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The Growth of Purpose in the Law of Diplomatic Immunity

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 April 2017

Montell Ogdon
Montell Ogdon*
Affiliation:
Texas Technological College
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Extract

The protection of unhampered and free exercise of the diplomatic function was recognized as one of the fundamental purposes of the law of diplomatic immunity in the Havana Convention of 1928, and in the Draft Convention of the Harvard Research Committee, 1932. The idea is not a new one—it has long been considered necessary that the channels of intercourse between States be made secure. Even before the political institutions of man began to play an important role in the life of peoples, nations or tribes recognized that it was necessary to treat with each other and guarantee security to messengers in order to advance their mutual interests. The history of the juristic philosophy of diplomatic immunity indicates that there are three periods of development in which the protection of the diplomatic function was deemed to be the purpose of the law, viz., (a) in antiquity, particularly in the universal law of Greece and Rome; (b) in the philosophy of the law-of-nature school, from the twelfth century to the seventeenth; (c) in the precedents of the modern Statessystem and the views of positivist writers, especially since the seventeenth century

Type
Research Article
Information
American Journal of International Law , Volume 31 , Issue 3 , July 1937 , pp. 449 - 465
Copyright
Copyright © American Society of International Law 2012

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References

1 See Report of the Delegates of the United States of America to the Sixth International Conference of American States, held at Habana, Cuba, Jan. 16 to Feb. 20,1928 (Washington, 1928), Appendix 11, Sec. iv, Art. 15, p. 206; Supplement to this JouRNAL, Vol. 26 (1932), p. 19; also the Comment, pp. 26, 88.

2 When a messenger from a hostile tribe is given an audience and granted freedom to return to his camp, for the purpose of permitting inter-tribal communication, the relationship between the purpose of immunity and the diplomatic function becomes apparent. Cf. Ward, Robert, An Enquiry into the Foundation and History of the Law of Nations in Europe (London, 1795), II, 477–478. Lisboa, Henri C. R., “Exterritorialite et immunity des agents diplomatiques,” Revue de Droit International et de Legislation Comparee, 2e sor. (1899), I, 354,355. See Carlo Nardi-Greco, Sociologia giuridica (Turin, 1907), Ch. VIII, especially Sec. 7, for a learned discussion of the facts necessary and sufficient for the rise and persistence of jural phenomena. Tr. by John, H. Wigmore, reprinted in Evolution of Law Series (Select Readings on the Origin and Development of Legal Institutions), Vol. III, Formative Influences of Legal Development (Boston, 1918), Ch. V, “Causes for the Variation of Jural Phenomena in General,” p. 193 Google Scholar.

3 For examples of numerous ancient embassies in which man realized the reciprocal advantages and mutual interests of granting immunity see Ogdon, Montell, Juridical Bases of Diplomatic Immunity (Washington, D. C., 1936), Sec. 6, “Why the Ancients Granted Immunity,” pp. 10–20.

4 The History of Rome by Titus Livius, tr. by G., Baker (Philadelphia, 1839), Vol. I, Book I, Ch. XXXII, p. 40 Google Scholar; Zouche, Richard, A Dissertation concerning the Punishment of Ambassadors (London, 1717), 83; Gentili, Alberico, De legationibus libri fres, 1594 (New York, 1924), II, 31; Ayala, Balthazar, De jure et officiis bellicis et disciplina militari, 1582 (Washington, 1912), II, 88.

5 Strabo quoted Eratosthenes, who reprimanded the Persians because they “were treacherous guides and conducted the ambassadors along circuitous and difficult ways,” Book XVII, Ch. I, Sec. 19. For the literal translation quoted here, see The Geography of Strabo, tr. by H., C. Hamilton Google Scholar and W., Falconer (London, 1857), Vol. III, p. 240. Livy, op. cit., Vol. I, Book I, Ch. XIV, p. 27 Google Scholar.

In the early epochs of Indian history the minister and his suite were exempt from local jurisdiction. It was held that a monarch should never slay an envoy under any circumstance; a king who slew an envoy sank with all his ministers into hell; the minister, be he good or bad, being sent by others to represent their cause, did not deserve death. Viswanatha, S. V., International Law in Ancient India (Bombay, 1925), 29-30, 64-89.

The Egyptians clothed the functions of ambassadors with a religious character, and were thought by some to have possessed a written code upon the subject, which Pythagoras was said to have introduced into Greece. See Phillimore, Sir Robert, Commentaries upon International Law (London, 3rd ed., 1882), II, 191.

For examples of embassies, and sacred treatment thereof, among the Greeks, see Gentili, op. cit., Book I, Chs. XVII-XVIII, 42-46; Phillipson, Coleman, The International Law and Custom of Ancient Greece and Rome (London, 1911), I, 328, 329; Phillimore, op. cit., II, 191.

6 Gentili, op. cit., II, 58.

7 Livy, op. cit., Vol. I, Book I, Ch. XIV, p. 27; Book IX, Ch. IV, p. 321.

8 Thus, Gentili, after these and a number of other citations, said that these facts had been so thoroughly established and so well known that one of the oldest proverbs was said to have been that “An ambassador is neither killed nor outraged.” Op. cit., II, 58.

9 “Sic serdio, jus Legatorum cum hominum prcesiclio munitum, tum etiam divine jure esse vallatum.” De haruspicum responsis, quoted by Rachel, Samuel, De jure naturce et gentium dissertationes, 1676 (Washington, 1916), I, 283; II, 191.

“Legatorum jus divino humanogue vallatum prcesidio, cujus tarn sanctum et venerabile nomen esse debet, ut non solum inter sociorum Jura, sed etiam et hostiurn tela,,incolume versatur.” In Verrem, III, quoted by Phillimore, Commentaries, 3rd ed., op. cit., II, 218; also, Rachel, op. cit., I, 283; II, 191.

10 See Ayala, op. cit., II, 89, citing Valerius Maximus, a Roman historian of the reign of Tiberius, first century A.D.

11 For this and other cases, see Zouche, Punishment of Ambassadors, op. cit., 38-41; Zouche, Juries et judicii feciadis, sive juris inter gentes, et quaestionum de eodem explicatio, 1650, tr. by J. L. Brierly (Washington, 1911), Vol. II, p. 100; Ayala, op. cit., II, p. 89.

12 Zouche, Punishment of Ambassadors, op. cit., 28.

13 This provision of the Corpus Juris Civilis, is as follows:

Liber Quinquagesimus, VII De legationibus, 18 (17). Pomponius libro trigensimo septimo ad Quintum Mucium Si quis legatum hostium pulsasset, contra ius gentium id commissum esse existimatur, quia sancti habentur legatum. et ideo si, cum legati apud nos essent geniis alicuius, bellum cum eis indicturn sit, responsum est liberos manere: id enim iuri gentium convent esse. itaque eum, qui legatum putsasset, Quintus Mucius dedi hostibus, quorum erant legati, solitus est respondere… .

See the Corpus Iuris Civilis ed. of Paulus Krueger and Theodorus Mommsen (Berlin, 1928), I, p. 903; Les Cinquante Libres du Digeste ou Des Pandectes de l’Empereur Justinien, tr. into French by Hulot and Berthelot (Metz, Paris, 1805), Vol. VII, p. 566.

14 Idem.

15 Corpus luris Civilis, op. cit., V, I, 25; Bynkershoek, Cornelius van, Traite du Juge Competent des Ambassadeurs (The Hague, 1723), 60; Textor, Synopsis juris gentium, tr. by John, Pawley Bate Google Scholar, ed. by James, Brown Scott (Washington, 1916), Vol. II, 147Google Scholar. The text of the Digest reads as follows: “Si legatianis tern pore quis servum vel aliam rem emerit, ant ex alia causa possidere coeperit, non inique cogetur ejus nomine juclicium accipere: aliter enim potestas dabitur legatis, sub hac specie, res aliens domum auferendi.”

16 “Sed si postulatur in rem actio adversus legatum, numquid danda sit, quoniam ex prtesenti possession hcec actio est? Cassius respondit, sic servandum, ut si subducatur ministerium ei, non sit concedenda actio: si vero, ex multis servis, de uno agatur, non sit inhibenda… .” Corpus Iuris Civilis, op. cit., V, I, 24; Bynkershoek, op. cit., 64.

17 Idem. “Julianus, sine distinctions denegandam actionem. Merito: ideo enim non datur actio, ne ab officio suscepto legationis avocetur.”

18 This was true even though the legate had made the contract at the place of the legation, or had entered into an agreement to pay debts antedating the legation, unless in the latter

case he had added that he would pay at the place of the legation. The Digest set forth the law as follows:

… Legatis in eo quod ante legationem contraxerunt, item his qui testimonii causa evocati sunt, vel si qui iudicandi causa arcessiti sunt, vel in provinciam destinati, revocandi domum suam ius datur…. V, I, 2, 3.

Omnes autem isti domum revocant, si non ibi contraxerunt, ubi conveniuntur. ceterum si contraxerunt ibi, revocandi ius non habent: exceptis legatis, qui licet ibi contraxerunt dummodo ante legationem contraxerunt, non compelluntur se Romce defendere, quamdiu legationis causa hic demorantur. quod et Julianus scribit et divus Pius rescripsit. plane si perfecta legation subsistant, conveniendos eos divus Pius rescripsit. V, I, 2, 4.

19 Zouuche, Richard, Juris et judicii fecialis, op. cit., II, 21. Walker, Thomas, Alfred, A History of the Law of Nations (Cambridge, 1899), I, 114–115, citing Eginhard, Vita et Gesta Karoli Magni (Cologne, 1521), 20; Eginhard, Annales Regum Francorum Pipini, Karoli (Ludovici), passim; Conde, J. A., Arabs in Spain, II, 71; Ockley, Simon, History of the Saracens (Cambridge, 1757), I, 203Google Scholar.

20 Walker, op. cit., I, 115.

For the full text of an early letter of safe-conduct see the Salmis Conductus Eduardi IV Regis Anglia pro Ambassiatoribus Christierni I, 27 Tu/ii 1473, in the Corps Universe/ Diplomatique du Droit des Gens, by J. Dumont (Amsterdam, 1726), Tome III, Pt. I, 459. The so-called salvia conductus was an order issued by a sovereign to all dignitaries, officers and private persons under his jurisdiction, requesting special protection to the ambassador, to specified members of his suite and to a limited number of horses, etc.

21 See quotations from same in Nys, Ernest, Les Origins du Droit International (Brussels, 1894), 339.

22 Idem: “.le to dy ainsi que de droit escript, lea ambassadeurs ou legaulx ont partout privilege d’aler aeurement eulx et leurs chases et, depuis que au roy vont, n’appartient a nul homme des siens lee empeschier.” Christine de Pisan, Le lime des faits d’armes et de chevalerie.

23 De Jure Gentium et Naturali, Commentaries on St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Secunda Secundce, Quest. 57, Art. 3, tr. by Francis Crane Macken. Appendix E, James Brown Scott, Francisco de Vitoria and His Law of Nations (Oxford, 1934), cxiii

24 See De Legatis et Legationibus Tractatus Varii, ed. by Hrabar, Vladimir E. (Dorpat, 1906), 104-112.

He further explained his view as follows: “… it y a une vicissitude et revolution necessaires en toutes chows, consequemment aussi de la paix et de la. guerre, qui noun y force et contraint le plus souvent. Or, pour y parvenir, it estoit done tres necessaire que ceux, lesquels au milieu des armees et entre le feu et le sang, iroient et viendroient d’un party a autre pour traicter et manier cette paix, eussent telle surete et privilege qu’on ne les peust toucher ne violer non plus que les saincts et sacrez dieux. Autrement qui voudroit entreprendre charge si dangereuse?” Quoted from L’ordre, formalite et instruction iudiciaire, I, Pt. 4, no. 12, p. 72, by Nys, Ernest, op. cit., 347–348.

25 Brierly, J. L., The Law of Nations (Oxford, 1928), 19.

26 De Legationibus, op. cit., II, 57, 58, 96.

27 De jure belli ac pacis, libri tres, tr, from the 1646 edition by Francis, W. Kelsey with the collaboration of othersGoogle Scholar, ed. by James, Brown Scott (Oxford, 1925), Vol. II, p. 55, referring to II Samuel, XGoogle Scholar.

28 It is deemed advisable therefore, to quote the pertinent extracts from the De jure belli ac pads, as found in an authentic translation rather than to endeavor to paraphrase a statement. It is apparent from the statement of Grotius that he was familiar with the unsettled condition of the law and also the diverse opinions of the writers. In the first quarter of the seventeenth century, the greater one’s knowledge in respect to diplomatic immunities, the more perplexed he must have been. No doubt Grotius had some difficulty in dealing with this problem.

29 Op. cit., Book 2, Ch. XVIII, Vol. II, pp. 442–443.

30 Elementorum Jurieprudentioe Universalie Libri duo,tr. of the 1672 edition by William Abbott Oldfather, ed. by James, Brown Scott (Oxford, 1931), II, 166Google Scholar.

31 Op. cit., Ch. XIV, 135.

32 Wicquefort, The Embassador and his Functions (tr. by Digby, London, 1716), Ch. I, 2.

33 Idem, Ch. XXVII, 246.

34 Since, in the Roman law, the same underlying principles of sanctity protected both ambassador and provincial legate, writers of the sixteenth century could state quite correctly the simple rules on inviolability of diplomatic representatives. For example, Frederic de Marselaer said: “The sacred law of nations provides that a legate should be safe and inviolate even in the garrison of the enemy…. The legate is sacred among all peoples. Hence, if anyone perpetrates anything against the security of them it is a crime against the sovereign.” Equitis Legatus Libri Duo (Antwerp, 1626), Dissertation xiii, “Inviolability,” p. 259.

35 He said: “… during the period of their ambassadorship, they possess, with reference to obligations contracted before their ambassadorship, the right of ’summons at home,’ that is, of a postponement of trial until they return home at the close of their mission. The case is different if they have contracted obligations during their ambassadorship, for then they undergo trial in the country in which they hold that office. Otherwise ambassadors would be given the opportunity, by such immunity from prosecution, of carrying home the property of others…. The reason for suit against them not being allowed is to prevent their being called away from their duties as ambassadors once they have assumed them. For the same reason suit for entrance upon an inheritance is not allowed against an ambassador, lest he be hampered in the performance of his office. The same is true of suits brought by testamentary and hereditary creditors, though the ambassador is compelled to post securities until his return. If, however, he should be unwilling to give security, they will be admitted to possession of the inherited property. For what is to hinder an ambassador’s performing his public office while the plaintiffs are in possession, as guardians, of the inherited property?” Doled, Stephani (Galli aurelii Liber unus), De officio legati, De immunitate legatorum, De legationibus Joannis Langiachi (Apia Steph. Doletum, Lugduni, 1541), “De immunitate legatorum,” 21-30; tr. by Prof. James E. Dunlap, printed in this JotraNAL, Vol. 27 (1933), pp. 91–95. Compare these words with those of the Digest, supra, notes 15 and 18.

36 See Tractatus de Legato, in Vol. XIII, pt. II, Tractatum Universi Juris, Venetiis, 1584, foil. 278v.-280v., Quaestio V, reprinted in De legatis et legationibus tractatus varii, ed. by Vladimir, E. Hrabar (Dorpat, 1906), pp. 59, 61 Google Scholar.

37 Op. cit., II, 106. Again, compare with the Digest, supra, note 15.

38 This summary is a condensed version of that stated and rejected by Zouche, Punishment of Ambassadors (London, 1717), Ch. IX, pp. 88–93.

39 “Si ung legat sur son chemin commettoit aucun delft, it seroit Bien tenu pour celui de respondre en jugement.” Quoted by M. de Maulde-la-Claviere, La diplomatie au temps de Machiavel (Paris, 1892), 36, from L’Arbre des batailles by Bonet.

40 M. de Maulde-la-Claviere, op. cit., 36, citing Bergenroth, Calendar of letters, despatches … preserved in the Archives at Simancas, I, XXIX.

41 4 Coke’s Institutes of the Laws of England (London, 1644), p. 153. Also, in the middle of the sixteenth century, quoting from Procopius, Conrad Brunus (in De legationibus, Mainz, 1548, Book IV, Ch. I, p. 160) and Jean Hotman (in De la charge et dignite de l’ambassadeur, 2nd ed., London, 1604, fo. 67b) reached the conclusion that immunity did not give the ambassador license to commit crimes against the State, and if he did, he could be punished therefor. For these references and quotations from Brunus and Hotma,n, see E. R. Adair’s excellent historical account in The Exterritoriality of Ambassadors in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries (London, 1929), pp. 16, 21.

42 Grotius, Hugo, De jure belli ac pools libri tres, tr. from the 1646 edition by Francis, W. Kelsey, ed. by James Brown Scott (Oxford, 1925), II, 448–449.Google Scholar

43 Traité du Juge Compétent des Ambassadeurs (The Hague, 1723), 168. Grotius, Wicquefort and Bynkershoek were all cited in the elaborate memorandum upon the Rights of Ambassadors drawn up by the jurisconsult, M. Pfefel, for the French Minister, le Duo d’AiguilIon, in 1772 in the case of Baron de Wrech. For text of the famous declaration see Martens, Ch. de, Causes célèbres du droit de gens (2 vols., Leipzig, 1827), T. II, pp. 110–121.

44 Las Siete Partidas, tr. and notes by Samuel Parsons Scott (Chicago, 1931), p. 1441.Professor Ernest Nye, the noted Belgian jurist, who made an extensive study in Le Droit d’ Ambassarle jusgu’a Grotius, declared that Alphonso X of Castile, in the 13th century, copied the Roman law into the Siete Partidas. As Professor Nys pointed out, the legati differed from the ambassadors of the law of nations; the Roman official referred to was not sent to a foreign country, but was delegated to some province or city within the empire. Conversely, the legati sent to Rome were not envoys from a foreign State, but were only the representatives from a distant part of the Roman Empire subject to its own sovereignty. Nys, Ernest, Revue de Droit International et de Legislation Comparée, XVI, 170.

45 The Spanish ambassador at Venice in 1601 defended the Spanish officer of justice who in that year entered by force into the quarters of the French ambassador resident at Valladolid and carried away to prison some of the servants and the ambassador’s nephew with the design of having them tried. He said that an ambassador, though he be remitted to his natural judge for his actions before he undertook his embassy, yet he is obliged to answer before the judge resident upon the place, for that which befalls him after the beginning of his embassy. See Wicquefort, op. cit., p. 249.

The substance of the provisions of Las Siete Partidas were incorporated into a later Spanish statute. See Clunet, Journal du Droit International Prime et de la Jurisprudence Comparée, 1884, 332, reference by Dr. Slatin to the Spanish law, Recopilación de leyes, t. ix, tit. 31, sec. 7; also, Genet, Raoul, Traité de dipknnatie et de droit diplomatigue (Paris, 1931), I, 572.

46 For the case of Smith and Throgmorton, Ambassadors of Queen Elizabeth to France, 1564, see M. de Flassan, Histoire générale et raisonnee de la diplomatie fran.caise (Paris, 1811), T. II, 73. For the above case, and also case of Randolph and Tamworth in Scotland, see Zouche, Punishment of Ambassadors, op. cit., 74.

47 See Walker, Thomas Alfred, A History of the Law of Nations (Cambridge, 1899), I, 179. Carlo Pasquali, long an official of the French Government, in 1598 observed that while justice might demand trial of a guilty ambassador, it was recognized from the standpoint of policy and prudence that the practicable way was to refrain from both trial and punishment; Legatos (Rouen, 1598), 422–425; Adair, op. cit., 21–22. Though Jean Hotman in 1603, on the Roman law basis, reasoned that the ambassador should be liable for the punishment of certain crimes, he thought it perhaps the more practicable to turn the envoy over to his principal, who could be counted upon to administer justice in the case. De la charge et dignité de l’ambassadeur (2nd ed., London, 1603), fo. 70b–71b; Adair, op. cit., 21.

48 Hotman, Jean, De la charge et dignite de l’ambassadeur (4th ed., 1616), quoted by Ernest Nys, in the Introduction to De legationibus libri tres by Alberico Gentili, op. cit., II, 21a–22a.

49 The words of the text are from Sir Cecil J. B. Hurst, “Diplomatic Immunities—Modern Developments,” 3, reprinted from The British Year Book of International Law, 1929 (Oxford University Press, London, etc., 1929). Also see Walker, op. cit., 180, and Adair, op. cit., 90–91.

50 Adair, op. cit., 25, citing Harleian Manuscripts in the British Museum, 304, folios 40–41. Certain other notable positivists of the period, namely, Gentili, Marselaer and Zouche, had still greater difficulty in trying to state the law on the subject. See Gentili, De Legationibus Libri Tres, op. cit., Chs. XVII and XVIII, pp. 108–114. After citing a limited number of ancient cases, and one Venetian case, Gentili said: “Why should I mention other cases? If it is permissible for the sovereign to make laws for the ambassador which do not impair the right of embassy, why should he not be permitted to enact a penalty for those who have broken the laws?” Idem, p. 109.

51 Grotius, Hugo, De jure belli ac pads libri tree, op. cit., II, 442.

52 De jure naturae et gentium dissertationes (appearing in Kiel, 1676), tr. by John Pawley Bate (Washington, 1916), II, 196.

53 Op. cit., p. 146.

54 The cases cited were as follows: The Bishop of Ross, agent and ambassador of the Queen of the Scots, Camden’s Eliz. sub anno 1571, p. 164, 165, 370; Mendoza, the Spanish ambassador, sub anno 27 Eliz., Camden’s Eliz., p. 296; Lord L’Aubespine, French ambassador, Camden’s Eliz. sub anno 1587, pp. 378, 379. See Historia Placitorum Coronce (The History of the Pleas of the Crown), Hale, Sir Matthew (London, 1736), pp. 97–98.