 292.

9 The Aroa Mines (Ralston’s Reports, Venezuelan Arbitrations of 1903, 344, 360, 383). See also the Crossman Case (id., 298) and the De Lemos Case (id., 302), both also decided by the umpire of the British-Venezuelan Commission.

Identical expressions in the Italian-Venezuelan protocol of the same date were given like interpretation by Mr. Ralston, umpire of the Italian-Venezuelan Commission, in a well-considered and instructive opinion in the Sambiaggio Case (id., 666, 679). But see the interpretation of the German-Venezuelan protocol by the umpire, General Duffield, in the Kummerow Case (Id., 526, 549); that of the Spanish-Venezuelan protocol by the umpire, Mr. Gutierrez-Otero, in the Padron Case (id., 923), and in the Mena Case (id., 931).

Note also the following cases involving the interpretation of international agreements:

Case of Joseph Chourreau before the French and American Claims Commission, under the convention between the United States and France of January 15, 1880, and the decision of Mr. Felinghuysen, Secretary of State, as to the interpretation of the terms “territory” and “territorial jurisdiction” employed in the convention. (Moore, Int. Arbitrations, II, 1145, 1146, citing H. Ex. Doc. 235, 48th Cong., 2 sess., 16; also Boutwell’s Report, 134.)

Opinion of the umpire, Sir Frederick W. A. Bruce, in the Capitation Tax Case, as to the power of the commission under the convention between the United States and Colombia of February 10, 1864, to determine whether a certain tax imposed by Panama was in violation of Articles II, III, and XXXV of the treaty between the United States and New Granada of December 12, 1846. (Moore, Int. Arbitrations, II, 1412.)

Opinion of Mr. Alexander S. Johnson, American commissioner of the joint commission under the British-American treaty of July 1, 1863, in the case of the Puget’s Sound Agricultural Company concerning the interpretation of Article IV, treaty of June 15, 1846, between the United States and Great Britain. (Moore, Int. Arbitrations, I, 266.)

Sentence and award of Mr. C. A. Logan, arbitrator in the matter of the Chilean-Peruvian Alliance of December 5, 1865, under the Chilean-Peruvian protocol of March 2, 1874. (Moore, Int. Arbitrations, II, 2086.)

Opinion of Mr. John Little, commissioner in the case of William H. Aspinwall, executor of G. G. Howland and others, v. Venezuela, No. 18, United States and Venezuelan Claims Commission under convention of December 5, 1885, as to whether bonds of Venezuela were included among the claims to be submitted to arbitration before the commission. (Moore, Int. Arbitrations, IV, 3616.) Also opinion of Mr. John V. L. Findlay, commissioner (id., 3642).

Decision of Mr. John Little, commissioner of the United States and Venezuelan Claims Commission, under the convention between the United States and Venezuela of December 5, 1885, as to the character of the proceedings under the treaty. (Moore, Int. Arbitrations, II, 1677.)

In the course of an elaborate opinion in the Manica arbitration between Great Britain and Portugal, under the Acte de Compromis of January 7, 1895, the arbitrator, Signor Paul Honoré Vigliani, said: “In our case the rule of legal interpretation, according to which the expressions made use of in a contract must be taken in the sense most in accordance with the intentions of the parties who have arranged it and the most favorable to the aim of the contract, obliges us to give to the word ‘plateau’ the broadest possible signification — that is to say, to require only the minimum normal altitude — so as to be able to affirm its existence as far as the Save, as the high contracting parties had supposed, and so as thus to render possible the application of the text of Article II of the treaty.” (Moore, Int. Arbitrations, V, Appendix, 4986, 6011.)

In the case of Marryatt v. Wilson, 1 Bosan. & Puller, 435, 436, Chief Justice Eyre said: “We are to construe this treaty as we would construe any other instrument, public or private. We are to collect from the nature of the subject, from the words and from the context, the true intent and meaning of the contracting parties, whether they are A and B, or happen to be two independent states.” Mr. Morse, the arbitrator in the Van Bokkelen Case, says that “Marryatt v. Wilson is strong authority for the proposition that the municipal tribunals of the country may not nullify the purpose and effect of treaty language by imposing upon it a cramped, narrow, and forced construction.” (Moore, Int. Arbitrations, II, 1840.)

Opinion of the arbitrator, Mr. Alexander Porter Morse, in the case of Charles Adrian Van Bokkelen, under the protocol between the United States and Haiti of May 24, 1888, concerning the interpretation of the treaty between those States November 3, 1864. (Moore, Int. Arbitrations, II, 1813.)

Kapier et al v. The Duke of Richmond, Journ. du. Pal., year 1839, II, 2, cited in the Van Bokkelen Case. (Moore, Int. Arbitrations, II, 1830.)

Case of Lewis S. Hargous before the United States and Mexican Claims Commission: Convention of April 11, 1839, concerning the scope of the powers of the commission under the convention, and the nature of claims for which liability was assumed. (Moore, Int. Arbitrations, II, 1267.)

Note the language of His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Russia, interpreting Article I of the treaty of Ghent of December 24, 1814, as arbitrator under Article V of the convention between the United States and Great Britain, October 20, 1818; also the reasons given for the method of interpretation employed. (Moore, Int. Arbitrations, I, 359, 360.)

See also Goetze v. United States, 103 Fed. Rep. 72; Schultze v. Schultze, 144 111. 290; Adams v. Akerlund, 168 111. 632; Tucker v. Alexandroff, 183 U. S. 424.

10 Prior to the exchange of ratifications of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty of 1850, Sir Henry Bulwer, the British Minister, made a declaration at the Department of State that his Government did not understand the engagements of that convention to apply to the British settlement at Honduras, or to its dependencies. Mr. Clayton, Secretary of State, in reply acknowledged that he understood British Honduras was not embraced in the treaty, at the same time declining to deny or affirm British title to the territory in question. The Secretary adverted to the fact that he had been informed by the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Mr. W. R. King, “that the Senate perfectly understood that the treaty did not include British Honduras.” (H. Ex. Doc., 34th Cong., 1 Seas., 119; Moore, , Int. Law Dig., III, 136–137 Google Scholar.) Lord Clarendon, in the course of a note to Mr. Buchanan, May 2, 1854, said: “It was never in the contemplation of Her Majesty’s Government, nor in that of the Government of the United States, that the treaty of 1850 should interfere in any way with Her Majesty’s settlement at Belize or its dependencies.” (Brit. & For. St. Pap., XLVI, 267; Moore, , Int. Law Dig., III, 138 Google Scholar.) The statements of Sir Henry Bulwer and Messrs. Clayton and King were clearly evidence of the fact asserted. For that purpose, and for that alone, they were entitled to consideration. It must be obvious that these gentlemen did not possess the power to amend a treaty between the United States and Great Britain. Owing, however, to their official positions they necessarily had precise knowledge of the fact in question. The evidential quality of their declarations in regard to it could not be ignored.

The reason why declarations of intention could not be given in aid of interpretation of the documents at common law, save in certain exceptional circumstances, was that they were considered dangerous for a jury who, not being expert in such matters, might attach to them too great weight. This objection is not applicable to the interpretation of agreements between states. Declarations of their plenipotentiaries, in so far as they indicate the sense in which the terms of a treaty are employed, are valuable not merely because they are enlightening, but also because they may be safely entrusted to the consideration of judges of International tribunals, or to ministers of state.

See also Mr. Marcy, Secretary of State, to Mr. Buchanan, December 30, 1853. Correspondence in Relation to the Proposed Interoceanic Canal (Washington, 1885), 247. Moore, , Int. Law Dig., III, 137 Google Scholar.

See also Lord Granville to Mr. West, Minister at Washington, December 30, 1882, U. S. For. Rel., 1883, 484; Memorandum of Mr. Olney, Secretary of State, 1896, on the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, Moore, Int. Law Dig., III, 203, 207; Crandall, Treaties, Their Making and Enforcement, 226-227 ; The Diamond Rings, 183 U. S. 176.

A commission under Article V of the Jay treaty of November 19, 1794, between the United States and Great Britain was established to decide what river was the River St. Croix intended by the treaty of 1782-1783, forming a part of the boundary between the United States and New Brunswick. There was at that time no river known as the St. Croix. The depositions of John Adams and John Jay, surviving negotiators of the treaty of 1782-1783, as well as a letter of Benjamin Franklin, also a negotiator of that treaty, were received in evidence as declarations concerning the original negotiations and the agreement itself. ( Moore, , Int. Arbitrations, I, 18–22 Google Scholar.)

11 In his award in the Reserved Fisheries Arbitration under Article I of the reciprocity treaty between the United States and Great Britain of June 6, 1854, the umpire, Mr. John Hamilton Gray, said: “But might it not also be assumed that where a country had, by a long series of public documents, legislative enactments, grants, and proclamations, defined certains waters to be rivers, or spoken of them as such, or defined where the mouths of certain rivers were, and another country subsequently entered into a treaty with the former respecting those very waters, and used the same terms, without specifically assigning to them a different meaning, nay, further stipulated that the treaty should not take effect in the localities where those waters were, until confirmed by the local authorities, might it not be well assumed that the definitions previously used, and adopted, would be mutually binding in interpreting the treaty, and that the two countries had consented to use the terms in the sense in which each had before treated them in their public instruments, and to apply them as they had been previously applied in the localities where used? I think it might.” ( Moore, , Int. Arbitrations, I, 449, 458Google Scholar.)

See the opinion of Mr. Pinkney, commissioner, July 1, 1797, case of the Betsey, Furlong, master; commission under Article VII, treaty between the United States and Great Britain, November 19, 1794, as to whether the commission, according to the treaty establishing it, was bound by the decision of the Lords Commissioners of Appeal affirming a sentence of condemnation by the Vice-Admiralty of Bermuda. Moore, , Int. Arbitrations, III, 3180 Google Scholar. In the course of his opinion Mr. Pinkney said : “Are we, then, to uphold an interpretation of this instrument which is not only unauthorized by its language, but is unsuitable io the subject of it, and at variance with the undoubted rights of one party and the duties of the other? What Great Britain could not properly demand, we are to suppose she did demand, what the United States ought to have insisted Upon, we are to suppose they abandoned, and this is to be done not only without evidence, but in direct contradiction to the declarations of the parties.” (Id., 3203-3204.)

See opinion of Sir Edward Thornton, umpire in the ease of Don Rafael Aguirre v. The United States, No. 131: Convention between the United States and Mexico of July 4, 1868, as to the scope of the release given the United States by Mexico in Article II of the Gadsden treaty of December 30, 1853. ( Moore, , Int. Arbitrations, III, 2444 Google Scholar.)

See also Mr. Ralston, umpire in the Sambiaggio Case, Italian-Venezuelan Claims Commission, under protocol of February 13, 1903, Ralston’s Reports, 666, 888.

See the opinion of Pinkney, commissioner, case of the Betsey, Furlong, master, commission under Article VII, treaty between the United States and Great Britain of November 19, 1794, concerning the power of the arbitrators under the treaty to determine their own jurisdiction. (Moore, Int. Arbitrations, III, 2291; also opinion of the same commissioner in the case of the Sally, Hayes, master, id., III, 2306.)

12 Note the respective contentions of the United States and Great Britain concerning Article I, treaty of June 15, 1846, providing for the San Juan water boundary, and the award of the arbitrator, William I, German Emperor, under Articles XXXIV-XLII, treaty of May 8, 1871. (Moore, Int. Arbitrations, I, 213-214, 219-221, 229-231.) Crandall, Treaties, Their Making and Enforcement, 224.

See also the frequently cited case of the interpretation of Article IX of the treaty of Utrecht of 1713, between Great Britain and France, providing for the destruction of the port and fortifications at Dunkirk, given by Phillimore, II, § 73, and Hall (5th ed.), 339.

Note also interpretation of Article I of the convention of September 10, 1857, between the United States and New Granada by Mr. Upham, umpire of the United States and New Granada Joint Commission, as to the presentation of and liability for riot claims. ( Moore, , Int. Arbitrations, II, 1375–1378 Google Scholar.)

13 is Mr. Ralston, umpire in Sambiaggio Case, Italian-Venezeulan Claims Commission, 1903, and Plumley, umpire in Aroa Mines Case, British-Venezuelan Claims Commission, 1903. Ralston’s Reports, 679 and 344, respectively.

14 See, for example, Article I, treaty between the United States and Japan, November 22, 1894; Treaties in Force, 1904, 474.

15 Hon. J. B. Moore, “Opinion Upon the Question Whether Congress Can Pass a Special Tariff Act for Cuba, Without Violating the Most-Favored-Nation Clause in Treaties with Other Countries.” January 14, 1902, p. 4, citing opinion of Mr. Olney, Attorney-General, 21 Op. Attys.-Gen., 80, 82, 83.

16 See correspondence between Mr. Adams, Secretary of State, and the French Minister, Mr. Hyde de Neuville, in the course of which Mr. Adams, in a communication December 23, 1817, said: “The eighth article of the treaty of cession stipulates that the ships of France shall be treated upon the footing of the most-favored nations in the ports of the ceded territory; but it does not say, and can not be understood to mean, that France should enjoy as a free gift that which is conceded to other nations for a full equivalent.” Am. St. Papers, For. Rel., V, 162, 163, 163, 165, 171, 180, 186, 192.

See also Mr. Sherman, Secretary of State, to Mr. Buchanan, Minister to Argentine Republic, No. 303, January 11, 1898, and No. 336, April 9, 1898, MS. Inst. Arg. Rep., XVII, 306, 337; Moore Int. Law Dig., V, 277; Mr. Adee, Acting Secretary of State, to Russian Chargé d’Affaires ad interim, July 30, 1895, U. S. For. Rel., 1895, II, 1121; Moore, , Int. Law Dig., V, 276 Google Scholar. For further diplomatic correspondence indicating the view of the United States, see documents contained in Moore, , Int. Law Dig., V, 257–288 Google Scholar.

See also Bartram v. Robertson, 122 U. S. 116; Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U. 8. 190; Thingvalla Line v. United States, 24 Ct. Cl. 256.

See de Martens, F., Droit International, II, 322 Google Scholar; Ernest Lehr, in Rev. Gén. Dr. Int. Pub., year 1893, 315; Information Respecting Reciprocity and the Existing Treaties, by Hon. John A. Kasson, Washington, 1901; Joseph Rogers Herod, Favored Nation Treatment, 1901.

17 See Earl Granville, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to Mr. West, British Minister at Washington, February 12, 1885, Blue Book, Commercial No. 4 (1885), 21-22, Moore, , Int. Law Dig., V, 270 Google Scholar; Mr. Frelinghuysen, Secretary of State, to Mr. Bingham, Minister to Japan, June 11, 1884, MS. Inst. Japan, III, 253, Moore, , Int. Law Dig., V, 267 Google Scholar, note.

See also SirBarclay, Thomas, in “The Effect of the Most-Favoured-Nation Clause in Treaties,” a paper read before the Portland Conference of the International Law Association, 1907, Yale Law Journ., XVII, 26 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

18 N. R. G., 2 ser., XXX, 266.

19 N. R. G., XIX, 688.

20 This fact was recognized by Germany. In a separate article of its treaty with Hawaii of September 19, 1879, it was declared that “certain relations of proximity and other considerations” rendered important the negotiation of the American-Hawaiian compact, the provisions of which should not be invoked by the contracting parties. See Moore, , Int. Law Dig., V, 263–267 Google Scholar, concerning diplomatic discussions resulting from the American-Hawaiian treaty. See also Bar-tram v. Robertson, 122 U. S. 116; Whitney v. Robertson, 21 Fed. Rep. 566.

21 We have in the case of the United States and Cuba a remarkable example of those special and exceptional relations, physical and political, which, not being estimable simply in terms of commerce, are universally recognized as the surest foundation for the mutual exchange of exclusive advantages; relations, moreover, which are expressed in valid public acts, whose legal effect all nations have acknowledged.” Hon. J. B. Moore, in opinion cited, 14.

See also Mr. Bayard, Secretary of State, to Mr. Robinson, consul at Tamatave, No. 129, May 12, 1886, 117 MS. Desp. to Consuls, 571. Moore, , Int. Law Dig., V, 313 Google Scholar.

22 See Report of Mr. Bayard, Secretary of State, to the President, January 14, 1889, concerning operation of act of Congress of June 26, 1884, and June 19, 1886. H. Ex. Doc. 74, 50th Cong., 2d Sess.; Moore, , Int. Law Dig., V, 288 Google Scholar.

23 See correspondence between the United States and Colombia as to whether a proclamation of President Harrison of March 15, 1892, suspending the free admission into the United States of certain articles produced in or exported from Colombia, in accordance with section 3 of the McKinley Act of October 1, 1890, should be regarded as a violation of the treaty between the United States and New Granada of December 12, 1846, U. S. For. Rel., 1894, Append. I, 451-503; U. S. For. Rel., 1894, 198-199.

23 See German Memorandum on Additional Duty on German Sugar, July 16, 1894; U. S. For. Rel., 1894, 234; Report of Mr. Gresham, Secretary of State, to the President, October 12, 1894, U. S. For. Rel., 1894, 236.

See also President Cleveland, Annual Message, December 3, 1894, U. S. For. Rel., 1894, ix-x; Mr. Olney, Attorney-General, November 13, 1894, 21 Op. Attys.-Gen., 80, 82; Mr. Sherman, Secretary of State, to the German Chargé d’Affaires ad interim, September 22, 1897, U. S. For. Rel., 1897, 178; Mr. Hengelmüller, Austro-Hungarian Minister at Washington, to Mr. Sherman, April 13, 1897, U. S. For. Rel., 1897, 22; act of Congress of July 24, 1897 (30 Stat. at L. 206); Downs v. United States, 187 U. S. 496. An excellent abstract of the correspondence between Great Britain and Russia “Respecting the Interpretation of the Most-Favoured-Nation Clause in Connection with Countervailing Duties on Bounty-Fed Sugar.” (Parliamentary Papers, Commercial No. 1 (1903), is given in Moore, , Int. Law Dig., V, 307–309 Google Scholar.

24 Mr. Gresham, Secretary of State, in Report cited U. S. For. Rel., 1894, 236, 239.

25 Treaties in Force, 1904, 27.

26 In re Wyman, 191 Mass. 276; In re Fattosini’s Estate, 33 N. Y. Misc. 18.

See also Mr. Olney, Secretary of State, to Mr. Dupuy de Lome, Spanish Minister, September 26, 1895, and October 11, 1895, claiming by virtue of the most-favored-nation clause of Article XIX of the treaty between the United States and Spain, of October 27, 1796, the benefit of Article IX of the Spanish-German consular treaty of February 22, 1870. U. S. For. Rel., 1895, II, 1210 and 1212; Mr. Speed, Attorney-General, June 26, 1866, 11 Op. Attys.-Gen. 508.

It is stated in the Regulations of the Consular Service of the United States, 1896, paragraph 78, that in those countries, which are specified, with whom the United States has entered into consular treaties containing the most-favored nation clause, “consuls of the, United States are entitled to claim as full rights and privileges as have been granted to consuls of other nations.”

But see Mr. Buchanan, Secretary of State, to the Chevalier Hülsemann, May 18, 1846, MS. Notes to German States, VI, 130; Moore, Int. Law Dig., V, 261 Google Scholar. Also note, Mr. Hay, Secretary of State, to Mr. Wolcott, U. S. S., February 3, 1900, 242, MS. Dom. Let., 522; Moore, , Int. Law Dig., V, 123 Google Scholar.

27 “Engagements of extradition, whether of fugitives from justice or from service, stand in each case on particular stipulations of treaty, and are not to be inferred from the ‘favoured-nation’ clause in treaties.” Moore, , Int. Law Dig., V, 311 Google Scholar, citing Cushing, Attorney-General, October 14, 1863, 6 Op. Attys.-Gen. 148, 156.

28 The James and William, 37 Ct. Cl. 303.

29 Olsen v. Smith (1904), 195 U. S. 332, 344.